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Abstract 
 
Grounded-embodied theories hold that language is understood and remembered through 
perceptual and motor simulations (i.e., activations and re-activations of sensorimotor 
experiences). This thesis aims to illustrate simulations of space in memory for language. In 
four experiments, we explored (1) how individuals encode and re-activate word locations and 
(2) how word meanings activate locations in space (e.g., “bird” - upward location). In the first 
part of the thesis (Experiment 1 and 2), we addressed the potential simulation of word locations 
by probing eye movements during memory retrieval (i.e., “looking at nothing”). In particular, 
we investigated why and when individuals need to rely on external memory support via 
simulation of word locations. Experiment 1 results reveal that the propensity to refer to the 
environment during retrieval correlates with individual’s visuospatial memory capacity. That 
is, participants with worse visuospatial memory relied more on the environment; whereas, 
participants with better visuospatial memory relied more on the internal memory sources. 
Experiment 2 shows that words which are more difficult to remember and, particularly, words 
that are more difficult to visualise in mind lead to more reliance on the environment during 
word retrieval. Experiment 1 and 2 suggest that the opportunistic and efficient human mind 
switches between internal sources and external support as a function of the richness of internal 
sources and cognitive demands coming from the words to be remembered. The second part of 
the thesis (Experiment 3 and 4), focuses on spatial simulations triggered directly by words (i.e., 
language-based simulations). Experiment 3 is a norming study in which raters were asked to 
associate words with locations in space. Experiment 3 results demonstrate that there is a high 
degree of agreement among individuals when linking both concrete and abstract words to 
locations in space although there are no explicit conventions with regard to these associations. 
Ratings in Experiment 3 indicate potential locations of word-induced simulations. Normed 
words were used as stimuli in Experiment 4 in which recognition memory for words with 
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spatial associations was probed. Experiment 4 results show that both language-based 
simulation of space and simulation of word locations dictate memory performance even if 
space is irrelevant and unnecessary for successful retrieval. In particular, words that were 
presented in incongruent locations as to the locations they imply (e.g., “bird” in a downward 
location) were remembered faster than words presented in congruent locations (e.g., “bird” in 
an upward location). Memory performance deteriorated whenever attention was shifted to the 
locations simulated with word meanings. Overall, the thesis specifies the mechanics of two 
different types of spatial simulation in language and their effects on memory. Results and their 
implications are discussed within the framework of grounded-embodied approaches to 
language and memory and the extended cognition. 
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Chapter 1   
 
Introduction 
  
 2 
1.1 Statement of Research Question 
 
The link between space, language and memory is one of the most intriguing topics is cognitive 
psychology. Decades of evidence has showed that language provides us with a framework to 
materialise and structure the relatively abstract notion of space (Bloom, Garrett, Nadel, & 
Peterson, 1996; Carlson-Radvansky & Logan, 1997; Majid, Bowerman, Kita, Haun, & 
Levinson, 2004; Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976; Talmy, 1983). Thus, language influences how 
people perceive, think about and remember space (Levinson, 2003). The blooming fields of 
grounded-embodied cognition and the extended mind thesis have redefined the space-
language-memory network and rekindled an interest about space with a novel perspective. 
Once seen as a central processing machine contained in the skull, the mind is now viewed as 
more of an interactive architecture extending onto the body and space. In accordance, 
burgeoning evidence suggests that space is not only a content but also a “medium” for language 
and memory (Mix, Smith, & Gasser, 2010). Memories can be indexed, and abstract thoughts 
can be grounded in space. Further, comprehending language can give rise to non-linguistic, 
spatial experiences. Despite the abundance of demonstrative experiments, how spatial 
perception and cognition influence language and memory operations is yet to be defined. To 
this end, the present thesis explores robust, systematic and often surprising ways that space is 
involved in memory for language. In particular, this thesis is an attempt to define and 
systematise different characteristics of spatial engagements during retrieval of words from 
memory. Thereby, it aims to contribute to the understanding of the effect of space on memory 
for language. 
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1.2 Definition of Concepts 
 
The key concepts examined in the present work are defined in this section. Thereby, the scope 
of the thesis is outlined.  
 
1.2.1 Spatial indexing 
 
The human mind can anchor spatially-located information to external spatial locations. Simply 
put, the location of a visual item is encoded with the item itself. This behaviour is called as 
spatial indexing. Marr (1982) was among the first to argue that the visual system separates 
locations from visual features (what vs. where). He introduced the term place token to refer to 
representations of location. A place token indexes the locations of visual information at the 
early stages of visual processing. Pylyshyn (1989) operationalised the phenomenon of spatial 
indexing in an exhaustive model termed FINST. The model assumes that spatial indexing is a 
primitive, that is pre-attentive or a pre-cognitive mechanism, which precedes “higher” visual 
operations such as recognition of patterns. But importantly, spatial indices allow for stability 
of visual information by constructing stable representations of locations in a constantly 
changing visual world. Hence, an index keeps pointing to the same location even if the visual 
pattern moves across the retina. According to the model, therefore, spatial indexing is different 
from merely encoding the position of a feature because a spatial index makes it possible to 
locate the visual stimulus for further examination when the necessity arises (see also Ballard, 
Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao, 1997). In a similar vein, Coslett (1999) proposes a spatial registration 
hypothesis. This hypothesis assumes that “all stimuli, even if not relevant to the task at hand, 
are automatically marked with respect to spatial location in egocentric coordinate systems” (p. 
703). Registering a location entails the creation of a marker that specifies the coordinate of an 
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object in relation with the other objects in the environment. According to spatial registering 
hypothesis, spatial indexing is limited with the capacity of visual attention. 
 
1.2.2 Looking at nothing 
 
Consider the following situation: You are in the middle of a maths exam, trying to solve a 
problem. The problem you engage requires the application of a formula that you fail to 
remember at that point. However, you remember that the instructor has previously used the 
blackboard to explain the formula in one of the classes. You remember that she has written the 
formula on the top left corner of the board. Of course, the blackboard has already been cleaned 
and is totally blank now. Still, you raise your head in the hope of a sudden recall and look at 
the previous, but now-blank location of the formula. You have just looked at “nothing” (Spivey 
& Geng, 2000). Obviously, there is nothing on the board. What you are looking at is the spatial 
indice that represents the previous but now-blank location of the formula. In this respect, 
looking at nothing is a memory-guided behaviour. Your eyes have been oriented to the previous 
location of the formula because you have attempted to remember it. To be more precise, spatial 
indices tied to external visual and verbal information trigger eye movements when a mental 
representation is reactivated. Thus, when retrieving information from memory, people tend to 
exploit location-based indices and look at the seemingly uninformative, empty locations where 
the information originally occurred even if the location is irrelevant to the task. Looking at 
nothing follows spatial indexing in a typical memory task with encoding and retrieval stages. 
Individuals are expected to index the location of the information at encoding. Then, they are 
expected to look at the previous locations of the to-be-retrieved information during retrieval. 
A considerable number of empirical studies has documented looking at nothing (e.g., Altmann, 
2004; Richardson & Kirkham, 2004; Richardson & Spivey, 2000; Spivey & Geng, 2000). The 
link between mental representations and looking behaviour (de Groot, Huettig, & Olivers, 
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2016; Ferreira, Apel, & Henderson, 2008; Martarelli, Chiquet, Laeng, & Mast, 2017; O’Regan, 
1992; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012; D. C. Richardson, Altmann, Spivey, & Hoover, 2009; D. C. 
Richardson & Spivey, 2000; Scholz, Mehlhorn, & Krems, 2011; Wantz, Martarelli, & Mast, 
2015) and whether looks to blank locations improve memory (Johansson, Holsanova, 
Dewhurst, & Holmqvist, 2012; Johansson & Johansson, 2014; Scholz, Klichowicz, & Krems, 
2018; Scholz, Mehlhorn, & Krems, 2016) have received much attention in looking at nothing 
research. 
 
1.2.3 Simulation 
 
In grounded-embodied cognition, a simulation is defined as a partial activation or reactivation 
of an original perceptual, motor, affective or introspective experience (Barsalou, 1999). A 
simulation can occur in the absence (offline) or upon the perception (online) of the original 
stimulus. A large body of neural and behavioural evidence indicates that major segments of 
cognition such as mental imagery, memory, language comprehension, consciousness, expertise 
and several cognitive performances such as facial mimicry, gesturing, reasoning and problem 
solving rely on simulations (see Dijkstra & Post, 2015; Hesslow, 2011; Körner, Topolinski, & 
Strack, 2016; Wilson, 2002 for reviews). The current thesis focuses on offline and online 
simulations of space in memory for language. 
Perceptual symbols lie at the heart of simulation mechanism as they make it possible the 
(re)activation of sensorimotor experiences (Barsalou, 1999). Perceptual symbols are mental 
representations that represent conceptual knowledge in the mind. Crucially, perceptual 
symbols are represented in the same system as the perceptual states that produced them 
(Barsalou, 1999, p. 578). As a result, they reflect physical and thus, perceptual characteristics 
of the referents they stand for, and represent continuous, rich and multimodal 
phenomenological experience. That said, perceptual symbols “partly” represent their referents 
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rather than being similar to “high-resolution video-clips” or “high-fidelity sound clips” 
(Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002). Based on these features, perceptual symbols are 
fundamentally different from physical symbols (Newell, 1980) asserted within the 
computational theories of mind (Fodor, 1975; Haugeland, 1985; Newell & Simon, 1976; 
Putnam, 1960). In contrast to perceptual symbols, physical symbols are amodal, abstract and 
discrete units. That is, they do not reflect the perceptual modality of or do not resemble to the 
physical entities that they refer to as in 1 and 0’s in a computation environment (Harnad, 1990; 
Pylyshyn, 1986). 
 
Offline simulation 
 
Consider that you need to remember a piece of conceptual information about cats (e.g., “What 
does a cat sound like?”). According to grounded-embodied cognition, in such a case, the human 
mind relies on the reactivation of perceptual, motor, affective or introspective experiences that 
are formed during previous interactions with a cat (e.g., how soft its fur is, how it smells, how 
you feel when you stroke it etc.). However, these experiences or states are not reinstated exactly 
on later occasions and “different contexts may distort activations of the original 
representations” (Barsalou, 1999, p. 584). Offline simulations have a situated character 
(Barsalou, 2003). For instance, they represent specific cats in specific situations rather than 
representing generic knowledge about cats. You might have noticed that remembering a piece 
of information about cats in the way described above bear similarities with remembering the 
location of a maths formula. In the latter case, the individual encodes conceptual information 
(the formula) along with a spatio-perceptual experience (perceiving the location of the formula 
on the blackboard). Later, when she needs to access the conceptual information through 
memory retrieval, she reactivates the perceptual experience associated with it. In other words, 
she “re-lives” the perceptual experience that she has during the encoding of the conceptual 
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information. On this ground, looking at nothing can be understood as a reflection of spatial 
simulation that takes place in the absence of the original stimulus. 
 
Online simulation  
 
Perceptual, motor, affective or introspective experiences can be activated whenever an 
individual perceives a stimulus. For example, merely viewing a graspable object such as a cup, 
a knife or a frying pan simulates the potential act of grasping. In turn, brain regions associated 
with motor movements are activated (Chao & Martin, 2000; Tucker & Ellis, 1998). Similarly, 
remembering a Japanese kanji character stimulates motor activity in the areas that would be 
activated when actually writing the characters (Kato et al., 1999; Topolinski & Strack, 2009). 
Merely listening to words that involve strong tongue movements when pronounced such as 
“birra” (beer in Italian) or “ferro” (iron in Italian) activates tongue muscles (Fadiga, Craighero, 
Buccino, & Rizzolatti, 2002). Language comprehension gives rise to simulations in this manner 
(see Chapter 2.1.3). 
To summarise, the fundamental difference between an offline and an online simulation is 
the existence of an external stimulus at the time of the simulation. An offline simulation is a 
recreation of previous sensorimotor activations without any stimulus when the stimulus is re-
accessed. An online simulation is a sensorimotor activation upon the perception of a stimulus 
(see Chapter 2.1 for further clarification with examples). 
There are other instances of a simulation mechanism in cognitive psychology. In social 
cognition, for instance, attributing mental states to others as in “mind reading” (i.e., theory of 
mind) (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Premack & Woodruff, 1978) is thought to be a simulation 
based on mirror neurons that are activated merely by observing others (Caggiano et al., 1996; 
Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996). This aspect of simulations is beyond the scope 
of the current thesis despite the possible overlaps between theory of mind and mental 
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simulations (Shanton & Goldman, 2010). Likewise, simulation within the context of this thesis 
does not refer to computer-based simulations. 
 
1.2.4 Cognitive offloading 
 
Cognitive agents can perform physical actions to outsource their cognitive work to the body 
and the world with the aim of reducing cognitive load (Wilson, 2002). This behaviour is called 
as cognitive offloading (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). Making a shopping list instead of keeping 
items to buy in your mind is a typical example of such behaviour. Cognitive offloading is 
treated as a fundamental mechanism of extended cognition, which posits that there is not a 
strict border between the mind and the world with the mind “leaking” into the world in 
surprising ways (A. Clark, 1998; A. Clark & Chalmers, 1998). 
Cognition can be extended to different body parts during several cognitive problems such 
as using hands in finger-counting (Butterworth, 2005) and co-speech gestures1 in 
communication (see Goldin-Meadow & Wagner, 2005; Pouw, de Nooijer, van Gog, Zwaan, & 
Paas, 2014 for reviews). Cognitive work can be offloaded directly onto the world as well. In 
particular, people can exploit their immediate space in an intelligent way to reduce their 
cognitive load. In such a case, space becomes a resource that must be managed, much like time 
or energy (Kirsh, 1995). For example, Kirsh and Maglio (1994) showed that in Tetris, 
participants solve perceptual and cognitive problems (e.g., judging whether a geometric piece 
can fit into a specific position) in the space by physically rotating the pieces on the screen rather 
than in their minds which would require mental rotation. 
Cognitive offloading with eye movements is a special case in which both body (via eye 
movements) and environment are used at the same time. In a seminal study, for instance, 
                                                             
1 Note that cognitive offloading is only one suggested use of co-speech gestures. Co-speech 
gestures are assumed to play other roles as well (Goldin-Meadow, 1999). 
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Hayhoe, Bensinger and Ballard (1998) asked participants to copy a pattern of coloured blocks 
on a computer screen. Participants had to use a mouse to drag scrambled blocks from the source 
window to an empty workspace window. The colour of blocks in the pattern was changed at 
different points during the task. Results showed that participants launched frequent fixations 
to the original pattern when they were copying it into the workspace window rather than 
keeping the original pattern in mind. In this respect, looking at nothing can be conceptualised 
as a type of cognitive offloading in which eyes are used to index certain locations in space for 
subsequent use in line with information-gathering goals (Ballard et al., 1997). 
There are two important aspects of cognitive offloading. First, cognitive offloading often 
results in betterment in performance. For example, children were found to be most accurate 
when they actively gesture to count (even when using a puppet to count for them) as compared 
to internal counting (Alibali & Dirusso, 1999). Second, exploitation of body and space to 
reduce cognitive load is correlated with the cognitive demands coming from the task and 
internal, “biologic” cognitive capacity. That is, higher cognitive load and/or lower cognitive 
capacity result in more frequent cognitive offloading. For example, in Risko and Dunn (2015), 
participants were asked to remember a mixture of random letters in a traditional short-term 
memory task. They either had to rely on internal memory only or had the option to write down 
the presented information and thus, to externalise memory work. Results showed that use of 
external storage became more frequent as the number of letters in a string increased. Further, 
individual short-term memory capacity predicted the likelihood of writing down the to-be-
remembered information. The functional role of cognitive offloading and the link between 
cognitive load/capacity and the tendency of offloading indicate that there is a systematic trade-
off between internal and external processing (Schönpflug, 1986). In the face of costs of 
cognitive operations and limited cognitive sources, a successful cognitive agent seeks to “get 
the job done” in the easiest way possible by integrating internal with external processes in 
complex environments (A. Clark, 1989). 
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1.3 Overview of Thesis 
 
The current thesis investigates activations and re-activations of space in memory for language. 
It contains seven chapters (including this one). 
Chapter 2 includes the review of the literature. Chapter 2.1 focuses on the simulations in 
mental imagery, memory and language as the core mechanism of grounded-embodied 
cognition. Chapter 2.2 addresses the relation between eye movements and memory. 
Chapter 3 contains the first experimental study in the form of a paper. This study investigates 
whether individuals with better visuospatial memory relies more on space and simulation of 
word locations through looks at previous but now-blank locations when retrieving words from 
memory. 
Chapter 4 contains the second experimental study in the form of a paper. This study employs 
the experimental design developed in Chapter 3 to investigate whether words that are more 
difficult to maintain and retrieve from memory lead to more reliance on space and spatial 
simulations via looking at nothing. It also examines the contributions of word properties (e.g., 
word length, imageability, frequency etc.) to the looking behaviour and memory performance. 
Chapter 5 contains the third experimental study in the form of an article. This is a lab-based 
norming study in which participants were asked to read 1439 concrete and abstract words and 
associate them with horizontal and vertical locations on a two-dimensional coordinate system. 
Chapter 6 contains the forth experimental study in the form of a paper. This study uses 
spatially normed words from Chapter 5 to investigate how spatial locations suggested and 
simulated by word meanings affect recognition memory performance in relation with the 
physical locations of the words on the screen. 
Finally, Chapter 7 (General Discussion) summarises findings and conclusions of the 
empirical studies and discusses them in the context of the grounded-embodied and extended 
approaches to memory and language. Additionally, it includes suggestions for future work. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Theoretical Background 
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2.1 Mind, Recreated: Simulations in Imagery, 
Memory, and Language 
 
2.1.1 Mental imagery as a simulation 
 
Mental imagery is the ability to construct mental representations in the absence of external 
sensory stimulation. Thus, it is a quasi-phenomenal experience (N. J. T. Thomas, 1999, 2018a). 
That is, it resembles the actual perceptual experience but occurs when the appropriate external 
stimulus is not there. The ability to see with the “mind’s eye” without any sensory stimulation 
is a remarkable feature of the human mind. Mental imagery underlies our ability to think, plan, 
re-analyse past events or even fantasise events that may never happen (Pearson & Kosslyn, 
2013). Accordingly, mental images involve, alter or even replace the core operations of human 
cognition such as memory (Albers, Kok, Toni, Dijkerman, & De Lange, 2013; Rebecca Keogh 
& Pearson, 2011; Tong, 2013), problem-solving (Kozhevnikov, Motes, & Hegarty, 2007) 
decision-making (Tuan Pham, Meyvis, & Zhou, 2001), counter-factual thinking (Kulakova, 
Aichhorn, Schurz, Kronbichler, & Perner, 2013), reasoning (Hegarty, 2004; Knauff, 
Fangmeier, Ruff, & Johnson-Laird, 2003), numerical cognition (Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 
1993) and creativity (LeBoutillier & Marks, 2003; Palmiero et al., 2016). The human mind can 
mentally “visualise” not only visual but also nonvisual perceptions (Lacey & Lawson, 2013) 
such as auditory mental imagery (e.g., imagining the voice of a friend or a song) (Lima et al., 
2015) or motor mental imagery (e.g., mentally rehearsing a movement before actualising it) 
(Hanakawa, 2016). Mental images can arise from nonvisual modalities (particularly auditory 
or haptic) in congenitally blind individuals (Cattaneo et al., 2008). However, the literature of 
mental imagery is largely dedicated to metal imagery that is specifically visual (Tye, 1991). 
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How do we imagine? By extension, what does a mental image look like? The format of 
mental images has been extensively discussed in the 70s and 80s with two camps: pictorial 
(depictivism) and propositional (descriptivism) imagery. The pictorial position (Kosslyn, 
1973) holds that mental images are like pictures and there are spatial relations between the 
imagined objects. On the other hand, the propositional view (Pylyshyn, 1973) is that mental 
images are more like linguistic descriptions of visual scenes based on tacit knowledge about 
the world (i.e., implicit knowledge that is difficult to express explicitly such as the ability to 
ride a bike). Mental imagery under the treatment of descriptivism is more of an amodal, formal 
system. Whereas, depictivism offers a picture of mental imagery that appears more compatible 
with the mechanics of grounded-embodied cognition. However, neither of these approaches 
captures the true essence of grounded-embodied cognition because both of them depend on an 
information processing approach. In both cases, perceptual data flows inward to a passive 
cognitive agent (N. J. T. Thomas, 1999). 
On the other hand, grounded-embodied theories of cognition conceive that mental imagery 
is based on active perceptions and actions. Mental images are considered as mental 
representations reactivated through previous perceptions (Ballard et al., 1997). Consequently, 
mental imagery is a simulation itself (Barsalou, 1999). As a matter of fact, mental imagery is 
assumed to be the most typical example of the simulation mechanism in that there are certain 
similarities between the properties of a sensorimotor simulation and mental imagery 
(Markman, Klein, & Suhr, 2008): First, mental images arise from perceptual representations. 
They are formed in the absence of the original perceptual stimulation. And lastly, a mental 
image is not an exact copy of the percept but rather, a partial recreation (Kosslyn, 1980). Within 
this view, the primary function of mental imagery is to simulate reality “at will” in order to 
access previous knowledge and predict the future (i.e., mental emulation) (Moulton & Kosslyn, 
2009). 
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In order to verify that mental imagery is sensorimotor simulation, evidence showing 
similarities between perception and imagery is needed. This is indeed what the literature on 
mental imagery within the framework of grounded-embodied cognition indicates. For instance, 
an overwhelming body of neuroimaging evidence shows that similar brain regions are activated 
during perception and imagery stages (Cichy, Heinzle, & Haynes, 2012; Ganis, Thompson, & 
Kosslyn, 2004; Ishai & Sagi, 1995; Kosslyn, Thompson, & Alpert, 1997; O’Craven & 
Kanwisher, 2000). Behavioural studies further reveal the nature of the link between perception 
and imagery. As early as 1910, the psychologist Cheves Perky’s experiments showed that 
visual mental images can supress perceiving real visual targets unconsciously (i.e., the Perky 
effect) (Craver-Lemley & Reeves, 1992; Perky, 1910). In the original experiment, participants 
were asked to fixate a point on a white screen and visually imagine certain objects there such 
as a tomato, a book or a pencil etc. After a few trials, a real but a faint image (i.e., in soft focus) 
of the concerned object was projected onto the screen. Participants failed to distinguish 
between their imagined projections and the real percepts. Shortly, real images intermingled 
with the mental images. For instance, some participants reported their surprise when they 
“imagined” an upright banana rather than a horizontally oriented one they were attempting to 
imagine (N. J. T. Thomas, 2018b). The Perky effect indicates that mental imagery and visual 
perception draw on the same sources (see also Finke, 1980). 
In a similar study (Lloyd-Jones & Vernon, 2003), participants saw a word (e.g., “dog”) 
accompanied by a line drawing of that object in the perception phase. In the imagery phase, 
participants made spatial judgements about the previously shown picture. Simultaneously, a 
picture distractor appeared on the screen during mental imagery. The picture distractor was 
either unrelated to the mental image of the previously shown object (e.g., dog - strawberry) or 
conceptually related (e.g., dog - cat). Response times in the judgement task were longer when 
participants generated a mental picture along with the perception of a conceptually related 
picture but not a conceptually unrelated picture. These findings suggest that imagery and visual 
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perception share the same semantic representations. Mental images are also processed in 
similar ways as the actual images. In Borst and Kosslyn (2008), participants scanned a pattern 
of dots and then, an arrow was shown on the screen. Participants then decided whether the 
arrow pointed at a location that had been previously occupied by one of the dots. Results 
showed that the time to scan during imagery increased linearly as the distance between the 
arrow and the dots increased in perception. Further, participants who were better at scanning 
distances perceptually were also better at scanning distances across a mental image, suggesting 
the functional role of perception in mental imagery. 
Finally, eye movement studies have given considerable support to the simulation account 
of mental imagery with two key findings (see Laeng, Bloem, D’Ascenzo, & Tommasi, 2014 
for a review): First, eye movements during perception are similar to those during imagery 
(Brandt & Stark, 1997; Johansson, Holsanova, & Holmqvist, 2006). Second, the amount of 
overlap between eye movements during perception and imagery predicts the performance in 
imagery-related tasks (Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002). Eye movements in mental imagery are 
further elaborated in Chapter 2.2.3. 
 
2.1.2 Memory retrieval as a simulation 
 
A simulation account of memory views memory retrieval as a partial recreation of the past that 
often includes sensorimotor and contextual details of the original episode (see Buckner & 
Wheeler, 2001; Christophel, Klink, Spitzer, Roelfsema, & Haynes, 2017; Danker & Anderson, 
2010; Kent & Lamberts, 2008; Pasternak & Greenlee, 2005; Rugg, Johnson, Park, & Uncapher, 
2008; Xue, 2018 for comprehensive reviews and see De Brigard, 2014; Mahr & Csibra, 2018; 
Marr, 1971 for theoretical discussions). Hence, memory retrieval can be thought as a simulation 
of encoding in a similar way to mental imagery being a simulation of perception. 
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Indeed, it is known that mental imagery and memory operate on similar machinery as long 
as their perceptual modalities match (e.g., visual mental imagery - visual memory). In the 
original model of working memory, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) assumed that one function of 
the visuospatial sketchpad (i.e., the component of working memory responsible for the 
manipulation of visual information) is manipulating visual mental images. In support of this 
assumption, Baddeley and Andrade (2000) showed that visual and auditory mental imagery 
tasks disrupted visual and auditory components of working memory respectively; that is, 
visuospatial sketchpad and phonological loop (i.e., the component of working memory 
responsible for the manipulation of auditory information). Keogh and Pearson (2014) 
evidenced that individuals with stronger visual mental imagery also have greater visual 
working memory capacity but not verbal memory capacity (see also Keogh & Pearson, 2011). 
Grounded-embodied cognition takes the link between mental imagery and memory one step 
forward: Memory not only involves mental imagery, but memory is mental imagery itself. In 
accordance, encoding corresponds to perception and retrieval corresponds to imagery. In this 
respect, Albers et al. (2013) presented strong evidence that working memory and mental 
imagery share representations in the early visual cortex (V1 - V3). Further, as Buckner and 
Wheeler (2001) noted “assessments of visual mental imagery ability in patients with damage 
to visual cortex support the possibility that brain regions involved in perception are also used 
during imagery and remembering” (De Renzi & Spinnler, 1967; D. N. Levine, Warach, & 
Farah, 1985). 
Mental time travel is a striking example of the role of imagery in memory (Corballis, 2009; 
Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Szpunar, 2010). Mental 
time travel is a cognitive ability of episodic memory (i.e., conscious and explicit recollection 
of past events) and episodic future thinking through mental imagery. Thus, a mental time 
traveller can mentally project herself backwards in time to re-live (i.e., reconstruct) the past 
events and pre-live (i.e., predict) the possible future events (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). In 
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this respect, mental time travel can be considered as an intertemporal simulation (Shanton & 
Goldman, 2010). Growing evidence has shown that episodic memory and simulation of future 
by mental imagery share a core neural network (i.e., default network) (see Schacter et al., 2012 
for a review), suggesting that memory, mental imagery and thinking about future rest on the 
similar neural mechanisms. 
As in mental imagery, a simulation approach to memory underlines the correspondence 
between encoding and retrieval (Kent & Lamberts, 2008). Mounting evidence illustrates that 
common neural systems are activated both in encoding and retrieval (Nyberg, Habib, 
McIntosh, & Tulving, 2000; Wheeler, Petersen, & Buckner, 2000). Crucially, the similarity 
between neural patterns during encoding and retrieval is often predictive of how well an 
experience is remembered subsequently (see Brewer, Zhao, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1998; Wagner 
et al., 1998 for reviews). There is much evidence indicating that reinstated neural activations 
are specific to perceptual modality (visual vs. auditory), domain (memory for what - where) 
and feature (colour, motion or spatial location) (see Slotnick, 2004 for a review). For example, 
Wheeler, Petersen and Buckner (2000) gave participants a set of picture and sound items to 
study and then a recall test during which participants vividly remembered these items. Results 
demonstrated that regions of auditory and visual cortex are activated differently during retrieval 
of sounds and pictures. In a similar fashion, Goldberg, Perfetti and Schneider (2006b) asked 
participants whether a concrete word possesses a property from one of four sensory modalities 
as colour (e.g. green), sound (e.g., loud), touch (e.g., soft) or taste (e.g., sweet). Retrieval from 
semantic memory involving flavour knowledge as in the word “sweet” increased specific 
activation in the left orbitofrontal cortex which is known to process semantic comparisons 
among edible items (Goldberg, Perfetti, & Schneider, 2006a). 
A number of studies supported a simulation account of memory with retrieval dependent on 
perceptions by showing temporal overlaps between encoding and retrieval (Kent & Lamberts, 
2008). There is not a strict temporal regularity between retrieval and encoding as far as the 
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ERP evidence shows (Allan, Robb, & Rugg, 2000). However, better memory performance was 
found in serial recall when retrieval direction (forward vs. backward) matched with the order 
in which the words were encoded in the first place (J. G. Thomas, Milner, & Hanerlandt, 2003). 
More direct evidence for temporal similarity between encoding and retrieval comes from Kent 
and Lamberts (2006). Participants were instructed to retrieve different dimensions of faces such 
as eye colour, nose shape, mouth expressions etc. Results revealed that features that were 
quickly perceived were also quickly retrieved. 
In addition to the findings from the abovementioned research areas, the historical 
phenomena of state-dependent memory and context-dependent memory show that memory 
retrieval is simulation of the original event. An overlap between the internal state (e.g., mood, 
state of consciousness) or external context of the individual during encoding and retrieval leads 
to higher retrieval efficiency (S. M. Smith & Vela, 2001; Ucros, 1989). In one such study, 
Dijkstra, Kaschak and Zwaan (2007) documented faster retrieval when body positions and 
actions during retrieval of autobiographical events were similar to the body positions and 
actions in the original events compared to when body positions and actions were non-
congruent. For example, participants were faster to remember how old they were at a concert, 
if they were instructed to sit up straight in the chair and clap their hands several times during 
the retrieval. In another intriguing study (Casasanto & Dijkstra, 2010), participants were 
instructed to tell their autobiographical memories with either positive or negative valence, 
while moving marbles either upward or downward, which was an apparently meaningless 
action. However, retrieval was faster when the direction of movement was congruent with the 
valence of the emotional memory in a metaphorical way (i.e., upward for positive and 
downward for negative memories). 
Lastly, eye movements provide plentiful evidence that retrieval is perceptual recreation of 
encoding (D. C. Richardson & Spivey, 2000; Spivey & Geng, 2000) and further, these 
simulations usually predict the success of the retrieval (Johansson & Johansson, 2014; Scholz 
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et al., 2018, 2016). Eye movements in memory simulations are further elaborated in Chapter 
2.2.3. 
 
2.1.3 Simulations in language 
 
Language is one of the most influential domains in showing the centrality of simulations in 
human cognition. The claim of simulation view of language is simple: “Meaning centrally 
involves the activation of perceptual, motor, social, and affective knowledge that characterizes 
the content of utterances” (Bergen, 2007, pp. 277-278). Thus, a simulation mechanism is 
essential to comprehend and remember language. 
Switch-cost effects are a clear demonstration of perceptual and affective (re)activation in 
language. In this paradigm, participants are asked to verify whether a property (e.g., “blender”) 
corresponds to a particular target modality (e.g., “loud” in the auditory modality). The effect is 
that participants are slower to verify a property in one perceptual modality (e.g., “blender” can 
be loud - auditory modality) after verifying a property in a different modality (e.g., 
“cranberries” can be tart - gustatory modality) than after verifying a property in the same 
modality (e.g., “leaves” can rustle - auditory modality) (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 
2003). A switch-cost occurs between properties with positive and negative valence (e.g., 
“couple” can be happy, and “orphan” can be hopeless) (Vermeulen, Niedenthal, & Luminet, 
2007) and at the sentence level (e.g., “A cellar is dark” in visual modality - “A mitten is soft” 
in tactile modality) (Hald, Marshall, Janssen, & Garnham, 2011). 
Similar switching costs occur when participants switch between actual modalities in 
perceptual tasks (Masson, 2015). Thus, findings reviewed above support the claim that 
language is rooted in perceptions and language comprehension can activate these perceptions. 
Importantly, the same priming effect was not elicited when participants verified semantically 
associated properties (e.g., “sheet” can be spotless, and “air” can be clean) as opposed to 
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unassociated properties (e.g., “sheet” can be spotless, and “meal” can be cheap) (Pecher et al., 
2003). This finding rules out the alternative, computational hypothesis that properties across 
all modalities are stored together in a single, amodal system of knowledge. Rather, they support 
perceptual roots of language processing and language-based simulations. 
 
Mental simulations and situation models 
 
Simulations triggered with language are slightly different than the sensorimotor simulations 
that have been covered so far. Sensorimotor simulations in mental imagery and memory rely 
on actual sensorimotor experiences (e.g., playing a piano or perceptually encoding an episode). 
They take place in an offline manner, that is, when the agent “needs” to access 
perceptual/conceptual information in the absence of original stimulus. Whereas, language-
based simulations are activated upon perceiving linguistic stimuli in an online manner. The 
subject (re)creates perceptual, motor, affective, introspective and bodily states not by actually 
experiencing them but through linguistic descriptions. Further, language can give rise to 
simulations of several abstract conceptualisations that go beyond these states. This type of 
simulation is usually referred to as a mental simulation (Zwaan, 1999). Mental simulations can 
extend into and affect subsequent perceptual/conceptual processing and memory retrieval 
(discussed below). 
It is reasonable to assume that online mental simulation evoked by language and offline 
simulation in memory and mental imagery share some common architecture. After all, both 
types of simulations originate from perceptual, motor, affective, introspective and bodily states. 
That said, the substantial difference between offline and online simulation is conscious effort. 
Mental simulations based on language are assumed to be inherently involved in language 
comprehension and thus, triggered automatically and unconsciously (Zwaan & Pecher, 2012). 
Whereas, offline sensorimotor simulation in memory and mental imagery is often a 
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consequence of effortful, resource-consuming and conscious processes as memory and mental 
imagery themselves. In line, there is little to no evidence that mental simulation is correlated 
with the strength of mental imagery (Zwaan & Pecher, 2012). 
The idea of mental simulation via language stems from the discovery of mirror neurons 
(Caggiano et al., 1996; Gallese et al., 1996). Mirror neurons are activated in motor regions of 
the brain by merely observing others executing motor actions (Hari et al., 1998). In a similar 
fashion, neural correlates were found between the content of what is being read and activated 
areas in the brain (see Hauk & Tschentscher, 2013; Binkofski, 2010; Pulvermüller, 2005 for 
exhaustive reviews and Jirak, Menz, Buccino, Borghi for a meta-analysis). In a pioneering 
study (Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004), participants saw action words referring to 
face, arm and leg (e.g., lick, pick and kick) in a passive reading task and then, moved their 
corresponding extremities (i.e., left or right foot, left or right index finger, or tongue). Results 
showed that reading action verbs activates somatotopic brain regions (i.e., regions 
corresponding to specific parts of the body) that are involved in the actual movements (see also 
Buccino et al., 2005). For example, reading the word “kick” or “pick” invokes activation in the 
specific regions of motor and premotor cortex that control the execution of leg and arm 
movements respectively. Critically, several fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) 
studies showed that not only concrete words but also idiomatic expressions involving action 
words (e.g., “John grasped the idea or Pablo kicked the habit) (see Yang & Shu, 2016 for a 
review) and counterfactual statements (e.g., “if Mary had cleaned the room, she would have 
moved the sofa”) (de Vega et al., 2014) elicit similar somatotopic activation in brain. In 
addition to action words, words in different perceptual modalities activate brain regions 
associated with the concerned modalities as well. For example, reading odour-related words 
such as “cinnamon”, “garlic” or “jasmine” triggers activations in primary olfactory cortex, the 
brain region involved in the sensation of smells (González et al., 2006). 
 22 
Language-based simulations go beyond recreation of perceptual and motor experiences. It 
is well-documented that reading narratives can form situation models (mental models) in the 
minds of the readers (e.g., Speer, Reynolds, Swallow, & Zacks, 2009). Situation models are 
integrated, situational mental representations of characters, objects and events that are 
described in narrative (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978). They allow readers to 
imagine themselves in the story by taking the perspective of the protagonist (e.g., Avraamides, 
2003). Consequently, situation models give rise to simulations of perceptual, motor and 
affective states and also abstract structures such as time, speed, space, goals and causations 
(Speed & Vigliocco, 2016; Zwaan, 1999; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). 
For instance, Zwaan, Stanfield and Yaxley (2002) evidenced that language comprehenders 
simulate what the objects described by language look like. In their study, participants read 
sentences describing an animal or an object in a certain location (e.g., egg in a carton vs. egg 
in a pan). Thus, the shape of the objects changed as a function of their location, but it is only 
implied by sentences (e.g., “The egg is in the carton.” - whole egg). Even though, a line drawing 
of the object matching with the shape implied in the previous sentence (e.g., a drawing of a 
whole egg) improved participants’ performance in retrieval of the sentences. Similar results 
were demonstrated for sentences that imply orientation (e.g., vertical - horizontal) (D. C. 
Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, & McRae, 2003), rotation (Wassenburg & Zwaan, 2010), size 
(de Koning, Wassenburg, Bos, & Van der Schoot, 2017), colour (Zwaan & Pecher, 2012), 
visibility (Yaxley & Zwaan, 2007), distance (Vukovic & Williams, 2014) and number (Patson, 
George, & Warren, 2014). 
Language can activate simulations of more abstract structures in the same manner. 
Simulation of time, in particular, is well-documented. For instance, longer chronological 
distance between two consecutively narrated story events denoted with “an hour later” as 
compared to “a moment later” leads to longer reading times (Zwaan, 1996). Reading times 
measured with eye movements were also shown to be longer when reading “slow” verbs (e.g., 
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amble) than “fast” verbs (e.g., dash) (Speed & Vigliocco, 2014). Similarly, Coll-Florit and 
Gennari (2011) found that judging the sensicality of sentences describing durative states (e.g. 
“to admire a famous writer”) took longer than non-durative states (e.g. “to run into a famous 
writer). Several other abstractions can be mentally simulated in the reader’s mind. In one 
experiment, participants can access the concept of “cake” more easily when they previously 
read a sentence in which a cake is actually present (“Mary baked cookies and cake”) than when 
it is not (“Mary baked cookies but no cake”) (MacDonald & Just, 1989). In another experiment, 
participants simulated the protagonist’s thoughts and they remembered and forgot what the 
character in the story remembered and forgot (Gunraj, Upadhyay, Houghton, Westerman, & 
Klin, 2017). In Scherer, Banse, Wallbott and Goldbeck (1991), participants simulated the 
intended emotions that were cued in characters’ voices. 
Mental simulations via language, and situation models play important roles in numerous 
cognitive tasks transcending language comprehension. Most importantly, simulations are 
involved in memory for language. Johansson, Oren and Holmqvist (2018) reported that eye 
movements on a blank screen when participants were remembering a narrative reflected the 
layout of the scenes described in the text rather than the layout of the text itself. Zwaan and 
Radvansky (1998) assumed that successful retrieval of what is comprehended would 
necessarily involve the retrieval of simulations. In accordance with this assumption, there is 
evidence that the ability to restructure situation models have beneficial effects on memory 
performance (Garnham, 1981; Magliano, Radvansky, & Copeland, 2012). 
 
Simulation of space with language 
 
Space has a privileged status in human cognition. Coslett (1999) argues that the representation 
of space in the mind has a fundamental evolutionary advantage because information about the 
location of objects in the environment is essential for sustenance and avoiding danger. A large 
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body of evidence indicates that young children show sensitivity to spatial concepts and 
properties starting from the infancy (e.g., Aguiar & Baillargeon, 2002; Casasola, 2008; Frick 
& Möhring, 2013; Hespos & Rochat, 1997; McKenzie, Slater, Tremellen, & McAlpin, 1993; 
Örnkloo & Von Hofsten, 2007; Wishart & Bower, 1982). There is also evidence suggesting 
that development of spatial cognition forms the foundation for subsequent cognitive structures 
such as mathematical aptitude (Lauer & Lourenco, 2016), creativity (Kell, Lubinski, Benbow, 
& Steiger, 2013) and notably, language (Levinson, 1992; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969). As a result, 
there is good reason to assume that language and space are inherently interconnected through 
the course of cognitive development (e.g., Casasola, 2005; Haun, Rapold, Janzen, & Levinson, 
2011; Hespos & Spelke, 2004). 
People use language when describing space and spatial language schematises space by 
selecting certain aspects of a scene while ignoring other aspects (Talmy, 1983). For instance, 
“across” conveys the information that the thing doing the crossing is smaller than the thing that 
is being crossed (Tversky & Lee, 1998). However, it does not contain any information about 
the distance between these things or their shapes. Thereby, language forms spatial 
representations in mind (H. A. Taylor & Tversky, 1992). 
On the other hand, space provides a rich canvas for representing abstraction. Many abstract 
conceptualisations such as time (Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002), valence (Meyer & Robinson, 
2004), power (Zanolie et al., 2012), numerical magnitude (Dehaene et al., 1993), happiness 
(Damjanovic & Santiago, 2016), divinity (Chasteen, Burdzy, & Pratt, 2010), health (Leitan, 
Williams, & Murray, 2015) and self-esteem (J. E. T. Taylor, Lam, Chasteen, & Pratt, 2015) 
are understood with space (e.g., “powerful is up”, “more is up”, “happy is up” etc.). Further, 
space constraints the use of language with gestures and in sign language (Emmorey, 2001; 
Emmorey, Tversky, & Taylor, 2000). In support of this, both brain imaging (Carpenter, Just, 
Keller, Eddy, & Thulborn, 1999) and behavioural (Hayward & Tarr, 1995) evidence indicate 
that there are similarities between spatial and linguistic representations. 
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Given the central position of space in human mind as briefly discussed above and the 
intrinsic links between language and space, spatial simulations in language deserve particular 
attention. Reading narratives can activate simulations of spatial descriptions in a text through 
situation models. For instance, objects that are described close to a protagonist in a narrative 
are accessed faster than the objects described as more distant (Glenberg, Meyer, & Lindem, 
1987; Morrow, Greenspan, & Bower, 1987). In seminal work, Franklin and Tversky (1990) 
showed that situation models of space derived from text are similar to the representations of 
spatial experiences in the real-world and notably, have bodily constraints. Participants in the 
study read descriptions of scenes and objects in them. Then, they were asked to remember and 
locate certain objects in a three-dimensional environment. Results showed that objects on the 
vertical (i.e., head-feet) axis were retrieved faster than objects on the horizontal (i.e., left-right) 
and sagittal (i.e., front-back) axes. The findings indicate that space in language is simulated 
with an ego-centric perspective rather than an allocentric (i.e., object-centred) or a mental 
transformation perspective. If the participants took an allocentric perspective as in inspecting 
a picture (in which the subject is not immersed into the environment), all directions would have 
been equally accessible. On the other hand, if they mentally transformed the described 
environments, response times would have varied as a function of the mental movement needed 
to inspect each location. Accordingly, response times would have been shortest for the objects 
in front of the subject and the accessibility would have decreased in line with the angular 
disparity from the front. Objects behind the subject, for example, would have been the most 
difficult to access. Bias for the objects on the vertical dimension suggests that simulation of 
space with language is body-based. As Franklin and Tversky (1990, p. 64) discuss, the 
dominant position of a person interacting with the environment is upright due to a number of 
reasons: First, the perceptual world of the observer can be described by one vertical and two 
horizontal dimensions (i.e., left/right and front/back). Second, vertical dimension is correlated 
with gravity, which in an important asymmetric factor in perceiving spatial relations. Thus, 
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vertical spatial relations generally remain constant with respect to the observer. Third, the 
ground and the sky present stationary reference points on the vertical axis. On the other hand, 
horizontal spatial relations change frequently. Thus, horizontal dimension depends on more 
arbitrary reference points, such as the prominent dimensions of the observer's own body. In 
another experiment using a similar methodology (Avraamides, 2003), it was demonstrated that 
simulated ego-centric positions are not static but can be automatically updated whenever the 
reader/protagonist moves in the text, suggesting the motor basis of language. In a recognition 
memory task, Levine and Klin (2001) showed that a story character’s current location was 
more active in the reader’s memory than her/his previous location (see Gunraj et al., 2017). 
Further, such spatial simulations remained highly accessible even several sentences after last 
mention, indicating the robustness of these spatial simulations. 
There are stable representational mappings between language and space at the sentence level 
as well. Richardson, Spivey, Edelman and Naples (2001) asked participants to read sentences 
involving concrete and abstract action verbs (e.g., lifted, offended). They were then asked to 
associate diagrams illustrating motions on the horizontal (left and right) and the vertical axis 
(up and down) with the sentences depicting motion events. Substantial agreement was found 
between participants in their preferences of diagrams for both concrete and abstract verbs 
within action sentences. For example, participants tended to attach a horizontal image schema 
to “push”, and a vertical image schema to “respect”. In a later study, it was evidenced that 
spatial simulation triggered by a verb affects other forms of spatial processing along the same 
axis both in a visual discrimination and a picture memory task (D. C. Richardson et al., 2003). 
Spatial simulations interfered with visual discrimination on the congruent axis and deteriorated 
performance; however, memory performance was facilitated when the picture to be 
remembered and the simulated orientation matched (see “Effects of mental simulation” below). 
The effect was shown for both concrete and abstract verbs. Not only orientation, but upward 
and downward motion on the vertical axis are simulated via language. In one study (Bergen, 
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Lindsay, Matlock, & Narayanan, 2007), subject nouns and main verbs related with up and 
down locations interfered with visual processing in the same location. However, the effect was 
shown in literal sentences implying real space (e.g., “The ceiling cracked” – downward 
movement for the subject noun, “The mule climbed” – upward movements for the main verb) 
but not in sentences implying metaphorical space (e.g., “The prices rose”). Bergen et al. (2007) 
argue that the comprehension of the sentence as a whole, and not simply lexical associations, 
yield spatial simulations. 
However, there is evidence that single words can also trigger simulation of space. Several 
abstract nouns such as “tyrant” (up) and “slave” (down) invoke simulations of metaphorical 
spatial locations (e.g., Giessner & Schubert, 2007). There are numerous common nouns in 
language such as “bird” (up) and “worm” (down) which are associated with actual spatial 
locations (i.e., spatial iconicity). Words denoting spatial locations simulate perceptions of these 
locations in space. In Zwaan and Yaxley (2003), participants were presented word pairs with 
spatial associations (e.g., “attic” - “basement”) and asked to decide whether the words are 
semantically related. Results showed that word pairs in a reverse-iconic condition (i.e., 
“basement” above “attic”) were judged slower than word pairs in an iconic condition (i.e., 
“attic” above “basement”). In a similar fashion, it was shown that reading words that occur 
higher or lower positions in the visual field (e.g., head and foot) hinders the identification of 
visual targets at the top or bottom of the display (Estes, Verges, & Barsalou, 2008). 
 
Effects of mental simulations 
 
Simulation-based language understanding leads to two main effects on simultaneous or 
subsequent visual/conceptual processing: compatibility and interference (see Fischer & Zwaan, 
2008 for a review). The underlying idea is that if understanding an utterance involves the 
activation of perceptual, affective and motor representations; then perceptions, emotions and 
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actions that are congruent with the content of the utterances should facilitate visual/conceptual 
processing and vice versa (Bergen, 2007). 
For example, the action-sentence compatibility effect demonstrates 
compatibility/interference resulting from motor simulations in language. In the study 
introducing the effect for the first time (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002), participants were 
presented sensible and non-sensible sentences (e.g., “Boil the air”) and were asked to judge 
whether the sentences made sense or not. Sensible sentences implied actions either toward the 
body (e.g., “Open the drawer”) or away from the body (e.g., “Close the drawer”). Response 
button for identifying the sentence as sensible (i.e., yes button) was either near or far from the 
participants’ bodies. Results showed that when the implied direction of the sentence and the 
actual action to press the button matched, participants were faster to judge the sensibility of the 
sentences. For example, the sentence, “Open the drawer” was processed faster when 
participants reached the yes button near them, an action that is comparable to opening a drawer. 
The effect was found not only for imperatives but also for descriptive sentences (“Andy 
delivered the pizza to you” - toward sentence / “You delivered the pizza to Andy” - away 
sentence). Notably, sentences describing abstract transfers (“Liz told you the story” - toward 
sentence / “You told Liz the story” - away sentence) elicited an action-sentence compatibility 
effect as well. An action-sentence compatibility effect extends to sign language, suggesting 
that the motor system is involved in the comprehension of a visual-manual language as well 
(Secora & Emmorey, 2015). Notably, the congruency effect was found relative to the verb’s 
semantics (e.g., “You throw a ball” - away) not relative to the actual motion executed by the 
signer and perceived by the participant (e.g., “You throw a ball” - toward). Along with that, 
there are meta-reviews and experimental evidence arguing that an action-sentence 
compatibility effect is generally weak (Papesh, 2015; but see Zwaan, van der Stoep, 
Guadalupe, & Bouwmeester, 2012) or highly task-dependent (Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006). 
In sum, the current status of the literature suggests that the factors modulating an action-
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sentence compatibility effect and in general, effects of language-based simulations should be 
further specified. 
Simulations can also interfere with language comprehension which results in a “mismatch 
advantage”. For example, Kaschak et al. (2005) demonstrated that participants judge the 
feasibility of motion sentences (e.g., “The horse ran away from you”) faster when they 
simultaneously view visual displays depicting motion in the opposite direction as the action 
described in the sentence (e.g., a spiral moving towards the centre). They concluded that visual 
processing and action simulation during language comprehension engage the same neural 
circuits; which, in turn leads to a mismatch advantage. Connell (2007) evidenced a mismatch 
advantage in the simulation of colour with language. Participants read sentences involving an 
object which can occur in different colours (e.g., meat can be red when raw and brown when 
cooked). They were then presented pictures of objects and they had to decide whether the 
pictured object had appeared in the preceding sentence. Colour of the objects sometimes 
matched with the descriptions in the sentences (e.g., “John looked at a steak in the butcher’s 
window” - red steak) and sometimes did not match (e.g., “John looked at a steak in the 
butcher’s window” - brown steak). Responses were faster when the colour of the object 
mismatched with the colour implied by the previous sentence. 
Why do some studies show a congruency advantage and others an incongruency advantage? 
This is an important question within the context of the present thesis (see Chapter 6). Kaschak 
et al. (2005) argue that there are two factors determining match or mismatch advantage in 
language-based simulations: (1) Temporal distance between the perceptual stimulus and the 
verbal stimulus to be processed. (2) The extent to which the perceptual stimulus can be 
integrated into the simulation activated by the content of the sentence. In support of the 
temporal distance assumption, Borreggine and Kaschak (2006) found that action-sentence 
compatibility effect arises only when individuals have enough time to plan their motor response 
as they process the sentence. According to Kaschak et al. (2005), if the verbal information must 
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be processed simultaneously with the perceptual information, a congruency or incongruency 
advantage may occur, depending on whether linguistic information and perceptual stimulus 
can be integrated. To be more specific, a congruency advantage is expected if the linguistic 
and visual stimulus are comparable such as reading the sentence “The egg is in the carton” and 
seeing a line drawing of a whole egg (Zwaan et al., 2002). However, different perceptual and 
linguistic stimulus such as reading the sentence “The horse ran away from you” and seeing a 
spiral moving towards the centre or away from it (Kaschak et al., 2005) result in an 
incongruency advantage (see also Meteyard, Zokaei, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2008). 
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2.2 I Look, Therefore I Remember: Eye Movements 
and Memory 
 
2.2.1 Eye movements and eye tracking 
 
Eyes do not flow in a smooth fashion when engaged in visual tasks (Huey, 1908). If you were 
able to see your gaze on the page or on the digital screen right now, you would notice that your 
eyes shift from one word to the next as you are reading this sentence. Known as saccades, these 
“jumps” are rapid, short and repeated ballistic (i.e. jerk-like) movements which occur 
approximately three to four times every second. Saccades abruptly change the point of 
fixations, the periods of eye immobility in which visual or semantic information is acquired 
and processed (Purves, Augustine, & Fitzpatrick, 2001; D. C. Richardson & Spivey, 2004). In 
simple terms, individuals internalise the visual world during fixations that are executed 
between saccades (Bridgeman, Van der Heijden, & Velichkovsky, 1994; Simons & Rensink, 
2005). Eye movements are fundamental to visual perception because visual system cannot 
process the huge amount of available information in the visual world at once. Thus, execution 
of eye movements allows us to see the world as a seamless whole, although we can only see 
one region at a time (Buswell, 1936; Yarbus, 1967) due to anatomical limitations (i.e., the total 
visual field that the human eye covers) and also, limited processing resources (Levi, Klein, & 
Aitsebaomo, 1985; D. C. Richardson, Dale, & Spivey, 2007). 
Fixations have two elemental measures: location and duration. Both measures are highly 
informative of ongoing cognitive operations. We can see a stimulus clearly only when it falls 
into the most sensitive area of the retina (i.e., fovea) (~2o or 3 to 6 letter spaces), which is 
specialised for high acuity visual perception (Mast & Kosslyn, 2002; Yarbus, 1967). Thus, eye 
position (i.e., fixation location) gives valuable information about the location of the attentional 
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“spotlight” (Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980). In other words, fixation location corresponds 
to the spatial locus of cognitive processing. On the other hand, fixation duration corresponds 
to the duration of cognitive processing of the material located at fixation (Irwin, 2004, p. 2). 
Longer fixations suggest higher cognitive load or higher attentional processing demands 
required by a material or task (Irwin, 2004). The underlying idea behind the link between 
cognition and fixation is known as eye-mind assumption (Just & Carpenter, 1980), which 
simply posits that the “direction of our eyes indicates the content of the mind” (Underwood & 
Everatt, 1992). Based on the location and duration of fixations, cognitive processes can be 
measured and evaluated objectively and precisely during the occurrence of the process in 
question. There is now a universal consensus on the value of eye movements and eye tracking 
as a methodology in the investigation of the human mind (e.g., Hyona, Radach, & Deubel, 
2003; Just & Carpenter, 1980; Rayner, 1998; Rayner, Pollatsek, Ashby, & Clifton, 2012; 
Reichle, Pollatsek, Fisher, & Rayner, 1998; Theeuwes, Belopolsky, & Olivers, 2009; Van der 
Stigchel et al., 2006). Eye tracking methodology provides detailed measures with regard to the 
temporal order of fixations and saccades, gaze direction, pupil size and time spent on pre-
defined regions of the scene. Fixation duration in a certain location relative to other locations 
is used as the main measure of looking behaviour in the present thesis. 
Eye movements can be monitored in various different ways. A pupil corneal reflection 
technique, that is based on high-speed cameras and near infrared light, is the most advanced 
remote and non-intrusive eye tracking method as of today. An illuminator shines dispersed 
infrared light to one eye or both eyes. A high-speed video camera captures the infrared 
reflections coming from the pupil and cornea (i.e., the outer layer of the eye) and transforms 
them into high-resolution images and patterns pertaining to the position of the eye(s) at any 
given millisecond. Such an infrared eye tracker can record eye movements quite precisely. 
Precision offered by an eye tracker is indicated by temporal resolution (i.e., sampling rate) and 
spatial resolution. Sampling rate shows the frequency of which a tracker samples and 
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determines the position of the eye at a given moment. For example, the eye tracker used in the 
present thesis (i.e., SR EyeLink 1000) operates at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz, which means 
that the position of the eye is measured 1000 times every second. Put differently, it produces 
one sample of the eye position per one millisecond. Spatial resolution refers to the angular 
distance between successive samples of eye position. Thus, an eye tracker with a higher spatial 
resolution can detect even the smallest eye movements in a certain interest area. SR EyeLink 
1000 has a spatial resolution of 0.25o - 0.50o which means that it can detect and sample eye 
movements within an angular distance of 0.25o - 0.50o. 
There generally exists a spatial difference between the calculated location of a fixation and 
the actual one. This difference is expressed in degrees of visual angle and reflects the accuracy 
of eye tracking. If you draw a straight line from the eye to the actual fixation point on the screen 
and another line to the computed one, the angle between these lines gives the accuracy. Thus, 
a smaller difference means higher accuracy. Accuracy depends on the screen size and the 
distance between the participant and the screen. Visual angle is also used to calculate the size 
of the experimental stimulus as it refers to the perceived size rather than the actual size. These 
measures of data quality are reported in the methods section of each experiment in accordance 
with the eye tracking standards and good practices in literature (Blignaut & Wium, 2014; 
Holmqvist, Nyström, & Mulvey, 2012; D. C. Richardson & Spivey, 2004). 
 
2.2.2 Investigating memory with eye movements 
 
The role of eye movements in evidently visual tasks and processes such as visual perception 
(Noton & Stark, 1971), reading (Rayner, 1998), visuospatial memory (Irwin & Zelinsky, 2002), 
visual search (Rayner, 2009) and visuospatial attention (Van der Stigchel et al., 2006) has been 
widely investigated for many decades and is very well-documented. Eye movements have 
recently emerged as an alternative means in memory research complementing behavioural 
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measures based on end-state measures (e.g., hit rate, hit latency etc.) (Lockhart, 2000) and 
brain-imaging studies (Fiser et al., 2016; Gabrieli, 1998; Rugg & Yonelinas, 2003). 
It has been known for a long time that previous experience and knowledge of the observer 
can govern eye movements in addition to the physical properties of the scene and stimulus. For 
example, many early studies have reported that human observers tend to look at areas of a 
picture which are relatively more informative to them. Importantly, informativeness rating of 
a region is modulated by the previous knowledge of the participants in the long-term memory 
(Antes, 1974; Kaufman & Richards, 1969; Mackworth & Morandi, 1967; Parker, 1978; Zusne 
& Michels, 1964). Similarly, Althoff and Cohen (1999) reported that previous exposure to a 
face changes the viewing behaviour and thus, eye movements. In their study, different patterns 
of eye movements emerged when participants viewed famous versus non-famous faces driven 
by recognition, fame rating and emotion labelling tasks. Participants made fewer fixations and 
fixation durations were shorter when viewing famous faces (now known as a repetition effect), 
which suggests lower cognitive load in processing previously experienced stimuli that can be 
retrieved from memory. Ryan, Althoff, Whitlow and Cohen (2000) took a similar approach: 
Participants viewed a set of real word images under three conditions: novel (i.e., seen once 
during the experiment), repeated (i.e., seen once in each block of the experiment) or 
manipulated (i.e., seen once in original form in the first two blocks and then seen in a slightly 
changed form in the final block). Participants made fewer fixations and sampled fewer regions 
when viewing repeated and manipulated scenes compared to novel scenes (i.e., repetition 
effect). Repetition effect speaks to the link between stability of mental representation and 
memory-guided eye movements. To illustrate, in Heisz and Shore (2008), the number of 
fixations gradually decreased with the number of exposures to the unfamiliar faces during a 
task. There was also evidence for another memory driven eye movement behaviour known as 
a relational manipulation effect: a higher proportion of total fixation time was dedicated to the 
manipulated regions in the scenes compared with repeated or novel scenes. Further, 
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participants made more transitions into and out of the changed regions of the manipulated 
scenes than in unchanged (matched) regions of the repeated scenes. Similar paradigms based 
on eye movements were also used to study memory in non-human primates (Sobotka, 
Nowicka, & Ringo, 1997), infants (Richmond, Zhao, & Burns, 2015; Richmond & Nelson, 
2009) and special populations. For example, Ryan et al. (2000, Experiment 4) did not observe 
any difference in looking patterns between amnesic patients with severe memory deficits and 
a control group when both were viewing the repeated images. However, amnesic patients did 
not look longer at the altered regions when viewing manipulated images, suggesting that 
amnesia disrupts relational memory, i.e., memory for the relations among the constituent 
elements of an experience. Likewise, in Niendam, Carter and Ragland (2010), schizophrenic 
patients failed to detect image manipulation, which was shown with eye movements and even 
though the memory impairment was not evident in behavioural results. 
Studies reviewed above suggest relevance of eye movements in memory and importantly, 
advantages of eye tracking methodology over behavioural, response-based methodologies. (1) 
Memory-guided eye movements are mostly obligatory, that is, cannot be controlled. For 
instance, repetition effect reviewed above occurs regardless of the instruction (i.e., whether 
participants are told just to study all items for later, are explicitly told to pick out the familiar 
item, or are told to avoid looking at the familiar item) (Ryan, Hannula, & Cohen, 2007, pp. 
522-523). (2) Individuals launch memory-guided eye movements whether exposure comes 
from short term memory (i.e., within the experiment) or from long term memory (i.e., prior to 
the experiment). (3) Memory-guided eye movements precedes conscious recall. As stated by 
Hannula et al. (2010), “eye movements can reveal memory for elements of previous experience 
without appealing to verbal reports and without requiring conscious recollection” (see Spering 
& Carrasco, 2015 for a comprehensive review; but see Smith, Hopkins, & Squire, 2006). For 
instance, repetition effect occurs as early as the very first fixation to the item and thus, prior to 
the behavioural recognition response (Ryan et al., 2007). Similarly, in Henderson and 
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Hollingworth (2003), gaze durations were reliably longer for manipulated scenes although 
participants failed to detect changes explicitly. 
To conclude, studies making use of eye movements are highly promising as a methodology. 
They can provide unique information about memory processes, which complement overt 
behavioural measures and brain imaging (e.g., Hannula & Ranganath, 2009). In fact, eye 
movements are so representative of memory that mathematical models are able to predict the 
task that a person is engaged in (e.g. scene memorisation) from their eye movements using 
pattern classification (Henderson, Shinkareva, Wang, Luke, & Olejarczyk, 2013). It should 
also be noted that eye movements in memory are not limited to fixation measures or saccadic 
trajectories. Variation in pupil size (e.g., pupil dilation) and blinks have been used to probe the 
ongoing processes during retrieval (Goldinger & Papesh, 2012; Heaver & Hutton, 2011; 
Kahneman & Beatty, 1966; Mill, O’Connor, & Dobbins, 2016; Otero, Weekes, & Hutton, 
2011; Siegle, Ichikawa, & Steinhauer, 2008; Van Gerven, Paas, Van Merriënboer, & Schmidt, 
2004; Vo et al., 2008). A well-established finding is that the pupil dilates as the retrieval 
becomes cognitively challenging (Goldinger & Papesh, 2012; Kucewicz et al., 2018; Laeng, 
Sirois, & Gredeback, 2012). 
 
2.2.3 Eye movements in mental imagery and memory simulations 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, there is mounting evidence showing the neural and 
behavioural similarities between memory and mental imagery (Albers et al., 2013; Rebecca 
Keogh & Pearson, 2011). Concordantly, simulation theories of memory within grounded-
embodied cognition highlight the connection between memory and mental imagery in that both 
processes are simulations in essence. That is, memory retrieval/mental imagery is a neural, 
perceptual and/or motor reinstatement of perception (Borst & Kosslyn, 2008; Buckner & 
Wheeler, 2001; De Brigard, 2014; Ganis et al., 2004; Kent & Lamberts, 2008; Mahr & Csibra, 
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2018; Michaelian, 2016b; Norman & O’Reilly, 2003; Pasternak & Greenlee, 2005; Shanton & 
Goldman, 2010). Eye movements play a crucial role in the simulation thesis of memory and 
mental imagery because they can illustrate the behavioural reinstatements between 
perception/encoding and imagery/retrieval. The essential idea behind this imagery - eye 
movements - memory network holds that eye movements are stored in memory along with the 
visual representations of previously inspected images and they are re-enacted during memory 
and visual imagery (Mast & Kosslyn, 2002). 
Long before the idea had been proven empirically, many researchers hinted at a possible 
similarity in saccades between visual perception and imagery (Hebb, 1968; Hochberg, 1968; 
Neisser, 1967; Schulman, 1983). Hebb (1968) was probably the first researcher who explicitly 
argued that “if the mental image is a reinstatement of the perceptual process, it should include 
the eye movements” (p. 470). Brandt and Stark (1997) provided direct empirical evidence for 
this argument by showing that people do move their eyes during mental imagery and the 
scanpaths (i.e., the sequential order of fixations and saccades, not only their spatial positions) 
are not random (see also Noton & Stark, 1971 for more on scanpath theory). Instead, they bear 
striking similarities with the scanpaths during the perception of the original image (Foulsham 
& Underwood, 2008; Underwood, Foulsham, & Humphrey, 2009) Correspondence between 
the eye movements in perception and imagery was so robust that it was observed both for 
auditory (retelling a story) and visual stimuli (depicting a picture) and even when participants 
were in complete darkness and thus, without any visual information at all during imagery 
(Johansson et al., 2006). It seems reasonable to assume that spatiotemporal characteristics of 
visual perception are similar to the mental imagery as eye movements reflect the mental 
processes during visual inspection. Memory-guided eye movements are also informative in 
grounding of abstract concepts such as time. In Martarelli, Mast and Hartmann (2017), 
participants launched more rightward saccades during encoding, free recall and recognition of 
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future items compared to past items (see also Hartmann, Martarelli, Mast, & Stocker, 2014; 
Stocker, Hartmann, Martarelli, & Mast, 2015). 
A majority of the studies investigating the ocular motility in mental imagery and memory 
have revolved around the role and functionality of eye movements. Whether these eye 
movements are merely epiphenomenal (i.e., an involuntary by-product of the imagery process) 
or play an important role and affect the imagery/retrieval performance is an important issue in 
that it directly taps into the primary question of nonvisual gaze patterns: Why do people move 
their eyes when forming mental images in the first place? Early studies (Kosslyn, 1980) 
discussed a potential advantage in vividness if non-random eye movements are systematically 
employed during mental imagery; yet, they failed to provide experimental evidence, which led 
to a premature conclusion: Oculomotor movements during imagery were regarded as a mere 
reflection of the visual buffer (Kosslyn, 1980, 1987). A visual buffer is a hypothetical unit 
which is responsible for holding visual information for a limited time. Nonvisual eye 
movements in mental imagery were assumed as an additional mechanism for presenting 
complex scenes on the visual buffer without overloading its capacity (Brandt & Stark, 1997). 
Thus, eye movements were viewed as passively mirroring the attentional window over the 
target image during encoding to provide a solution for the cognitive load problem (Irvin & 
Gordon, 1998). 
There is now increasing evidence that eye movements have a relatively more direct role in 
mental imagery and memory (Bochynska & Laeng, 2015; Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002; 
Laeng et al., 2014; Mäntylä & Holm, 2006; Stark & Ellis, 1981; Underwood et al., 2009; 
Valuch, Becker, & Ansorge, 2013). For example, in Laeng and Teodorescu (2002), participants 
viewed an irregular checkerboard, similar to the one used by Brandt and Stark (1997) or a 
coloured picture. Then, they were asked to mentally imagine the visual stimuli as they were 
looking at a blank screen. Percentages of fixation time on certain interest areas and the order 
of scanning during perceptual phase (i.e., original image) and imagery phase (i.e., blank screen) 
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were highly correlated. But importantly, the strength of relatedness between scanpaths 
predicted the vividness of mental imagery. 
More recent evidence indicates that what is perceptually simulated in memory retrieval or 
mental imagery is not the order of eye movements (i.e., scanpaths) but rather, the locations of 
perception. In a visual memory experiment, Johansson, Holsanova, Dewhurst and Holmqvist 
(2012) found no literal re-enactment during retrieval although suppression of eye movements 
hindered retrieval accuracy (cf., Bochynska & Laeng, 2015). By challenging the scanpath 
theory, they deduced that eye movements during retrieval are functional but not one-to-one 
reactivation of the oculomotor activity produced during perception/encoding (see also 
Foulsham & Kingstone, 2012 for similar results). Also, in Laeng and Teodorescu (2002), the 
participants who were not allowed to free scan during imagery phase (i.e., fixed gaze condition) 
did worse when they were asked to recall the original pattern, which was calculated by the 
number of squares corresponded to the location of a black square in the grid. Using a similar 
paradigm in visuospatial memory, Johansson and Johansson (2014) asked participants to view 
objects distributed in four quadrants at the encoding phase. Participants then listened 
statements about the direction of the objects (e.g., “The car was facing left”) and were asked 
to decide whether the statements are true or false. Results showed that participants who were 
free to look at a blank screen during retrieval had a superior retrieval performance than 
participants whose eye movements were constrained to a central fixation point. Further, 
participants whose eye movements were constrained to the previous locations of the objects 
were more accurate and faster than participants whose eye movements were constrained to a 
diagonal location as to the previous location of the concerned object. 
Studies reviewed above suggest that the human mind encodes eye movements not as they 
are but in the form of spatial indices, seemingly invisible spatial pointers in space (D. C. 
Richardson & Kirkham, 2004; D. C. Richardson & Spivey, 2000). Spatial indices link internal 
representations to objects in the visual world by tapping into space-time information and in 
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turn, trigger eye movements to blank locations during retrieval to reduce working memory 
demands (Ballard et al., 1997). Therefore, there is no need for a literal recapitulation of gaze 
patterns because eye movements function as a scaffolding structure with the network of spatial 
indices for the generation of a detailed image. In other words, spatial indices in the environment 
which are internalised via eye movements complete the representations “in the head” resulting 
in a detailed mental image (Ferreira et al., 2008). In an alternative model, O’Regan and Noë 
(2001) put forward that seeing is a way of acting and eye movements are visual representations 
themselves in a nod to ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979). 
To sum up, current evidence shows that oculomotor activity during memory and mental 
imagery is not limited to the reconstruction of the original: it is essential to generate mental 
images. Further, it seems that the role of eye movements is also beyond an automatic and 
involuntary distribution of limited cognitive sources between the oculomotor activity and 
memory to alleviate the mental load. Rather, eye movements might serve as an optional, 
situational strategy in situations where expanding could make a difference for solving the task 
(Hayhoe et al., 1998; Laeng et al., 2014; J. T. E. Richardson, 1979). In support of this 
assumption, many task-oriented vision studies have suggested that “the eyes are positioned at 
a point that is not the most visually salient but is the best for the spatio-temporal demands of 
the job that needs to be done” (Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005, p. 189). Furthermore, there is also 
intriguing evidence that these strategic, opportunistic eye movements in goal-directed 
behaviour are guided by a dopamine-based reward system (Glimcher, 2003; Hikosaka, 
Takikawa, & Kawagoe, 2000). Thus, eye movements during imagery and memory can be 
situational and adaptive according to the task demands. For example, in Laeng, Bloem, 
D’Ascenzo and Tommasi (2014) eye movements during mental imagery concentrated in the 
salient, information-rich parts of the original image (e.g., head region of an animal picture in 
the study). Here, it is important to underline that difficulty of the task seems to be the decisive 
factor. For instance, memory tasks requiring relatively low cognitive load would not need a 
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detailed mental image of the original scene to be solved and thus, retrieval should be 
challenging in order to observe any memory advantage (Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002; 
Laeng et al., 2014). 
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Chapter 3  
 
Experiment 1  
Simulating Space when Remembering Words: 
Role of Visuospatial Memory 
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3.1 Motivation and Aims 
 
Spatial simulation within grounded-embodied cognition and cognitive offloading within the 
extended cognition were outlined and discussed in Chapter 1 and 2. Based on this theoretical 
background, this chapter describes an experimental study investigating a memory-based 
looking behaviour (i.e., looking at nothing) which is representative of spatial simulation and 
cognitive offloading. In general terms, this study aims to investigate how spatial location is 
simulated following the visual perception of words to support the retrieval of these words.  
 
3.2 Abstract 
 
People tend to look at uninformative, blank locations in space when retrieving information. 
This gaze behaviour, known as looking at nothing, is assumed to be driven by the use of spatial 
indices associated with external information. In the present study, we investigated whether 
people form spatial indices and look at nothing when retrieving words from memory. 
Participants were simultaneously presented four nouns. Additionally, word presentation was 
sometimes followed by a visual cue either co-located (congruent) or not (incongruent) with the 
probe word. During retrieval, participants looked at the relevant, blank location, where the 
probe word had appeared previously, more than the other, irrelevant blank locations following 
a congruent visual cue and when there was no cue between encoding and retrieval (pure looking 
at nothing condition). Critically, participants with better visuospatial memory looked less at 
“nothing”, suggesting a dynamic relationship between so-called “external” and “internal” 
memory. Overall, findings suggest an automatic spatial indexing mechanism and a dynamic 
looking at nothing behaviour for words. 
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Highlights 
• Participants offloaded memory work onto the environment with eye movements when 
remembering visually and simultaneously presented single words. 
• Worse visuospatial memory led to more reliance on the environment during retrieval. 
 
3.3 Introduction 
 
The human mind can anchor spatially-located information to external spatial locations. This 
mechanism has been expressed within a visual processing model, where the location of an 
object is separated from the visual features of it (Marr, 1982). This view, expanded into an 
exhaustive spatial indexing model (Pylyshyn, 1989), assumes that the visual system is able to 
individuate spatial relations before discerning a visual pattern and immediately index the 
locations of such patterns. In a similar fashion, spatial registration hypothesis (Coslett, 1999) 
holds that perceived stimuli are coded with respect to their location in space. Location, 
therefore, is a critical constituent of our interactions with the world (van der Heijden, 1993).  
Within the spatial indexing (or spatial registering/encoding) model, spatial indices remain 
attached to a particular object independent of its movements and visual properties. Critically, 
spatiotemporal continuity (i.e., persistence of spatial “tags” over time) occurs even when the 
visual information disappears, as often manifested in mental imagery (e.g., Brandt & Stark, 
1997). Spatial indices tied to external visual and verbal information trigger eye movements 
when a mental representation is reactivated. Thus, when retrieving information from memory, 
people tend to exploit location-based indices and look at the seemingly uninformative, empty 
locations where the information originally occurred even if location is irrelevant to the task. 
This behaviour is known as looking at nothing (Spivey & Geng, 2000). 
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In their pioneering study, Richardson and Spivey (2000) documented the use of spatial 
information and looking at nothing in verbal memory. Four faces randomly appeared on 
different quadrants of a two by two grid along with four corresponding spoken facts (e.g., 
“Shakespeare’s first plays were historical dramas; his last was the Tempest”). On the next 
screen, a statement (e.g., “Shakespeare’s first play was the Tempest”) probed participants’ 
memory for verbal information. During retrieval, there were significantly more looks in the 
blank quadrant where the face associated with the probed semantic information had been when 
compared to other quadrants. Thus, people did not just look at any nothing when answering the 
questions. Rather, they looked at an invisible spatial index, which was previously allocated to 
the information (Spivey & Geng, 2000). 
Looking at nothing may be best thought of as an interface between internal and external 
worlds. Ferreira, Apel and Henderson (2008) proposed an integrated memory architecture, 
where external cues and internal representations work hand in hand to retrieve information as 
efficiently as possible (see also Richardson, Altmann, Spivey, & Hoover, 2009). More 
precisely, the integrated memory account combines visual/auditory and spatial information in 
the external world with visual, linguistic, spatial and conceptual counterparts in the mental 
world. When part of an integrated representation (linguistic information) is reactivated, the 
other parts (spatial information) are retrieved as well. In this regard, looking at nothing is also 
an example of spatial simulation (Barsalou, 1999) in that the spatial position where the 
information is presented is recreated when the information is needed again. Looking at nothing 
can also be thought as an example of efficient cognitive offloading (Risko & Gilbert, 2016), in 
which the memory work is offloaded onto the world to minimise internal demands.  
In the current study, we addressed the looking at nothing triangle, which is composed of 
actual looking behaviour, spatial indices and mental representations to answer three questions 
(1) How automatic is spatial indexing? Do individuals automatically index the locations of 
short and briefly presented linguistic information (e.g., visually and simultaneously presented 
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single words)? (2) How dynamic is spatial indexing and looking at nothing? Can spatial indices 
be updated with subsequent visual information and how does it affect looking behaviour? (3) 
Does everybody look at blank locations, or is looking at nothing modulated by certain cognitive 
capacities such as visuospatial memory span? 
 
3.3.1 Spatial indexing and looking at nothing: automaticity 
 
Looking at nothing typically occurs under two retrieval conditions as shown in the previous 
studies: (1) People look at blank locations when remembering spoken linguistic information 
such as factual sentences (Hoover & Richardson, 2008; D. C. Richardson & Kirkham, 2004; 
D. C. Richardson & Spivey, 2000; Scholz et al., 2018, 2011, 2016). As illustrated above, 
spoken linguistic information is explicitly associated with a visual object in this paradigm, 
which we term as explicit indexing. In turn, eyes revisit the previous locations of the object 
(associated with the information) when retrieving the spoken factual information. (2) Looking 
at nothing also occurs during retrieval of visually presented non-linguistic information such as 
single objects (Martarelli & Mast, 2013; Spivey & Geng, 2000), arrangement of multiple 
objects (Altmann, 2004; Johansson & Johansson, 2014) or visual patterns (Bochynska & 
Laeng, 2015; Laeng et al., 2014). In this case, locations are encoded along with the visual 
object(s) or patterns.  
In the current study, we adopted a different approach to examine the automaticity of spatial 
encoding of linguistic information. We showed participants four nouns on a grid 
simultaneously to study for a brief period of time. Then, an auditorily presented word (which 
could be either among the studied words or not) probed participants’ verbal recognition 
memory while participants were looking at a blank screen. If participants automatically encode 
location of the words as assumed in spatial indexing hypothesis (implicit indexing), they should 
display looking at nothing behaviour. In other words, we predict more fixations in the now-
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blank locations of the probe word during retrieval compared to the other, irrelevant blank 
locations. However, if explicit indexing is required for looking at nothing as shown in the 
previous studies, there should be same amount of spontaneous looks in the relevant and 
irrelevant blank locations. 
Word locations are encoded in reading (Fischer, 1999; but Inhoff & Weger, 2005), writing 
(Le Bigot, Passerault, & Olive, 2009) and complex cognitive tasks such as memory-based 
decision-making (Jahn & Braatz, 2014; Renkewitz & Jahn, 2012; Scholz, von Helversen, & 
Rieskamp, 2015). However, to what extent spatial encoding is automatic is not clear. An 
automatic process is fast, efficient, unconscious, unintentional, uncontrolled (i.e., cannot be 
wilfully inhibited), goal-independent and purely stimulus-driven (i.e., cannot be avoided) 
(Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). Based on the criteria of automaticity, 
there is evidence that spatial encoding is an automatic process (Andrade & Meudell, 1993), an 
effortful process (Naveh-Benjamin, 1987, 1988) and a combination of both (Ellis, 1991). For 
instance, Pezdek, Roman and Sobolik (1986) reported that spatial information for objects are 
more likely to be encoded automatically as compared to words. 
If participants look at previous locations of the words they are asked to remember, this could 
provide evidence for the automaticity of spatial encoding in looking at nothing due to the 
specifics of the present experimental paradigm (i.e., implicit encoding and brief encoding time) 
and the nature of looking at nothing (i.e., an unintentional and efficient behaviour). 
 
3.3.2 Spatial indexing and looking at nothing: dynamicity 
 
How stable are the spatial indices in looking at nothing? Can they be updated with subsequent 
visuospatial information? How does updated spatial indices guide eye movements during 
memory retrieval? Answers to these questions are critical to understand mechanics of spatial 
indexing and looking at nothing. Thus, we tested whether congruency or incongruency of 
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visuospatial cues between encoding and retrieval stages affects spatial indexing and looking at 
nothing. 
There are studies examining the temporal stability of spatial indices. For example, in Wantz, 
Martarelli and Mast (2015), location memory for visual objects faded 24 hours after the initial 
encoding. In consequence, participants looked at relevant, blank locations immediately after 
the encoding, 5 minutes and 1 hour after the encoding but not after 24 hours. That said, less is 
known about the spatial stability of indices. In one study (D. C. Richardson & Kirkham, 2004), 
looking at nothing was reported when the visual information that was associated with the to-
be-retrieved information moved and thus, updated the spatial indices. Participants looked at the 
previous locations of the updated locations rather than the original locations of the previously 
encoded information, suggesting a flexible and a dynamic spatial indexing mechanism. 
In the current study, a visual cue (i.e., a black dot) that was irrelevant to the words and to 
the task itself was shown between encoding and retrieval stages. The cue was presented either 
in the same quadrant of the grid or a diagonal quadrant as to the location of the probe word at 
the encoding stage. There was also a third condition, in which, the participants did not see a 
cue at all. 
A plethora of studies on Simon effect (Simon & Rudell, 1967) indicates that spatial 
congruency between the stimulus and the response results in faster and more accurate response 
even when the location is irrelevant to successful performance (see Hommel, 2011 for a 
review). In line, Vankov (2011) presented evidence for a Simon-like effect in spatial indexing 
and showed that compatibility of irrelevant spatial information benefits memory retrieval (see 
also Hommel, 2002; Wühr & Ansorge, 2007; Zhang & Johnson, 2004) Participants saw four 
objects on a 2 x 2 grid (e.g., a line drawing of a guitar, cat, camel and plane) at the encoding 
phase. Then, they were presented a word denoting either a new object or one of the studied 
objects (e.g., guitar) in one of the four locations as to the location of the target object; that is, 
in the same location, a vertical location (above or below the target object), a horizontal location 
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(left or right of the target object) or a diagonal location. Participants were asked to remember 
whether the object denoted by the word appeared before. The fastest responses were found 
when the word cue appeared in the same location as to the target object. Participants were the 
slowest to respond when the word cue was in the diagonal location as to the target object. 
In the light of the abovementioned evidence, we predict that (in)congruency between the 
spatial code attached to the word and the spatial code attached to the visuospatial cue could 
modulate looking at nothing behaviour. A congruent cue is predicted to emphasize the original 
location of the probe word and thus, the spatial indice tagging it. In turn, fixations to the 
relevant, blank locations should be more frequent in congruent cue condition as to no cue 
condition. On the other hand, an incongruent cue could update the spatial code attached to the 
word and disrupt looking to blank locations by shifting participants’ attention to a diagonal 
location. Such a pattern would suggest that spatial indexing and looking at nothing for words 
are dynamic processes that are sensitive to the systematic manipulation of irrelevant 
visuospatial information. 
 
3.3.3 Looking at nothing and visuospatial memory 
 
The link between mental representations and looking at nothing is critical. One position within 
the radical grounded-embodied cognition (Chemero, 2011) is that the world functions as an 
outside memory without the need for mental representations (O’Regan, 1992). According to 
this view, the external memory store can be accessed at will through visual perception.  
As discussed above, the integrated memory account (Ferreira et al., 2008) represents an 
opposing position within a relatively “traditional” grounded-embodied approach. Accordingly, 
“internal memory” (mental representations) and so called “external memory” (i.e., the external 
world internalised via spatial indices and eye movements) work cooperatively in an efficient 
and goal-directed manner in looking at nothing. To be more precise, “the opportunistic and 
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efficient mind” (D. C. Richardson et al., 2009) exploits external support whenever it needs to 
minimise internal memory load. In support of this assumption, there is evidence that short-term 
memory capacity is a reliable predictor of conscious and intentional use of environment in 
memory tasks (see Risko & Gilbert, 2016 for a review). In one memory study (Risko & Dunn, 
2015), offloading (i.e., writing down to-be-retrieved information) was given as an option to the 
participants. Results revealed that participants with worse short-term memory wrote down the 
information rather than relying on the internal memory more frequently than the participants 
with better short-term memory. 
In looking at nothing, there is evidence that reliance on the environment increases/decreases 
in proportion to internal demands. For example, people tend to exhibit less looking at nothing 
as they are asked to study and recall the same sentences over and over again, suggesting less 
reliance on external cues as the task becomes easier through repetition (Scholz et al., 2011). 
Similarly, Wantz, Martarelli and Mast (2015) showed less looks to blank locations with 
repeated recall without rehearsal as mental representations stabilise in time. 
However, not much is known about how individual differences in internal memory map 
onto the differences in looking at nothing within the scope of integrated memory account. If 
the opportunistic and efficient cognitive system uses both internal and external cues to access 
memory traces (D. C. Richardson et al., 2009) and if external cues are used to relieve internal 
operations (Risko & Dunn, 2015), people with relatively worse visuospatial memory should 
rely more on the environment during memory retrieval (and vice versa). A correlation between 
visuospatial memory capacity and looking at nothing could provide further evidence for the 
integrated memory system by disproving the world as an outside memory argument (O’Regan, 
1992) and consequently, radical grounded-embodied cognition. 
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3.3.4 Role of eye movements in memory retrieval 
 
Another fundamental issue is whether looks occur to blank regions that are associated with 
information facilitate the retrieval of this information. This issue taps into a seemingly simple 
question with regard to the very nature of memory-guided eye movements: Why do people 
look at nothing? Role and functionality of eye movements in memory retrieval have been 
highly controversial (see Ferreira et al., 2008; Mast & Kosslyn, 2002; Richardson et al., 2009 
for discussions). First studies did not present any evidence for improvement in memory with 
looks to blank spaces (Hoover & Richardson, 2008; D. C. Richardson & Kirkham, 2004; D. C. 
Richardson & Spivey, 2000; Spivey & Geng, 2000; Vankov, 2011). Initial failure to 
demonstrate memory enhancement lead to the preliminary conclusion that eye movements only 
co-assist the retrieval process as a by-product (Spivey, Richardson, & Fitneva, 2004). 
There is now growing evidence that gaze position can play a functional role in memory 
retrieval. For example, Laeng and Teodorescu (2002) reported that participants who viewed an 
image and looked at the blank screen freely (free perception & free retrieval) were more 
accurate in answering the retrieval questions those whose gaze were restricted to the central 
fixation point (free perception & fixed retrieval) (see also Johansson, Holsanova, Dewhurst, & 
Holmqvist, 2012; Laeng et al., 2014 for memory advantage in free gaze compared to fixed 
gaze). In a similar gaze manipulation paradigm, participants who were instructed to look at 
relevant, blank regions were more accurate in judging statements about visual objects 
(Johansson & Johansson, 2014) and verbal information (Scholz et al., 2018, 2016) than the 
participants who were instructed to look at a diagonal location as to the original location of the 
object or object associated with verbal information. 
The current study was not designed to test the role of looking behaviour in memory. That 
is, eye gaze at retrieval was not manipulated as in the studies reviewed above. Rather, we 
analysed the functionality of looking at nothing by using the fixation percentage in the relevant 
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quadrant (i.e., looking at nothing) as a predictor of hit rate and hit latency within mixed-effects 
models. If looks to the relevant, blank locations predict recognition memory for visually 
presented single words, it might provide tentative evidence for the facilitatory role of gaze 
position in memory. 
 
3.4 Method 
 
3.4.1 Participants 
 
The experiment was carried out with forty-eight students at the University of Birmingham (six 
males; Mage = 19.92, SD = 1.96, range: 18 - 27). 96% of the participants were psychology 
students. All participants were monolingual native speakers of British English as determined 
with the Language History Questionnaire (version 2.0; Li, Zhang, Tsai, & Puls, 2013). 
Participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no speech or hearing difficulties 
and no history of any neurological disorder. They received either £6 (n = 12) or course credit 
(n = 36) for participation. All participants were fully informed about the details of the 
experimental procedure and gave written consent. Post-experiment debriefing revealed that all 
participants were naïve to the purpose of the experiment. No participant was replaced.  
 
3.4.2 Materials 
 
There were 192 trials involving 864 unique nouns in total. Trials were evenly divided into two 
groups (n = 96) as experimental (positive probe) trials and fillers. Probe words in the 
experimental trials were among the four study words in the encoding phase, whereas a 
different, not seen, word was probed in fillers. Words in the experimental trials (n = 384) were 
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drawn from the extensions of Paivio, Yuille and Madigan norms for 925 nouns (J. M. Clark & 
Paivio, 2004). The word pool was filtered to exclude words shorter than 3 letters and longer 
than 6 letters. Imageability, frequency (the CELEX database; Baayen, Piepenbrock, & 
Gulikers, 1995; and logarithmic values of occurrences per million in Kučera & Francis, 1967), 
age of acquisition, concreteness, availability (Keenan & Benjafield, 1994), length in letters and 
number of syllables were identified as major predictors of verbal memory (Rubin & Friendly, 
1986) and used to control the experimental stimuli. 
The subset was then grouped into quadruples and trial sets were identified. Words within 
quadruples were matched on age of acquisition, availability, concreteness, imageability, length 
in letters, log frequency and number of syllables (all SDs < 2.00 and all SEs < 1.00). Words 
were further controlled so that no word started with the same letter, rhymed or related 
semantically with any other in the quadruple. Monosyllabic, disyllabic and trisyllabic words 
were evenly distributed [e.g., (3, 3, 3, 3), (1, 2, 1, 2) or (3, 2, 3, 2) etc.]. The word in each trial 
set with the median imageability value was selected as the probe among four words leaving the 
others as distractors (see Rubin & Friendly, 1986). Welch’s t-tests revealed no significant 
difference between the probe and distractor words in in frequency, length in letters or number 
of syllables (all ps > .05). Thus, any word among the four words in each trial set was as likely 
to be remembered as any other word. Words in filler trials were drawn from the Toronto Word 
Pool (Friendly, Franklin, Hoffman, & Rubin, 1982). They were also controlled to develop a 
consistent stimuli set. Words were grouped into quintuples and matched on log frequency in 
CELEX database (all SDs < 0.60 and all SEs < 0.30). 
Finally, we formed 192 unique mathematical equations [e.g., (2*3) - (2+3) = 1] to present 
as memory interference between encoding and retrieval phases (see Conway & Engle, 1996 
for a similar design). Half of the equations were correct. Incorrect equations were further 
divided into two equal groups: The results were either plus or minus one of the correct result. 
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3.4.3 Apparatus 
 
Stimuli were presented on a TFT LCD 22-inch widescreen monitor operating at 60 Hz with a 
resolution of 1680 x 1050 pixels (501.7 mm x 337.4 mm). The monitor was placed 640 mm in 
front of the participant. A chin and forehead rest was used to reduce head movements. 
Participants’ eye movements were monitored using SR EyeLink 1000 (sampling rate: 1000 Hz, 
spatial resolution < 0.5°, http://sr-research.com/eyelink1000.html). Viewing was binocular but 
only the left eye was monitored. Auditory material was produced by a native female speaker 
of British English in a sound attenuated room and recorded using Audacity (version 2.1.10, 
https://www.audacityteam.org). Participants responded (yes/no they had seen the word) by 
pressing one of two keys on a standard keyboard. Eye movement data were extracted using the 
SR EyeLink Data Viewer (version 2.4.0.198, https://www.sr-research.com/data-viewer/). No 
drift or blink correction procedure was applied. 
Data were analysed and visualised in R programming language and environment (R Core 
Team, 2017). Mixed-effects models were constructed with lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, 
Bolker, & Walker, 2015). Significance values of the likelihood tests and coefficients in models 
were computed based on the t-distribution using the Satterthwaite approximation with lmerTest 
package (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2015). 
 
3.4.4 Procedure 
 
Eye tracking started with a standard nine-point calibration and validation, which confirmed 
high data quality (average calibration error < 1° and maximum calibration error < 1.50°). As 
spelled out in detail below, each trial was composed of five consecutive phases: (1) fixation 
(2) encoding, (3) cueing, (4) interference and (5) retrieval (See Figure 3.1). The task was to 
decide whether an auditorily presented word had appeared before or not (i.e., yes/no verbal 
 55 
recognition memory test). As soon as the participants made yes/no judgement by hitting one 
of the response buttons, the trial ended, and a new encoding phase began.  
 (1) Fixation: A fixation cross appeared at the centre of the screen for 500 ms. (2) Encoding: 
Participants were presented four words on a 2 x 2 grid for 1600 ms. Words (Times New Roman, 
font size = 40) were centrally placed in rectangular boxes (285 x 85 in pixels, 7.6° x 2.4° of 
visual angle). By using boxes during encoding and retrieval, we aimed to enrich the spatial 
context in order to evoke more reliance on the space and thereby, observe looking at nothing 
when remembering short verbal information as words (see Spivey & Geng, 2000 for the effect 
of spatial context). (3) Cueing: A flashing black dot appeared in cue trials for 1000 ms either 
in the same (congruent cue) or in the diagonal quadrant (incongruent cue) as the original 
location of the probe word in the encoding phase. There was also a third condition where no 
cue was presented between encoding and interference. Cue condition was a within-subjects 
variable and three cue conditions were randomly presented in a session. That said, an equal 
number of random participants (n = 16) saw the same probe word with a congruent cue, an 
incongruent cue or without any cue. (4) Interference: Participants were exposed to 
retrospective memory interference which was irrelevant to the main task. We expected to push 
out old information (i.e., encoded words) from the episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2000) and 
encourage participants to depend on spatial indices for the retrieval of words without using 
explicit indexing (see Martarelli, Chiquet, Laeng, & Mast, 2017 for a similar paradigm). Hence, 
participants were presented a mathematical equation and asked to identify whether the equation 
was correct or not within 10,000 ms. (5) Retrieval: The probe word was auditorily presented 
as participants looked at the blank grid with empty boxes. There was a 500 ms gap at the 
between the presentation of the blank retrieval screen and the sound file was played. 
Participants were asked to make an unspeeded yes/no judgement to determine whether they 
had seen the probe word among the four words shown in the encoding phase within 10,000 ms 
(or they timed-out). 
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The order of trials and equations were fully randomised independent of each other. The 
location of all words in all conditions was counterbalanced with Latin Square design to control 
gaze biases so that each word appeared an equal number of times in each location of the grid. 
The experiment was divided into four equal blocks with 48 trials in each block and there was 
a short pause between blocks. A typical session lasted approximately 60 minutes, including 
consent and setting up the eye tracker. Overall accuracy in interference equations and in the 
recognition memory test for words were 86% and 81% respectively, suggesting that 
participants attended to the task with high concentration. 
Following the experiment, a computerized version of the Corsi block-tapping task (Corsi, 
1972) operated on PEBL (Psychology Experiment Building Language, version 0.13, test 
battery version 0.7, http://pebl.org) (Mueller & Piper, 2014) was used to measure visuospatial 
short-term memory. 
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responded yes. Hit latency was the time in milliseconds between the onset of auditory 
presentation of the probe word and correct keyboard response. Participants were not instructed 
to make speeded response in the current paradigm. Nevertheless, hit latencies were reported to 
verify and complement hit rate. 
Looking behaviour: Fixation percentage was used as the main gaze measure and dependent 
variable as in previous looking at nothing studies discussed above (e,g., Wantz et al., 2015). 
Fixation percentage (or fixation frequency) is the percentage of fixations in a trial falling within 
a particular interest area in proportion to total fixations in a trial. Thus, it was computed by 
dividing the number of fixations on each quadrant to the total number of fixations during the 
retrieval phase (see Wenzel, Golenia, & Blankertz, 2016 for a similar computation and use of 
fixation frequency). 
Words in the study were of varying lengths and thus, had different presentation durations. 
Fixation percentage was purposefully chosen as it is immune to such differences in durations. 
Further, we assumed that fixations rather than the time spent on particular region (i.e., dwell 
time per quadrant) are important for the link between memory and eye movements. Fixation-
based measures are reliable indicators of memory load and attention in a given location (e.g., 
Just & Carpenter, 1980; Meghanathan, van Leeuwen, & Nikolaev, 2015). Hence, we preferred 
fixation percentage over dwell time percentage as a more refined indicator of looking at 
nothing2. Accordingly, we expected that participants would fixate on the relevant quadrant to 
derive support from the environment. 
Four rectangular interest areas corresponding to the quadrants were identified. All interest 
areas were of the same size (502 x 368 in pixels, 13.4° x 10.6° of visual angle). They framed 
the rectangular boxes that words were presented in (see Figure 3.1) and were not contiguous 
(see Jahn & Braatz, 2014 for a similar arrangement). Interest areas occupied 93.58% of the 
                                                             
2 The same analyses were performed with dwell time percentages as well and findings were 
consistent with the analyses based on fixation percentages reported here. 
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total screen area. A circular interest area with a diameter of 40 pixels (1.1° of visual angle) was 
defined at the centre of the grid. Participants’ head were positioned on a head and chin rest to 
minimise head movements and we assumed that looking at the centre was the baseline looking 
behaviour in contrast to the looking at the relevant quadrant. Negative correlation between 
looks to the centre and the relevant quadrant confirmed this inverse relationship; rs (46) = -.73, 
p < .0001.  
Proportion of fixations accrued on the interest areas during the retrieval phase (from the 
onset of auditory presentation of the probe word until the participant’s response) were 
calculated. Fixations were a minimum duration of 40 ms. First fixations and fixations outside 
the interest areas (7.91%) were omitted. Only hits (i.e., correct responses) in yes trials were 
included in the fixation analyses. Fixation percentages allocated to the three quadrants that did 
not contain the target probe word were averaged into one and analysed against the relevant 
quadrant in which the probe word was seen. 
 
3.5.2 Mixed-effects modelling 
 
Data were analysed using linear and binomial logit mixed-effects modelling. Visual inspections 
of residual plots did not reveal any obvious deviations from homoscedasticity or linearity. 
Linear models were fit for continuous target variables (hit latency and fixation percentage). 
Binomial models were fit for categorical target variables (hit rate) and with bobyqa optimiser 
to prevent non-convergence. Participants and items were treated as random effects to explain 
by-participant and by-items variation (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008).  
We started fitting models by building the random effects structure and followed a maximal 
approach. That is, random effects were included as both random intercepts and correlated 
random slopes (random variations) as long as they converged and were justified by the data 
(Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). Random intercepts and slopes were included even if 
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they did not improve the model fit in order to control for possible dependence due to repeated 
measures or order effects. In particular, imageability and word length among the lexico-
semantic variables were selected to add as random slopes as long as the models converge. 
Random effects structure was simplified step by step as per the magnitude of the contribution 
of a random effect to the explanation of the variation in the data. That is, the random effect 
with the weakest contribution was dropped first and if necessary, the structure was further 
reduced accordingly. 
Contribution of a fixed effect was investigated by comparing a full model containing the 
effect in question against a reduced model in which only that effect was removed, or a null 
model without any fixed effects. Compared models had the same random effects structure 
(Winter, 2013).  
 
3.5.3 Memory performance 
 
Hit rate 
 
We analysed whether there was a difference in hit rate across congruent and incongruent cue 
conditions. Fixed effect was cue location with two levels (congruent and incongruent cue). 
Imageability was added as random slopes into participants. Imageability and word length were 
added as random slopes into items. Cue location did not improve the model fit when compared 
against a null model; χ2(1) = 0.01, p = .91. In other words, participants retrieved the probe 
words in incongruent cue condition (mean hit rate = 81%) as accurately as congruent cue 
condition (mean hit rate = 81%). Cue location did not improve the model fit either when no 
cue condition (mean hit rate = 82%) was included; χ2(2) = 0.48, p = .79. 
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Hit latency 
 
Linear mixed-effects models were fit to identify any difference in hit latency between cue 
conditions. Fixed effect was cue location with two levels (congruent and incongruent cue). 
Imageability, word length and cue location were added as random slopes into participants. 
Imageability and word length were added as random slopes into items. As in hit rate, likelihood 
tests indicated that there was no difference in hit latency between congruent (mean hit latency 
= 1807.48 ms) and incongruent (mean hit latency = 1830.94 ms) cue condition; χ2(1) = 1.47, p 
= .23. Results did not change when no cue condition (mean hit latency = 1842.84 ms) was 
included; χ2(2) = 2.59, p = .27. 
 
Effect of visuospatial memory on memory performance 
 
The effect of visuospatial memory capacity of participants as measured by Corsi-block tapping 
test on hit rate and hit latency was examined. As reported above, we did not find any differences 
in hit rate or hit latency across cue conditions. Thus, mixed-effects models including all cue 
conditions were fit. Fixed effect was Corsi-block tapping score. 
Hit rate: Imageability was added as random slopes into participants. Corsi-block tapping 
score improved the model fit; χ2(1) = 9.39, p = .002. Participants with better visuospatial 
memory retrieved the probe words from memory more accurately; b = 0.01, z = 3.19, p = .001. 
Hit latency: Word length were added as random slopes into participants. Imageability and 
word length were added as random slopes into items. Corsi-block tapping score did not 
improve the model fit; χ2(1) = 0.55, p = .46. 
 
 
 
 62 
3.5.4 Looking behaviour 
 
Looking at nothing for words 
 
First, we examined whether there was a difference in spontaneous looking times between 
relevant and irrelevant quadrants during the retrieval phase. The target variable was fixation 
percentage in the correctly answered yes trials. Fixed effect was quadrant with two levels 
(relevant and irrelevant quadrant). Imageability was added as random slopes into participants. 
Imageability and word length were added as random slopes into items. Likelihood tests showed 
that quadrant significantly improved the model fit; χ2(1) = 22.85, p < .0001. Overall, 
participants looked significantly more at the relevant quadrant as compared to the irrelevant 
quadrant when retrieving probe words from memory; b = 0.03, t = 4.78, p < .0001. 
 
Effect of visuospatial interference on looking at nothing 
 
We examined looking at the relevant and the irrelevant quadrants within congruent, 
incongruent and no cue conditions separately to specify the effect of visuospatial interference 
on looking at nothing (see Figure 3.2). The target variable was fixation percentage in correctly 
answered yes trials. Fixed effect was quadrant with two levels (relevant and irrelevant 
quadrant). Imageability was added as random slopes into participants; imageability and word 
length were added as random slopes into items in all models. 
Congruent cue condition: Quadrant improved the model fit; χ2(1) = 27.51, p < .0001. 
Participants looked significantly more at the relevant quadrant compared to the irrelevant 
quadrant in congruent cue condition; b = 0.05, t = 5.25, p = .0001. 
No cue condition: Quadrant improved the model fit with a smaller magnitude compared to 
congruent cue condition; χ2(1) = 5.00, p = .03. Participants looked significantly more at the 
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Visuospatial memory and looking behaviour 
 
Visuospatial memory as a predictor of looking at nothing 
 
The effect of visuospatial memory capacity of participants as measured by Corsi-block tapping 
test on looking at the relevant, blank quadrant was investigated. The target variable was fixation 
percentage in the relevant quadrant in correctly answered yes trials. Fixed effect was Corsi-
block tapping score. Word length was added as random slopes into participants; imageability 
was added as random slopes into items in all models. 
Congruent cue condition: Corsi-block tapping score did not predict looks in the relevant 
quadrant; χ2(1) = 1.07, p = .30 or irrelevant quadrant; χ2(1) = 1.50, p = .22. 
No cue condition: Corsi-block tapping score did not predict looks in the relevant quadrant; 
χ2(1) = 0.30, p = .58 or irrelevant quadrant; χ2(1) = 1.52, p = .22. 
Incongruent cue condition: Corsi-block tapping score improved the model fit for fixation 
percentage in the relevant quadrant; χ2(1) = 4.83, p = .03 but not the irrelevant quadrant; χ2(1) 
= 0.67, p = .41. Participants with better visuospatial memory looked less at the relevant 
quadrant during memory retrieval when there was an incongruent cue between encoding and 
retrieval phases; b = -0.0009, t = 2.28, p = .03. 
 
Correlation between visuospatial memory and looking behaviour 
 
We tested the correlation between visuospatial memory as a function of Corsi-block tapping 
test and fixations to relevant, irrelevant and central interest areas under three different cue 
conditions (see Figure 3.3). 
Relevant quadrant: There was a significant, negative correlation between visuospatial 
memory capacity and fixation percentage in the relevant quadrant under incongruent cue 
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condition; rs (46) = -.37, p = .009. Participants with better visuospatial memory tended to look 
less at the relevant quadrant when there was an incongruent cue between encoding and retrieval 
phases. There was not such a correlation within congruent; rs (46) = .20, p = .18 or no cue 
conditions; rs (46) = -.18, p = .22. 
Irrelevant quadrant: There was a significant, negative correlation between visuospatial 
memory capacity and fixation percentage in the irrelevant quadrant under the no cue condition; 
rs (46) = -.29, p = .05. Participants with better visuospatial memory tended to look less at the 
irrelevant quadrant when there was not any cue between encoding and retrieval phases. There 
was not such a correlation within congruent; rs (46) = -.26, p = .07 or incongruent cue 
conditions; rs (46) = -.16, p = .27. 
Central interest area: There was a significant, positive correlation between visuospatial 
memory capacity and fixation percentage in the central interest area under congruent cue 
condition; rs (46) = .39, p = .006, no cue condition; rs (46) = .30, p = .04 and incongruent cue 
condition; rs (46) = .33, p = .02. All conditions combined, participants with better visuospatial 
memory tended to look more at the central interest area; rs (46) = .30, p = .04. 
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score and fixation percentage in the relevant quadrant did not predict hit rate or hit latency (ps 
> .05). 
 
3.6 Discussion 
 
The purpose of the current study is to shed light on the nature of spatial indexing and looking 
at nothing mechanisms and particularly, to investigate the relationship between internal and 
external memory within memory for language. To this end, we asked three questions as to 
automaticity of spatial indexing, dynamicity of spatial indexing and looking at nothing and the 
effect of individual differences in visuospatial memory on looking behaviour.  
 
3.6.1 Looking at previous word locations 
 
Results showed there were significantly more fixations in the relevant, blank region where the 
probe word appeared at the encoding stage relative to other, irrelevant blank regions during 
memory retrieval. In other words, participants looked at nothing when retrieving 
simultaneously and visually presented single words. Our results in the congruent and no cue 
conditions were in line with the previous studies evidencing looking at nothing when 
remembering verbal information (Hoover & Richardson, 2008; D. C. Richardson & Kirkham, 
2004; D. C. Richardson & Spivey, 2000; Scholz et al., 2018, 2011, 2016). That is, we replicated 
the corresponding area effect (Wantz et al., 2015). The novelty of this study lies in the 
linguistic information to be retrieved and how it is encoded and remembered. As discussed in 
introduction, people saw “fact-teller” objects along with the spoken information in the previous 
studies which document looking at nothing for language memory (e.g., Richardson & Spivey, 
2000). Thus, participants associated verbal information with external visual information. Such 
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an explicit indexing might have motivated participants to rely on the environmental sources. 
Whereas, linguistic information was not explicitly associated with any visual object in the 
current study. Further, words appeared in the four cells of the grid at the same time (see 
Vankov, 2011). Lastly, memory was not probed with details about factual information or 
correct/incorrect statements but in a simple recognition memory test. In such a relatively 
minimal and ecologically valid retrieval scenario, participants offloaded memory work onto 
the environment by simulating locations unintentionally when retrieving linguistic information 
from memory. It is also important note that looking at nothing in the present study occurred 
following an intervening task (i.e., judging a maths equation). Simulating spatial locations 
following a demanding task might suggest that looking at nothing is a not mere residual of the 
encoding process but rather, an efficient means of memory retrieval (see Renkewitz & Jahn, 
2012). To put in a nutshell, our findings suggest that looking at nothing could be a more robust 
and ubiquitous behaviour than previously documented.  
One limitation of the current study could be the use of boxes. We aimed to enrich the spatial 
context on the screen by following the methodology in Spivey and Geng (2000) by placing 
words in rectangular boxes at the encoding stage in both experiments. Importantly, participants 
were asked to remember the probe word while looking at a retrieval screen with boxes without 
the words in them. This methodology allowed us to identify narrower and thus, more specific 
interest areas (i.e., boxes) than quadrants of the grid. However, to what extent remembering 
words while looking at a screen with empty boxes meets the definition of looking at “nothing” 
in strict terms can be discussed. Replication studies are necessary to ascertain that word 
locations can be registered, simulated and referred back to via eye movements without any 
contextual enrichment such as boxes (see Chapter 6 for a methodology where words are not 
placed in boxes). 
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3.6.2 Indexing word locations 
 
Visuospatial cues affected spatial indexing and thus, looking at nothing in line with our 
predictions. Participants looked at relevant, blank locations in congruent cue condition, that is, 
when the cue appeared in the same location as to the probe word. Importantly, there were also 
more looks in the relevant quadrant when there was no cue between encoding and retrieval 
stages (pure looking at nothing). Findings from no cue condition suggest that looking at nothing 
is not driven by mere attentional shift. Rather, eye movements in the present study resulted 
from the spatial indices associated with words and thus, were governed by memory for 
language. On the other hand, looking at nothing did not occur when the visuospatial cue 
appeared in a diagonal location as to the original location of the probe word (i.e., incongruent 
cue condition). 
Results indicate that participants formed spatial indices corresponding to simultaneously 
presented single words even though locational information was not required in the memory 
task. Spatial indices were formed for subsequent cues as well. Emergence and magnitude of 
looking at nothing were determined by the relationship between the spatial indices for words 
and cues. Congruent cues reinforced the encoded locations and amplified the corresponding 
area effect as expected. In turn, participants looked more at the relevant locations in congruent 
cue condition as compared to no cue condition. In contrast, incongruent cue functioned as 
interference. When spatial indices associated with words and visual cues did not match, the 
initial index attached to the word was updated. Consequently, eye movements to the relevant, 
blank location were disrupted. It is important to note that participants did not look at any blank 
region (relevant, irrelevant or centre) more than the other regions in incongruent cue condition. 
Such a behaviour suggests that spatial codes corresponding to words and visuospatial cues were 
in competition when they did not refer to the same location. 
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We can conclude that word locations were registered in all cases. Participants were given 
only 1600 ms to study four words leaving 400 ms for each word. Thus, we can argue that word 
locations were encoded almost instantaneously upon the presentation. Further, locations were 
encoded unintentionally suggested by the fact that participants were naïve to the purpose of the 
experiment and they were not instructed to remember word locations (cf., Andrade & Meudell, 
1993; Naveh-Benjamin, 1988). Informal interviews with the participants after the experiment 
suggested that locations were indexed without awareness. In keeping with this, it appears safe 
to argue that spatial indexing mechanism in the current study meets most of the automaticity 
criteria (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). In this regard, our results contrast with Pezdek et al. 
(1986), which shows automatic spatial encoding for objects but not words. 
In conclusion, we present that not only the existence but also the magnitude of looking at 
nothing is determined by the strength and stability of spatial encoding. Although spatial 
indexing and looking at nothing are inherently different processes, they are both linked to each 
other in a dynamic relationship. 
 
3.6.3 Looking at nothing and visuospatial memory 
 
The chief finding of the study is the relation between visuospatial memory capacity and the 
tendency to look at blank locations. To our knowledge, this is the first direct evidence showing 
individual differences in looking at nothing. We showed this relation in predictive and 
correlational analyses. There was a positive correlation between visuospatial memory 
measured with Corsi-block tapping test and fixation percentages in the central interest area 
during retrieval in all cue conditions. Higher visuospatial memory predicted less looking at 
nothing under incongruent cue condition. In line, there were negative correlations between 
visuospatial memory and fixations in relevant (within incongruent cue condition) and irrelevant 
locations (within no cue condition). 
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Taken together, participants with better visuospatial memory, thus richer internal sources, 
looked more at the centre of the screen rather than looking at relevant (or irrelevant) locations. 
Central interest area was the initial and thus, default looking position prompted by a central 
fixation cross shown before each trial. Given that participants’ head was stabilised on the 
chinrest, we assume that participants with better visuospatial memory who “looked” at the 
centre of the screen; in fact, did not look at any specific area. In other words, they sustained 
their attention on the internal sources rather than the external codes in space by not launching 
fixations to relevant, or as a matter of fact, irrelevant regions. Such a looking behaviour can be 
comparable to cases in which individuals avert their gazes (Glenberg, Schroeder, & Robertson, 
1998) or close their eyes (Vredeveldt, Hitch, & Baddeley, 2011) in order to disengage from the 
environment in the face of cognitive difficulty. Here, we surmise that participants with better 
visuospatial memory did not feel the “necessity” to rely on the blank locations as their internal 
memory was sufficient to retrieve the probe word accurately. Thus, they did not look at any 
regions in a task where moving their eyes could drain cognitive sources further (see Scholz et 
al., 2018). This interpretation was supported by the fact that participants with better 
visuospatial memory did better in the memory test in general. 
Further, participants with better visuospatial memory looked less at nothing when they saw 
an incongruent cue. The negative correlation between visuospatial memory and fixations in the 
relevant quadrant within incongruent cue condition illuminates another dimension of the 
coordination between internal and external memory. We argue that additional and incongruent 
visuospatial information made the environment unreliable for a successful memory retrieval. 
In the event of such spatial interference, participants with better visuospatial memory seemed 
to ignore any deictic code either attached to words or cues and, turned to internal sources. It 
appears that unreliability of the external memory was detected as a function of the strength of 
internal visuospatial memory. 
Overall, findings support the integrated memory account (Ferreira et al., 2008; D. C. 
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Richardson et al., 2009) where internal memory representations and spatial indices which are 
internalised with eye movements work cooperatively to realise fast and efficient retrieval. On 
the other hand, results are at odds with the view that looking at nothing is an automatic attempt 
to access contents of the spatial index (Spivey et al., 2004). If looking at nothing were an 
automatic behaviour as spatial indexing, all participants would be expected to display the same 
behaviour regardless of their memory capacity. Rather, results demonstrate that looking at 
nothing systematically changes not only with the task conditions (e.g., memory demands 
coming from the task difficulty) (Scholz et al., 2011; Wantz et al., 2015), encoding conditions 
(e.g., explicit/implicit spatial indexing), or retrieval conditions (e.g., type of retrieval questions, 
grid arrangement) (Spivey & Geng, 2000) but also cognitive differences between individuals. 
Coordination between internal and external memory in looking at nothing presents further 
evidence for the dynamicity account of looking at nothing. 
On a larger scale, findings extend the literature showing that the likelihood of cognitive 
offloading is determined by the abundance of internal sources (Risko & Dunn, 2015). One 
important aspect here is consciousness. Previous studies showing more frequent cognitive 
offloading as a consequence of worse internal capacity typically offers offloading as an option 
to the participants (e.g., Risko & Dunn, 2015). However, looking at nothing is an unintentional 
and presumably an unconscious behaviour in that participants in our study (and previous 
looking at nothing studies reviewed above) were never instructed to pay attention to word 
locations and that they can rely on the environment whenever they encountered retrieval 
difficulty. Even though, they still used the environment in an intelligent way (Kirsh, 1995) and 
further, this behaviour was modulated by their internal capacity. Such an unintentional trade-
off between internal and external memory might suggest that cognitive offloading to minimise 
memory load could be a deeply-entrenched but an unconscious memory strategy. That said, 
consciousness and intentionality were not systematically tested in the current study. Future 
studies should be designed in a way to investigate whether looking at nothing is a completely 
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unconscious behaviour, or whether we have some kind of control on our “decision” to offload 
memory work onto the world. 
 
3.6.4 Looking at nothing and memory performance  
 
Results showed that participants who looked at the relevant, blank locations retrieved the probe 
words more accurately only in congruent cue condition. Accuracy predicted more looks in the 
relevant quadrant within congruent cue condition as well (see Martarelli et al., 2017; Martarelli 
& Mast, 2011; Scholz et al., 2014 for looking at nothing occuring in correct trials but not in 
error trials). Looking at nothing did not predict hit rate in the no cue condition or hit latency in 
none of the conditions. Thus, we did not present any conclusive evidence that looking at 
nothing improves memory performance. It can well be argued that Simon-like congruency 
effect (as in congruent condition) accounts for the enhanced memory rather than fixations in 
the relevant, blank quadrant. Along with that, eye movements at retrieval were not manipulated 
in the current study unlike previous studies (e.g., Scholz et al., 2014). Hence, our method to 
investigate the functionality of gaze position lacks direct causality between looking at nothing 
and accuracy. Consequently, results reported here cannot distinguish whether participants who 
looked at nothing were more accurate or participants who were more accurate also looked at 
nothing. Findings showing partial functionality in the present work should be interpreted 
cautiously due to methodological limitations. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
 
Looking at nothing is a unique case in that it demonstrates how the cognitive system can 
maximize efficiency by spreading the cognitive problem across three domains with the act of 
looking, the environment with the spatial indices and mental representations in the brain. Our 
results extended the current literature by shedding further light on the nature of spatial indexing 
and looking at nothing mechanisms. We provide evidence for automatic and dynamic spatial 
indexing and a dynamic, efficient looking at nothing behaviour for words. The major 
contribution of this study is showing a systematic trade-off between internal and external 
sources driven by individual cognitive differences in order to make the most of environmental 
opportunities and cognitive capacity. Finally, the current looking at nothing paradigm provides 
a venue to study the relationship between language and looking at nothing. 
  
 75 
Chapter 4 
 
Experiment 2  
Simulating Space when Remembering Words: 
Role of Memory Load and Word Imageability 
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4.1 Motivation and Aims 
 
The previous chapter showed that individuals simulate word locations when remembering 
words. More importantly, results revealed a link between internal visuospatial memory and 
looking at nothing. This chapter also focuses on the efficient and opportunistic coordination 
between internal and external memory. Yet, the study described in this chapter addresses the 
differences between the words to be retrieved rather than the differences between individuals 
who retrieve the words. In this respect, we move into the domain of language and investigate 
the effect of different word properties on memory-guided looking behaviour. 
 
4.2 Abstract 
 
People revisit spatial locations of visually encoded information when they are asked to retrieve 
that information, even when the visual image is no longer present. Such “looking at nothing” 
during retrieval is likely modulated by memory load (i.e., mental effort to maintain and 
reconstruct information) and the strength of mental representations. We investigated whether 
words that are more difficult to remember also lead to more looks to relevant, blank locations. 
Participants were presented four nouns on a two by two grid. A number of lexico-semantic 
variables were controlled to form high difficulty and low difficulty noun sets. Results reveal 
more frequent looks to blank locations during retrieval of high difficulty nouns compared to 
low difficulty ones. Mixed-effects modelling demonstrates that imagery-related semantic 
factors (imageability & concreteness) predict looking at nothing during retrieval. Results 
provide the first direct evidence that looking at nothing is modulated by word difficulty and in 
particular, word imageability. Overall, the research provides substantial support to the 
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integrated memory account for linguistic stimuli and looking at nothing as a form of mental 
imagery. 
 
Highlights 
• Remembering less imageable words led to more reliance on the environment during 
retrieval. 
• Experiment 1 was replicated: Participants looked more at relevant, blank locations when 
remembering single words and worse visuospatial memory led to more reliance on the 
environment during retrieval. 
 
4.3 Introduction 
 
4.3.1 Memory load and looking at nothing 
 
Under grounded-embodied (Barsalou, 1999; Wilson, 2002) and extended (A. Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998) views of cognition, human memory exploits available sources in an 
opportunistic and efficient manner. This is particularly the case in the face of increased 
cognitive demands (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). Eye movements to “nothing” (i.e., blank locations 
in space) during memory retrieval is an example of exploitation of external sources to reduce 
memory load (i.e., the mental effort required for the maintenance and retrieval of information), 
and to increase memory efficiency (Scholz et al., 2016). In looking at nothing, an integrated 
memory system attaches spatial information (represented as spatial indices) to information that 
needs to be retrieved during encoding (Ballard et al., 1997; Pylyshyn, 1989; Spivey et al., 
2004). When the visual information itself is absent in retrieval, spatial indices trigger eye 
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movements to the blank locations of the previously presented information (Ferreira, Apel, & 
Henderson, 2008; Richardson & Kirkham, 2004).  
The present study aims to specify the conditions under which memory, as an internal faculty, 
relies on external support via eye movements. Looking at nothing phenomenon presents an 
appropriate example of how eye movements are employed in such coordination between 
internal and so-called “external memory”. To this end, we examined the mechanisms of 
looking at nothing by investigating word retrieval with different lexico-semantic properties. To 
be more precise, we tested whether people rely more on the environmental support by looking 
at blank locations when remembering words that are more difficult to retrieve from memory 
due to their lexico-semantic properties. 
Previously, eye closure, gaze aversion and other nonvisual eye movements that do not 
involve visual processing but accompany mental operations such as memory retrieval have 
been shown to be related to cognitive demands (see Salvi & Bowden, 2016 for a review). For 
instance, people disengage from environmental stimuli by shifting their gaze during 
challenging memory tasks in order to manage memory load (Doherty-Sneddon & Phelps, 2005; 
Glenberg, Schroeder, & Robertson, 1998). People also execute eye movements to search for 
nonvisual information stored in long-term memory and importantly, more frequent eye 
movements are executed when the task requires a more extensive and conceptually-driven 
memory search (i.e., verbal memory compared to visuospatial memory) (Ehrlichman & Micic, 
2012; Ehrlichman & Barrett, 1983). Ballard et al. (1997) were among the first to suggest that 
the cognitive system can tap into eye movements at an embodied level in order to minimise 
memory load. Following a similar line of thought, Spivey and Geng (2000) speculated that 
people might not look at nothing when the answer in a memory task is salient enough to allow 
a response before any eye movements are produced. Johansson et al. (2012) also argued that 
eye movements could serve a supportive role during demanding tasks that involve visuospatial 
imagery. Similarly, Laeng, Bloem, D’Ascenzo and Tommasi (2014) suggest people attend 
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blank locations only if additional spatial information could make a difference in memory 
retrieval. Based on these assumptions and previous studies, a correlation can be expected 
between looks to “now-empty” locations and memory load, where higher load results in more 
frequent eye movements to blank locations. 
Drawing on the potential trade-off between memory load and eye movements, two studies 
demonstrated that changing cognitive demands coming from task difficulty modulate looking 
at nothing. First, in Scholz et al. (2011), participants heard four sentences with a visual cue 
appearing for each sentence in one of the four quadrants across 12 trials. During a retrieval 
phase, participants’ recognition memory was probed with an auditory statement (correct vs. 
incorrect) querying a fact from one of the previously presented sentences. Sentences were 
repeated across the experiment and the proportion of fixations in the relevant, blank quadrant 
(where the corresponding cue had previously appeared) diminished after the first block as the 
retrieval task became easier through repetition. Memory load was high in the first block as the 
information to be retrieved was new and representations were weak. As a consequence, people 
looked at blank locations. However, the relevant information became familiar by the second 
and third blocks. Hence, internal memory no longer required an external aid. Consequently, 
memory load decreased and looking at nothing was not found. 
Mental representations were also shown to play a fundamental role in the link between 
memory load and looking at nothing in a second study showing the effects of decreasing 
cognitive demands on looking at nothing. Wantz et al. (2015) presented participants with an 
object in one quadrant of a two by two grid. Memory for the presented objects was probed with 
a statement about one of the objects as participants looked at a blank screen. The retrieval phase 
was repeated across five sessions (immediately after the encoding, 5 minutes, 1 hour, 24 hours 
and 1 week after the encoding). More looks were directed towards the relevant, blank quadrant 
in the first three sessions compared to looks towards the irrelevant locations. However, looks 
towards the relevant quadrant were not greater in the latter two sessions, compared to looks 
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towards other locations. In other words, people directed gaze less frequently to spatial locations 
associated with previously presented objects one day after the original encoding. This suggests 
that mental representations stabilise over time with repeated retrieval such that revisiting the 
original locations becomes unnecessary (see also Martarelli & Mast, 2013). 
An integrated model of memory (Ferreira et al., 2008; Hoover & Richardson, 2008; D. C. 
Richardson et al., 2009; Spivey et al., 2004) accounts for the relationship between memory-
guided eye movements and memory representations. Under this integrated model, mental 
representations (internal memory) and environmental sources internalised via eye movements 
(external memory) work cooperatively. This model is at odds with “world as its own memory” 
account articulated within the context of radical embodied cognition (e.g., Chemero, 2011). 
The integrated model acknowledges the existence of mental representations that are “well 
suited for interfacing with external structures” (Barsalou, 2010). However, “world as its own 
memory” account rejects the involvement of mental representations in looking at nothing 
(O’Regan, 1992). 
According to the integrated model, representations are integrated and composed of spatial 
and linguistic input. If one part of the representation (e.g., linguistic) is reactivated through 
probing, other parts (e.g., spatial information) will be retrieved from memory as well. Task 
conditions such as repetition can make the linguistic component stronger, which stabilises the 
mental representations as a whole. In turn, people do not “need” to refer to spatial information 
for accurate retrieval. Thus, they look less at nothing. In other words, stronger internal memory 
and stronger mental representations require less environmental support through eye 
movements. In line with this view, Johansson, Holsanova, and Holmqvist (2011) showed that 
people with low spatial imagery ability needed more eye movement support when describing 
a picture from memory using mental imagery. Kumcu and Thompson (2016) also reported less 
reliance on spatial indices during the retrieval of words among individuals with better 
visuospatial memory. 
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There is ample evidence showing that eye movements to blank locations are executed to 
offload memory work onto the environment during demanding memory tasks (see Risko & 
Gilbert, 2016 for a review). However, the nature of this behaviour remains elusive: When does 
the memory system “feel the necessity” to rely on environmental support and when does it turn 
back to internal memory? Does reliance on the environment change from item to item in a 
dynamic manner? If so, what type of information drives eye movements to blank locations? 
We addressed these questions in the current study. More precisely, we investigated whether 
words that are more difficult to remember also lead to more looks to relevant, blank locations. 
We hypothesise that fixations to blank locations are more likely to occur during retrieval of 
more difficult words compared to retrieval of easier words on two accounts: First, retrieval of 
difficult words impose a higher load on memory, which in turn, may make environmental 
support more appealing for the opportunistic memory system. Second, if the verbal component 
of the mental representation is weaker for more difficult words, people may rely on the spatial 
component more heavily by looking at the original location of the word in order to compensate 
for the verbal memory deficiency. 
If the difficulty of individual items modulates eye movements, then we should expect both 
increases and decreases in looking percentages from trial to trial within the same session. 
Evidence for such eye movement behaviour would reveal the ability to switch between internal 
memory (representations) and so-called “external memory” (spatial indices via eye 
movements) in a flexible way. There is evidence for the effect of task difficulty on memory-
guided eye movements as discussed above. However, we lack direct evidence that looking at 
nothing is modulated by word difficulty. 
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4.3.2 Lexico-semantic variables and looking at nothing 
 
Different word properties such as frequency have varying effects on how easily words are 
remembered. If words that are more difficult to remember lead to more reliance on 
environmental support via eye movements, the following question arises: Which lexico-
semantic variables contribute to looking at nothing? Word properties could affect memory-
driven eye movements via two possible channels: Memory load or mental imagery. 
Individual properties of a word that make it difficult to remember (e.g., factors such as 
frequency and age of acquisition) increase memory load (e.g., Collette et al., 2001) and thus, 
might contribute to the tendency to look at nothing. In this regard, one prediction is that lexico-
semantic variables modulate looking at nothing in proportion to their effects on memory 
performance. Distinctiveness enhances memorability in recognition (Eysenck & Eysenck, 
1980; Schulman, 1967). In other words, people are less likely to detect previously seen words 
if they are not distinctive enough. According to a word difficulty prediction, therefore, 
variables which make a word less distinct and thus, more difficult to remember will also 
contribute to looks to blank locations during retrieval. 
Many word properties play a role in verbal recognition memory through distinctiveness. For 
example, worse recognition performance has been evidenced for more frequent (Glanzer & 
Bowles, 1976), more available words (i.e., words that come to mind easily) (Rubin, 1983), 
early-acquired words (Dewhurst, Hitch, & Barry, 1998; but see Coltheart & Winograd, 1986) 
and words that have more orthographically similar neighbours (e.g., “book” – “hook”, “cook”, 
“crook” etc.) (Cortese, Khanna, & Hacker, 2010; Cortese, McCarty, & Schock, 2015). Longer 
words are typically regarded as more distinct. However, more hits (i.e., correctly identifying 
previously seen words as old words) and fewer false alarms (i.e., identifying new words as 
previously seen) were reported for shorter words, suggesting that longer words tax the memory 
system by imposing more load (Cortese et al., 2010, 2015). In a typical recognition memory 
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paradigm, words are presented visually and hence, encoded and retrieved in written form. As 
a result, phonological effects have not been demonstrated. For example, phonological 
similarity (i.e., having more neighbours that sound similar) does not appear to predict 
recognition memory accuracy as opposed to orthographic similarity (e.g., Cortese et al., 2010, 
2015). Pronounceability was reported to have limited effect on recall (Rubin & Friendly, 1986) 
and its effect on recognition memory is not clear. 
Imageability has a critical role in verbal memory (see Paivio, 1991; Schwanenflugel, 1991 
for reviews). Imageability is defined as the extent to which a word evokes a mental image 
(Paivio, Yuille, & Madigan, 1968). For example, “apple” is a highly-imageable word in that 
its meaning can quickly bring a salient picture to mind, which would be similar for most people. 
Whereas, the same cannot be said for low-imageable words such as “offer” or “coincidence”. 
Although these words can also stimulate images to a certain degree, they would not be as strong 
as those associated with high-imageable words. It is well established that words associated with 
perceptually salient, highly imageable objects/concepts are better remembered than those 
associated with low imageable objects/concepts (see Marschark & Cornoldi, 1991 for a 
review). Imageability was shown to be one of the strongest predictors of recognition memory 
(e.g., Cortese et al., 2010, 2015) and recall (Rubin & Friendly, 1986) relative to other variables. 
One prediction tested here is that imageability modulates looking at nothing due to its 
contribution to the mental image of the target word’s referent. Decades of evidence has 
demonstrated that eye movements are instrumental in mental imagery processes (see Mast & 
Kosslyn, 2002 for a review). For instance, Noton and Stark (1971) showed that eye movements 
during imagery are similar to the movements during perception (scanpath theory). Specifically, 
people simulate perception during imagery by re-enacting the eye movements that are executed 
during viewing (Altmann, 2004; Johansson et al., 2012; Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002; but see 
Johansson, Holsanova, & Holmqvist, 2006). Further, eye movements in mental imagery appear 
to support the image generation process (Johansson et al., 2012; Laeng et al., 2014). For 
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instance, the degree of similarity in scanpaths between perception and imagery predicts the 
accuracy of memory for the visual scene (Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002). 
Previously encoded visual or verbal information is “recreated” without any visual stimulus 
when people attend to blank locations during retrieval. Thus, looking at nothing involves 
visuospatial mental imagery by nature. Low-imageable words are expected to have weaker 
mental images as opposed to high-imageable words. In the face of weak mental images, people 
could rely more on external support by looking at blank locations to meet the imagery deficit. 
Alternatively, participants might treat the words as “picture-like” orthographic units when 
remembering them on a blank screen. In such a case, mental images are expected to reflect the 
physical, perceptual properties of the words (e.g., number and shape of letters) rather than 
conceptual elements activated by word meanings (see Hunt & Elliot, 1980). Under this 
prediction, orthographic properties; namely, word length, number of syllables and 
orthographical similarity would be expected to regulate fixations to the blank location. 
In light of the research discussed above, we selected ten variables to control the words in 
the current study (imageability, concreteness3, context availability, pronounceability, age of 
acquisition, frequency, syllable length, length in letters, phonological and orthographic 
similarity). Mixed-effects models were fit to reveal the predictors of looking at nothing. It is 
important to note that imageability is a crucial predictor in both word difficulty and mental 
imagery predictions. Thus, models were fit for the variables predicting memory performance 
as well. If memory-guided eye movements are modulated mainly by word difficulty and 
                                                             
3 Imageability and concreteness are highly correlated, exhibit similar advantages in memory 
(see also Richardson, 1975) and thus, used interchangeably in many studies (e.g., Fliessbach, 
Weis, Klaver, Elger, & Weber, 2006; Nittono, Suehiro, & Hori, 2002; Reilly & Kean, 2007). 
Along with that, we controlled the words on concreteness in addition to imageability due to 
conceptual differences between them (see Vigliocco, Vinson, Druks, Barber, & Cappa, 2011 
for a discussion). Concreteness is typically defined as the extent to which a word can be 
experienced by senses. 
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memory load, predictors of memory performance should also predict looking at nothing. If 
mental imagery, in particular, modulates looks to blank locations, then imageability should 
stand out as a critical predictor of looking at nothing. If mental images corresponding to words 
are based on orthographic properties, word length (in letters and syllables) and orthographical 
similarity rather than imageability should play a role in eye movements to blank locations. 
 
4.3.3 Spatial interference between encoding and retrieval 
 
Finally, we aimed to follow the experimental design in Experiment 1 (Kumcu & Thompson, 
2016) for consistency and comparison. Thus, participants were presented black dots as 
unrelated visual cues between encoding and retrieval phases. Cues were either congruent 
(shown in the same location as to the original location of the probe word) or incongruent 
(shown in a diagonal location as to the original location of the probe word) in addition to a 
“pure” looking at nothing condition without any cue. The cueing condition was designed to 
guide participants’ attention and eye movements to the location of the information held in 
memory (congruent cue) or away from it (incongruent cue) before retrieval. 
There is evidence that additional visual processing within the looking at nothing paradigm 
has consequences both on memory performance and eye movements. For example, in Scholz, 
Klichowicz and Krems (2017), participants were asked to judge the truth of a sentence they 
had encoded in a grid location. At the same time, they were asked to attend a visual tracking 
task (L. E. Thomas & Lleras, 2009). In this task, random string of digits from 0 to 9 appeared 
on the screen and participants had to press a button whenever the digits appeared. Importantly, 
digits always appeared in the same location of the grid in a trial; that is, either congruent or 
incongruent locations with the location associated with the sentence to be retrieved. In one 
condition (overt attention), participants were asked to gaze freely as the visual tracking task 
occurred on the retrieval screen. In the other (covert attention), participants were asked to fixate 
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on the centre and respond when the digits appeared. Participants were less accurate when the 
digit appeared in the incongruent locations compared to the congruent locations both under 
overt or covert attention conditions. Similarly, Kumcu and Thompson (2016) showed that a 
visual cue shown between the encoding and retrieval stages which is congruent with the 
location of the to-be-remembered word reinforces the spatial index of the word and thus, 
amplifies looking at nothing. On the other hand, an incongruent visual cue interferes with 
spatial indexing of the probe word and leads to the disruption of looks to relevant, blank 
locations. 
 In the present study, we investigated how spatial cues modulate the link between retrieval 
difficulty due to lexico-semantic variables and looking behaviour/memory performance. In 
particular, we tested how imageability affects looking at nothing in congruent and no cue 
conditions respectively. If mental imagery is a reinstatement of previous perceptions in the 
absence of any stimulus (Hebb, 1968; Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006), the effect of 
imageability on looking at nothing should be stronger in a no cue condition in comparison to a 
congruent cue condition. There is overwhelming empirical evidence that actual visual 
perception and visual mental imagery share common mechanisms and influence each other 
(Cichy et al., 2012; Ganis et al., 2004; Kosslyn et al., 1997; Perky, 1910). Hence, visual 
perception of a cue could interfere with the generation of a mental image invoked with words 
under congruent cue condition. In turn, this could attenuate the effect of word imageability on 
looking at nothing. Whereas, word imageability could modulate looking behaviour under no 
cue condition; that is, when there is no visual information to interfere between encoding and 
retrieval phases. 
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4.4 Method 
 
4.4.1 Participants 
 
The experiment was carried out with forty-eight students at the University of Birmingham (nine 
males; Mage = 20.06, SD = 2.30, range: 18 - 29). 75% of them were psychology students. All 
participants were monolingual native speakers of British English as determined with the 
Language History Questionnaire version 2.0 (Li, Zhang, Tsai, & Puls, 2013). Participants 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no speech or hearing difficulties and no history 
of any neurological disorder. They received either £10 (n = 27) or course credit (n = 21) for 
participation. All participants were fully informed about the details of the experimental 
procedure and gave written consent. Post-experiment debriefing revealed that all participants 
were naïve to the purpose of the experiment. No participant was replaced.  
 
4.4.2 Materials 
 
There were 180 trials involving 810 unique nouns in total. All words were drawn from the 
extensions of Paivio, Yuille and Madigan norms for 925 nouns (J. M. Clark & Paivio, 2004). 
The word pool was filtered to exclude words shorter than three letters and longer than 11 letters. 
Trials were evenly divided into two (n = 90) as high difficulty and low difficulty word 
groups based on the mean imageability of the whole set (4.99). It is not viable to manipulate 
one dimension by holding others constant due to intercorrelations between the variables. Thus, 
high difficulty words were less imageable, more abstract, less available, less pronounceable, 
learnt later in life, longer (both in number of letters and syllables) and had less phonologic and 
orthographic similarity with other words in the language (see Table 4.1).  
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Both high and low difficulty groups were further divided into yes and no trials (n = 45). 
Probe words in the yes trials were among the four study words in the encoding phase, whereas 
a different, not seen, word was probed in the “no trials”. There were no significant differences 
in any of the variables between yes and no groups within high and low difficulty word groups 
(all ps > .05). 
Words were then grouped into smaller trial sets of four (yes trials) and five words (no trials). 
Words within sets were matched on all variables (all SDs < 2.00) both in the yes and no trials. 
Words were further controlled such that no word started with the same letter or had any 
semantic relationship with any other word in the set. Monosyllabic, disyllabic and trisyllabic 
words were evenly distributed [e.g., (3, 3, 3, 3), (1, 2, 1, 2) or (3, 2, 3, 2, 3) etc.]. 
The word in each trial set with median imageability was selected as the probe leaving the 
others as distractors. Welch’s t-tests revealed no significant differences between the probe and 
distractor words in any of the variables or in any of the four sub groups (i.e., high difficulty 
yes, low difficulty yes, high difficulty no, low difficulty no) (all ps > .05). Thus, any word 
among the four or five words in each trial set was as likely to be remembered as any other word 
in the same set. 
Finally, we formed 180 unique mathematical equations [e.g., (2*3) - (2+3) = 1] to present 
as memory interference between encoding and retrieval phases (see Conway & Engle, 1996 
for a similar design). Half of the equations were correct. Incorrect equations were further 
divided into two equal groups: The results were either plus or minus one of the correct result. 
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Table 4.1 Differences in lexico-semantic variables between high and low difficulty words shown as mean 
values, standard deviations in parentheses and Welch’s t-test statistics 
 
Variable High difficulty words Low difficulty words t p 
Imageability 3.78 (0.88) 6.19 (0.43) 49.55 < .0001 
Concreteness 3.55 (1.45) 6.51 (0.65) 37.41 < .0001 
Length in letters 7.45 (1.88) 6.13 (1.78) -10.30 < .0001 
Number of syllables 2.59 (0.90) 1.85 (0.77) -12.64 < .0001 
Orthographic similarity 2.89 (0.52) 3.15 (0.73) 5.63 < .0001 
Phonological similarity 2.80 (0.73) 3.32 (1.04) 8.22 < .0001 
Pronounceability 6.23 (0.63) 6.53 (0.43) 8.12 < .0001 
Age of acquisition 4.96 (0.89) 3.64 (1.05) -19.29 < .0001 
Availability 2.07 (0.80) 2.28 (0.78) 3.68 < .001 
Frequency 1.10 (0.70) 1.16 (0.66) 1.09 .28 
 
4.4.3 Apparatus 
 
Stimuli were presented on a TFT LCD 22-inch widescreen monitor operating at 60 Hz with a 
resolution of 1680 x 1050 pixels (501.7 mm x 337.4 mm). The monitor was placed 640 mm in 
front of the participant. A chin and forehead rest was used to reduce head movements. 
Participants’ eye movements were monitored using SR EyeLink® 1000 (sampling rate: 1000 
Hz, spatial resolution < 0.5°, http://sr-research.com/eyelink1000.html). Viewing was binocular 
but only the left eye was monitored. Auditory material was produced by a native female speaker 
of British English in a sound attenuated room and recorded using Audacity (version 2.1.10, 
https://www.audacityteam.org). Participants responded (yes/no they had seen the word) by 
pressing one of two keys on a standard keyboard. Eye movement data were extracted using the 
SR EyeLink Data Viewer (version 2.4.0.198, https://www.sr-research.com/data-viewer/). No 
drift or blink correction procedure was applied. 
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Data were analysed and visualised in R programming language and environment (R Core 
Team, 2017). Mixed-effects models were constructed with lme4 package (Bates, Mächler, 
Bolker, & Walker, 2015). Significance values of the coefficients in models were computed 
based on the t-distribution using the Satterthwaite approximation with lmerTest package 
(Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2015). 
 
4.4.4 Procedure 
 
We followed the procedure in Experiment 1 (Kumcu & Thompson, 2016). Eye tracking started 
with a standard nine-point calibration and validation, which confirmed high data quality 
(average calibration error < 1° and maximum calibration error < 1.50°). As spelled out in detail 
below, each trial was composed of five consecutive phases: (1) fixation, (2) encoding, (3) 
cueing, (4) interference and (5) retrieval (See Figure 4.1). The task was to decide whether an 
auditorily presented word had appeared before or not (i.e., yes/no verbal recognition memory 
test). As soon as the participants made yes/no judgement by hitting one of the response buttons, 
the trial ended, and a new encoding phase began. 
(1) Fixation: A fixation cross appeared at the centre of the screen for 500 ms. (2) Encoding: 
Participants were presented four words in capital letters on a 2 x 2 grid for 1800 ms. Words 
(Times New Roman, font size = 40) were centrally placed in rectangular boxes (300 x 85 in 
pixels, 8° x 2.4° of visual angle). Word difficulty was a within-subjects variable and all 
participants saw the high and low difficulty words. (3) Cueing: A flashing black dot appeared 
in cue trials for 1000 ms either in the same (congruent cue) or in the diagonal quadrant 
(incongruent cue) as the original location of the probe word in the encoding phase. There was 
also a third condition where no cue was presented between encoding and interference. Cue 
condition was a within-subjects variable and three cue conditions were randomly presented in 
a session. That said, an equal number of random participants (n = 16) saw the same probe word 
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with a congruent cue, an incongruent cue or without any cue. (4) Interference: Participants 
were presented a mathematical equation and asked to identify whether the equation was correct 
or not within 20,000 ms (or they timed-out). (5) Retrieval: The probe word was auditorily 
presented as participants looked at the blank grid with empty boxes. There was a 500 ms gap 
between the presentation of the blank retrieval screen and the presentation of the probe word. 
Participants were asked to make an unspeeded yes/no judgement to determine whether they 
had seen the probe word among the four words shown in the encoding phase within 20,000 ms 
(or they timed-out). 
The order of trials and equations were fully randomised independent of each other. The 
location of all words in all conditions was counterbalanced with Latin Square design to control 
gaze biases so that each word appeared an equal number of times in each location of the grid. 
The experiment was divided into four equal blocks with 45 trials in each block and there was 
a short pause between blocks. A typical session lasted approximately 100 minutes, including 
consent and setting up the eye tracker. Overall accuracy in interference equations and in the 
recognition memory test for words were 88% and 78% respectively, suggesting that 
participants attended to the task with high concentration. 
Following the experiment, a computerized version of the Corsi block-tapping task (Corsi, 
1972) operated on PEBL (Psychology Experiment Building Language, version 0.13, test 
battery version 0.7, http://pebl.org) (Mueller & Piper, 2014) was used to measure visuospatial 
short-term memory and Gordon Test of Visual Image Control (Gordon, 1949) was 
administered to measure subjective ability with regard to manipulation of mental images.  
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4.5 Results 
 
4.5.1 Measures 
 
Results were analysed in two parts as memory performance and looking behaviour.  
Memory performance: Hit rate, hit latency and correct rejection rate were used as 
measures of memory performance. Hit rate was the proportion of yes trials to which the 
participants correctly responded yes. Correct rejection rate was the proportion of no trials to 
which the participants correctly responded no. Hit latency was the time in milliseconds between 
the onset of auditory presentation of the probe word and correct keyboard response. 
Participants were not instructed to make speeded response in the current paradigm. 
Nevertheless, hit latencies were reported to verify and complement the indicators of memory 
performance based on accuracy. 
Looking behaviour: Fixation percentage was used as the main gaze measure and dependent 
variable as in previous looking at nothing studies discussed above (e.g., Wantz et al., 2015). 
Fixation percentage (or fixation frequency) is the percentage of fixations in a trial falling within 
a particular interest area in proportion to total fixations in a trial. Thus, it was computed by 
dividing the number of fixations on each quadrant to the total number of fixations during the 
retrieval phase (see Wenzel, Golenia, & Blankertz, 2016 for a similar computation and use of 
fixation frequency). 
Proportion of fixations was selected as the main indicator of looking behaviour on two 
grounds: First, it is immune to differences in durations. To be more precise, fixation percentage 
was considered appropriate particularly for comparing two different conditions (high and low 
difficulty words) with varying trial durations due to differences in word length between high 
and low difficulty words. Second, we assumed that fixations rather than the time spent on 
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particular region (i.e., dwell time per quadrant) is important for the link between memory and 
eye movements. Fixation-based measures are reliable indicators of memory load and attention 
in a given location (e.g., Just & Carpenter, 1980; Meghanathan, van Leeuwen, & Nikolaev, 
2015). Hence, we preferred fixation percentage over dwell time percentage as a more refined 
indicator of looking at nothing4. Accordingly, we expected that participants would fixate on 
the relevant quadrant to derive support from the environment. 
Four rectangular interest areas corresponding to the quadrants were identified. All interest 
areas were of the same size (502 x 368 in pixels, 13.4° x 10.6° of visual angle). They framed 
the rectangular boxes that words were presented in (see Figure 4.1) and were not contiguous. 
Proportion of fixations accrued on the interest areas during the retrieval phase (from the onset 
of auditory presentation of the probe word until the participant’s response) were calculated. 
Fixations were a minimum duration of 40 ms. First fixations and fixations outside the interest 
areas (8.62%) were omitted. Only hits (i.e., correct responses) in yes trials were included in the 
fixation analyses. Fixation percentages allocated to the three quadrants that did not contain the 
target probe word were averaged into one and analysed against the relevant quadrant in which 
the probe word was seen. 
 
4.5.2 Mixed-effects modelling 
 
Data were analysed using linear and binomial logit mixed-effects modelling. Visual inspections 
of residual plots did not reveal any obvious deviations from homoscedasticity or linearity. 
Linear models were fit for continuous target variables (hit latency and fixation percentage). 
Binomial models were fit for categorical target variables (hit rate and correct rejection rate) 
and with bobyqa optimiser to prevent non-convergence. Participants and items were treated as 
                                                             
4 The same analyses were performed with dwell time percentages as well and findings were 
consistent with the analyses based on fixation percentages reported here. 
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random effects to explain by-participant and by-items variation (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 
2008). 
We started fitting models by building the random effects structure and followed a maximal 
approach. That is, random effects were included as both random intercepts and correlated 
random slopes (random variations) as long as they converged and were justified by the data 
(Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). Random intercepts and slopes were included even if 
they did not improve the model fit in order to control for possible dependence due to repeated 
measures or order effects. Random effects structure was simplified step by step as per the 
magnitude of the contribution of a random effect to the explanation of the variation in the data. 
That is, the random effect with the weakest contribution was dropped first and if necessary, the 
structure was further reduced accordingly. 
Two approaches were adopted when building the fixed effects structure. Contribution of a 
fixed effect was investigated by comparing a full model containing the effect in question 
against a reduced model in which only that effect was removed, or a null model without any 
fixed effects. Compared models had the same random effects structure (Winter, 2013). Best-
fit model was specified by starting with a full model which included all fixed effects and their 
interactions (Bates et al., 2015). The full model was then reduced systematically in each step 
until the null model. Models were then compared using anova function to identify the model 
offering the best-fit by Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC), where lower is better in both cases (Hilbe, 2011) (see Appendix for the outputs of the 
best-fit models). 
 
4.5.3 Factor analysis 
 
The effect of lexico-semantic predictors on looking at nothing and memory performance were 
examined. Thus, we conceptualised fixation percentage in blank location, hit rate, hit latency 
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and correct rejection rate as a function of length in letters, syllable length, orthographic 
similarity, phonological similarity, age of acquisition, frequency, availability, 
pronounceability, imageability and concreteness. 
However, diagnostic tests indicated collinearity between the predictors as identified with 
the correlation matrix, variance inflation factors (VIF) (M = 3.60, range = 2.42 - 5.13) and 
kappa (96.34). In order to address collinearity, we performed exploratory factor analysis and 
clustered the variables in components. Results of Bartlett’s test of sphericity, χ2(45) = 
17011.77, p < .0001 and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (.78) supported 
the existence of factors within the data. Hence, we proceeded to conduct the factor analysis 
using a principal component analysis extraction method with an orthogonal (varimax) rotation 
method. Both Kaiser’s criterion and the scree test criterion indicated the presence of three 
factors in our data. This conclusion was also supported by the percentage of variance criterion 
(Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2009), which suggests that all retained factors should account 
for at least 60% of the total variance. The three-factor solution in our analysis explained 78.24% 
of the variance in the data. Communalities of all predictors were above .70 (Mean communality 
= 78.23; see Table 4.2) suggesting that all measures were adequately accounted for by the 
three-factor solution. As suggested by (Hair et al., 2009), only factor loadings above .40 (or 
below -.40) were considered to meet the minimal level for interpretation of factor structure. 
Factor loadings did not have substantial loadings on other factors and they showed particularly 
clean clustering (except for age of acquisition). Further, the factors themselves had substantial 
loadings only for those variables, thus other variables did not load on these factors.  
Three factors were interpreted as follows based on the loadings (see Table 4.2): (1) 
Imagery: Imageability and concreteness. (2) Lexical: Age of acquisition, frequency, 
availability and pronounceability. (3) Length & similarity: Length in letters, syllable length, 
orthographic similarity and phonological similarity. Age of acquisition seemed to contribute to 
all three factors to a certain degree. It was therefore considered within the lexical factor on 
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theoretical grounds, its loading and in line with previous factor analyses (e.g., J. M. Clark & 
Paivio, 2004) VIF of the factors were below one and thus, below our threshold of two. 
Regression scores calculated for the three factors were employed both as predictors and 
random slopes in the subsequent linear mixed-effects multiple regression models. Regression 
scores were additionally recalculated for each subset in each analysis. As expected, factor 
analyses extracted similar factor loadings and produced the same three-factor solutions. 
 
Table 4.2 Varimax rotated factor-loadings and communalities of the predictors 
 
 Factor  
Predictors Imagery Lexical Length & similarity  h2 
Imageability 0.91 0.17 0.25 0.93 
Concreteness 0.92 -0.04 0.18 0.89 
Frequency -0.05 0.91 0.00 0.82 
Availability 0.01 0.81 0.29 0.74 
Pronounceability 0.20 0.79 0.33 0.76 
Age of acquisition -0.48 -0.61 -0.37 0.74 
Phonological similarity 0.14 0.20 0.89 0.85 
Syllable length -0.18 -0.17 -0.87 0.82 
Length in letters -0.20 -0.13 -0.84 0.77 
Orthographic similarity 0.22 0.30 0.73 0.68 
Factor statistics     
Eigenvalue 2.10 2.67 3.22 7.99 
Variance (%) 21.03 26.73 32.16 79.93 
Bolded numbers indicate the groupings. Eigenvalues and percentage of variance are after rotation. h2 = 
communality 
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4.5.4 Memory performance 
 
Hit rate 
 
First, we analysed whether there was a difference in hit rate across congruent and incongruent 
cue conditions. The fixed effect was cue location with two levels (congruent and incongruent 
cue). Imagery and length & similarity factors were added as random slopes into participants. 
Imagery, lexical and length & similarity factors were added as random slopes into items. Cue 
location did not improve the model fit when compared against a null model; χ2(1) = 1.16, p = 
.28. In other words, participants retrieved the probe words in incongruent cue condition (mean 
hit rate = 79%) as accurately as congruent cue condition (mean hit rate = 77%). Cue location 
did not improve the model fit either when no cue condition (mean hit rate = 78%) was included; 
χ2(2) = 1.18, p = .55. 
Second, we examined lexico-semantic variables modulating hit rate. As reported above, we 
did not find any differences in hit rate across cue conditions. Thus, mixed-effects models 
including all cue conditions were fit. All factors (i.e., imagery, lexical and length & similarity 
factors) were added as random slopes both into participants and items. Imagery factor improved 
the model fit significantly; χ2(1) = 13.20, p = .0003. Length & similarity factor contributed to 
the model with even higher magnitude; χ2(1) = 24.49, p < .0001. Whereas, lexical factor was 
not predictive of hit rate; χ2(1) = 0.02, p = .90. The best-fit model converged with length & 
similarity and imagery factors; χ2(1) = 13.19, p = .0003. This model was supported by a large 
AIC difference of 11.2 and a BIC difference of 4.8 compared to the next best model converged 
with length & similarity factor only. Participants were more accurate when retrieving high 
imageable & concrete; b = 0.18, z = 3.96, p < .0001 and shorter & less similar words; b = 0.24, 
z = 4.86, p < .0001. 
 99 
Length & similarity included four different variables (phonological similarity, orthographic 
similarity, length in letters and syllable length) which might have contradicting effects on the 
memory performance. We therefore fitted simpler models in order to identify the individual 
effects of the variables on hit rate within length & similarity factor. In order to avoid 
collinearity, we selected length in letters from the word length set and orthographic similarity 
from the similarity set as fixed effects (VIF < 2). Models including word length and 
orthographic similarity as random slopes within items and word length within participants 
indicated that hit rate was predicted by word length; χ2(1) = 23.89, p < .0001 but not 
orthographic similarity; χ2(1) = 0.12, p = .73. Participants were more accurate when retrieving 
shorter words; b = -0.12, z = 5.79, p < .0001. Models with syllable length and phonological 
similarity did not change the results.  
 
Hit latency 
 
Linear mixed-effects models were fit to identify any difference in hit latency between cue 
conditions. Imagery and length & similarity factors were added as random slopes into 
participants. Imagery, lexical and length & similarity factors were added as random slopes into 
items. As in hit rate, likelihood tests indicated that there was no difference in hit latency 
between congruent (mean hit latency = 1978.22 ms) or incongruent (mean hit latency = 2057.67 
ms) cue conditions; χ2(1) = 2.16, p = .14. Results did not change when no cue condition (mean 
hit latency = 2027.86 ms) was included; χ2(2) = 2.04, p = .36. 
Next, we investigated the effect of lexico-semantic factors on hit latency. Imagery, lexical 
and length & similarity factors were added as random slopes into participants. Imagery and 
length & similarity factors were added as random slopes into items. All three factors, that is, 
lexical factor; χ2(1) = 4.62, p = .03, imagery factor; χ2(1) = 6.14, p = .01 and with a considerably 
higher magnitude, length & similarity factor; χ2(1) = 34.29, p < .0001 predicted hit latency. 
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Thus, the best-fit model converged with all three factors as the fixed effects; χ2(1) = 4.34, p = 
.04. Participants were faster to retrieve high imageable & concrete; b = -48.66, t = 2.38, p = 
.02 and shorter & less similar words; b = -83.24, t = 4.73, p < .0001. They were slower to 
retrieve more frequent, more available, more pronounceable words which were learned earlier 
in life; b = 41.49, t = 2.13, p = .04. 
As in hit rate, simpler models with word length and orthographic similarity demonstrated 
that hit latency was predicted by word length; χ2(1) = 8.57 p = .003 but not orthographic 
similarity; χ2(1) = 0.49, p = .49. Participants were faster to retrieve shorter words; b = 44.5, t = 
4.78, p < .0001. Models with syllable length and phonological similarity did not change the 
results. Correlation between variables within lexical factor (i.e., frequency, availability, 
pronounceability and age of acquisition) did not allow us to investigate their individual effects 
on hit latency due to high collinearity (VIF > 2). 
 
Correct rejection rate 
 
Correct rejection rate was the proportion of “no trials” to which the participants correctly 
responded no. Visual cues in yes trials were located according to the location of the probe 
words at encoding; whereas, a different, not seen, word was probed in no trials. Thus, “no 
trials” were not presented with different cue conditions and there is necessarily no effect of cue 
for these trials. As a result, only the effect of lexico-semantic variables on correct rejections 
was investigated. 
Imagery, lexical and length & similarity factors were added as random slopes into items. 
Participants were added as a random intercept as the random-slope model did not converge. 
None of the lexico-semantic variables predicted correct rejection rate: [length & similarity 
factor; χ2(1) = 3.23, p = .07, imagery factor; χ2(1) = 0.13, p = .72, lexical factor; χ2(1) = 0.23, 
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p = .63]. Word length and orthographic similarity as raw values rather than regression scores 
of the length & similarity factor did not predict correct rejection rate either. 
 
4.5.5 Looking behaviour 
 
Looking at nothing 
 
We first analysed whether participants looked at nothing during memory retrieval. In other 
words, we investigated whether there were more looks to relevant, blank locations where probe 
words were shown at the encoding stage compared to irrelevant, blank locations. 
The target variable was fixation percentage in correctly answered yes trials. The fixed effect 
was quadrant with two levels (relevant and irrelevant quadrant). Imagery, lexical and length & 
similarity factors were added as random slopes into participants and items.  
Quadrant improved the model fit when all cue conditions were factored in; χ2(1) = 8.60, p 
= .003. Models with a single cue condition indicated that quadrant improved the model fit in 
congruent; χ2(1) = 5.70, p = .02 and in no cue conditions; χ2(1) = 5.39, p = .02 but not in 
incongruent cue condition; χ2(1) = 0.13, p = .72. That is, participants looked more at the 
relevant location in congruent; b = 0.02, t = 2.39, p = .02 and no cue conditions; b = 0.02, t = 
2.32, p = .02. However, they did not look at nothing when they were shown a visual cue that 
was incongruent with the original location of the probe word during encoding. Hence, we 
analysed the effect of word difficulty and lexico-semantic predictors on looking at nothing in 
congruent and no cue conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 102 
Effect of word difficulty on looking at nothing 
 
A further sub-analysis was performed on the two conditions with overall evidence of looking 
at nothing behaviour (congruent and no cue conditions), in order to determine the role of word 
difficulty. Linear mixed-effects models with high and low difficulty word sets were fit 
separately. The target variable was fixation percentage in correctly answered yes trials. Fixed 
effect was quadrant with two levels (relevant and irrelevant quadrant). All lexico-semantic 
factors were included into participants and items as random slopes. 
Congruent cue condition: Quadrant improved the model fit for high difficulty; χ2(1) = 
7.00, p = .008 but not low difficulty word set; χ2(1) = 0.59, p = .44. Participants looked more 
at the relevant quadrant than the irrelevant quadrant only when retrieving more difficult words; 
b = 0.04, t = 2.65, p = .008 (see Figure 4.2). 
No cue condition: Quadrant improved the model fit in high difficulty words set with a 
higher magnitude than the congruent cue condition; χ2(1) = 9.59, p = .002. Quadrant did not 
improve the model fit in low difficulty words set; χ2(1) = 0.08, p = .77. Participants looked 
more at the relevant quadrant than the irrelevant quadrant when retrieving more difficult words; 
b = 0.04, t = 3.10, p = .002 (see Figure 4.2). 
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fixation percentage in the relevant quadrant in correctly answered yes trials. Imagery and length 
& similarity factor were added as random slopes into participants. Imagery factor was added 
as random slopes into items. 
Congruent cue condition: Imagery factor; χ2(1) = 3.21, p = .07, length & similarity factor; 
χ2(1) = 1.27, p = .26 or lexical factor; χ2(1) = 0.24, p = .62 did not significantly predict fixation 
percentage in the relevant quadrant. Along with that, the best-fit model explaining the data was 
fit with imagery factor; b = -0.02, t = 1.76, p = .08 based on AIC (0.74) and BIC differences 
(5.75) as to the next best model converged with imagery and length & similarity factors. 
No cue condition: Imagery factor predicted fixation percentage in the relevant quadrant; 
χ2(1) = 4.31, p = .04. Length & similarity; χ2(1) = 1.37, p = .24 or lexical factor; χ2(1) = 0.69, 
p = .41 were not significant predictors of looking at nothing. As a result, the best-fit model 
explaining the data was the one with imagery as the fixed effect; χ2(1) = 4.06, p = .04. Higher 
imageability and concreteness predicted less fixations in the relevant quadrant; b = -0.02, t = 
2.03, p = .04.  
 
4.5.6 Additional analyses 
 
Functionality of looking at nothing 
 
The current experiment was not designed to test the functionality of looking behaviour in 
memory. Nevertheless, we examined whether memory performance was predicted by the 
proportion of fixations in the relevant, blank locations. Imagery factor was added as random 
slopes into participants. Imagery and length & similarity factors were added as random slopes 
into items. Looks to relevant, blank locations did not predict hit rate (congruent cue; b = 0.30, 
z = 1.24, p = .22, no cue; b = 0.02, z = 0.09, p = .93) or hit latency (congruent cue; b = -64.77, 
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t = 0.70, p = .49, no cue; b = 85.31, t = 0.78, p = .44). Models fit with high difficulty or low 
difficulty words only did not change the results. 
 
Mental imagery control and looking at nothing 
 
Additionally, we investigated the correlation between subjective measures of mental imagery 
control and looking at nothing. There was a positive correlation between mental imagery 
control and fixation in the relevant quadrant in no cue condition; rs (46) = .34, p = .02 but not 
in congruent; rs (46) = .23, p = .11 or incongruent cue condition; rs (46) = .04, p = .81. 
Participants who reported to control their mental imagery better used space more frequently in 
the memory task when there was no visual cue between encoding and retrieval stages. 
 
Visuospatial memory and looking at nothing 
 
The current experiment did not specifically address the link between visuospatial memory and 
looking at nothing. Along with that, we investigated whether the effect of visuospatial memory 
on looking behaviour is robust enough to replicate. Results in Experiment 1 were replicated. 
There was a significant, negative correlation between visuospatial memory capacity and 
fixation percentage in the irrelevant quadrant under the no cue condition; rs (46) = -.35, p = .01. 
There was also a significant, positive correlation between visuospatial memory capacity and 
fixation percentage in the central interest area when all cue conditions combined; rs (46) = .37, 
p = .01. Participants with better visuospatial memory tended to look more at the centre in all 
cue conditions and look less at the irrelevant quadrant in no cue condition. 
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4.6 Discussion 
 
We investigated (1) whether looking at nothing increases as participants are asked to study and 
retrieve more difficult words in a yes/no recognition memory paradigm and if so, (2) which 
lexico-semantic variable(s) predict the change in memory-guided eye movements to relevant, 
blank location. We further tested how a visual cue presented between encoding and retrieval 
stages modulates the effects of word difficulty and word properties on memory performance 
and looking at nothing. 
As shown in Experiment 1 (Kumcu & Thompson, 2016), participants displayed looking at 
nothing behaviour in congruent and no cue conditions but not in the incongruent cue condition. 
Incongruent cues functioned as interference. That is, the spatial index associated with the probe 
word was updated with a visual cue that did not match with the word’s original location. In 
turn, the spatial index attached to the word and the spatial index attached to the visual cue 
competed and disrupted eye movements to blank locations. As looking at nothing behaviour 
was not exhibited in the incongruent cue condition, we investigated the effect of word difficulty 
and word properties on eye movements under congruent and no cue conditions. 
We also examined memory performance under different retrieval conditions (cue conditions 
and high difficulty vs. low difficulty words) to verify the experimental manipulations and to 
compare against looking behaviour results. Unlike their effect on fixations, cue locations did 
not affect memory performance. Participants performed equally well under all retrieval 
conditions as demonstrated by both hit rate and hit latency. On the other hand, memory 
performance was superior in the retrieval of low difficulty words in comparison to high 
difficulty words as expected. Taken together, it is probable that visual cues were salient enough 
to modulate eye movements but not memory performance as memory performance was based 
more on the nonvisual, verbal parameters. 
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In line with our hypothesis, participants looked more at the blank, relevant quadrant 
compared to irrelevant quadrants when retrieving high difficulty words but not low difficulty 
words in congruent and no cue conditions. That is, participants relied on additional external 
sources when memory load was high, and they returned back to internal memory sources only 
when memory load decreased. We conceptualised memory load as the mental effort to maintain 
and reconstruct information as a function of difficulty. In this respect, such retrieval behaviour 
is in line with previous studies showing a proportional relation between memory load (via 
difficulty) and looking at nothing (Scholz et al., 2011; Wantz et al., 2015), where increase in 
load triggers eye movements. Additionally, the current study provides the first evidence that 
word difficulty as a function of lexico-semantic properties, modulates looking behaviour 
directly in memory. 
Participants were likely to form stronger representations for low difficulty words. Retrieving 
these words required less mental effort as opposed to words that are more difficult to remember. 
Consequently, internal memory involving mental representations was sufficient to retrieve the 
probe word and solve the memory problem (i.e., yes/no judgement) accurately. However, 
integrated memory engaged spatial indices when retrieving difficult words. Thereby, the verbal 
component of the memory representations corresponding to high difficulty words was 
reinforced with stronger spatial information through eye movements and, as a consequence, 
memory load was alleviated (Ferreira et al., 2008). 
High difficulty words in the current study were in fact more distinctive than low difficulty 
words in orthographic & phonological similarity, age of acquisition, availability and 
pronounceability. That is, high difficulty words were less similar with others in the lexicon, 
learnt at later ages, less available (i.e., do not come to mind easily) and less pronounceable. If 
high difficulty words were more distinctive in these variables, then why did participants still 
retrieve low difficulty words more accurately than high difficulty words? The variables which 
made high difficulty words more distinctive (i.e., orthographic & phonological similarity, age 
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of acquisition, availability and pronounceability) did not play a role in hit rate in the current 
study. Major predictors of hit rate, and by extension we assume, memory load, were word 
length, imageability and concreteness. Low difficulty words were more imageable, more 
concrete and shorter (in letters and syllables). As a result, low difficulty words imposed less 
load on memory and were retrieved more accurately. 
The results have important implications for theories postulating that cognitive work can be 
offloaded onto the environment (Risko & Gilbert, 2016) and for the dynamics of looking at 
nothing, in particular. First, we clearly showed that participants switched from internal to 
external sources swiftly and efficiently from trial to trial given that difficulty was a randomised, 
within-subjects variable in the current study. Such behaviour suggests that memory retrieval 
from internal and so-called “external memory” is not binary, but a dynamic process. Depending 
on the immediate memory load and strength of memory representations, retrieval behaviour 
hovers between the two extremes of a spectrum, where internal memory (representations) is on 
one end and external memory (spatial indices internalised via eye movements) on the other. 
Our results are in contrast to accounts that reject the existence of mental representations 
(Chemero, 2011), instead claiming that the external world is its own memory (e.g., O’Regan, 
1992). Rather, findings support the position that the external world has a supportive role in 
memory (Ferreira et al., 2008; Johansson et al., 2011; Richardson et al., 2009). Eye movements 
are of particular importance in this pattern as they bind the internal representations to external 
information. 
Whether or not eye movements are employed consciously as a memory strategy remains an 
unanswered question. There is evidence that explicit external support such as writing down to-
be-remembered information is co-opted intentionally when it is offered as a choice (Risko & 
Dunn, 2015). We did not address this question in the current study. However, informal queries 
with the participants following the experiment revealed that they were not aware of the 
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manipulation and did not look at the blank location with the intention of alleviating memory 
load (see also Johansson & Johansson, 2014; Scholz et al., 2014). 
We did not present any evidence that looking at nothing has a functional role in memory. 
However, a number of studies demonstrated that looking at relevant, blank locations improves 
memory performance for both verbal and visual information (Johansson & Johansson, 2014; 
Scholz et al., 2018, 2016). What lies behind this discrepancy? We argue that the main reason 
is the difference in the experimental paradigms. Participants were instructed to look at either 
relevant or irrelevant quadrants during retrieval in the abovementioned studies evidencing 
functionality of looking at nothing. We did not design the current paradigm to test whether 
looking at nothing improves memory performance. Thus, eye movements were not 
manipulated, and all participants gazed freely during the retrieval phase. As a supplementary 
analysis, we tested whether fixations in the relevant, blank quadrant predict memory 
performance using mixed-effects models. As Martarelli et al. (2017) assert, the best way to 
understand functionality of looks to blank locations seems to be the manipulation of eye 
position at retrieval. In the current study, participants might have used other strategies to 
retrieve information from memory when they were not forced to look at certain positions on 
the screen. 
Another possibility could be the difference in verbal information to be retrieved. In Scholz 
et al. (2017, 2014), participants encoded longer verbal information (i.e., factual sentences) and 
in the retrieval phase, a true/false statement probed participants’ memory. In our study; 
however, participants were asked to encode four single nouns shown simultaneously and 
memory was probed with another single noun. In line with our findings showing a link between 
word difficulty and looking at nothing, we speculate that functional role of eye movements in 
memory might emerge when memory load reaches a certain threshold (see Johansson et al., 
2012; Laeng et al., 2014; Spivey & Geng, 2000). It is important to highlight that although 
participants looked more at relevant, blank locations than irrelevant, blank locations when 
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remembering difficult words, looking at nothing did not predict memory performance in the 
retrieval of difficult words either. It is possible that maintaining and retrieving single words 
instead of longer verbal information were demanding enough to elicit looking at nothing 
behaviour but not demanding enough to allow for functional eye movements. Given the 
previous evidence discussed above, it is highly probable that the role played by eye movements 
in memory is beyond an epiphenomenal by-product of the retrieval mechanism (see also 
Hannula et al., 2010). That said, future studies should test the functional role of eye movements 
in memory under different retrieval conditions and with different verbal or visual material in 
order to systematise the effect. 
Lastly, we used the term “eye movements” to describe the looking behaviour in the present 
study, following the practice in the literature (e.g., Johansson & Johansson, 2014; Richardson 
et al., 2009; Spivey & Geng, 2000). That said, it should be noted that we did not present any 
evidence that eye movements, in the strictest sense, are relevant in looking at nothing for 
visually presented single words as opposed to looking at nothing during mental imagery (e.g., 
Brandt & Stark, 1997).  
Which word properties contribute to looking at nothing? Within the scope of the second 
research question, we explored lexico-semantic variables predicting eye movements to blank 
locations by clustering the variables into three factors (imagery, lexical and length & similarity 
factors). Use of word properties as independent and continuous variables instead of within 
difficulty categories in mixed-effects models eliminated the possibility of any confounding 
influence of stimuli design on the results. Imagery, that is, imageability and concreteness was 
predictive of looking at blank locations during retrieval. Participants looked more at nothing 
when retrieving less imageable and more abstract words in no cue, that is, a “pure” looking at 
nothing condition. The effect of imageability and concreteness on fixations in the relevant 
quadrant under congruent cue condition was at a p level of .08. For the sake of simplicity, we 
will use the term “imageability” to refer both imageability and concreteness below. 
 111 
Why did participants look more frequently to blank regions when retrieving less imageable 
words? As discussed in the introduction, imageability might have modulated eye movements 
in two different ways: due to its contribution to (1) word difficulty and thus, memory load or 
(2) mental imagery of words. 
There is robust evidence that imageability is among the strongest predictors of performance 
in verbal recognition memory (Paivio, 1991). Accordingly, imageability might have affected 
fixations as the main moderator of word difficulty and memory load. However, retrieval 
performance was also predicted by length & similarity factor (length in letters, syllable length, 
phonological similarity and orthographic similarity) although it did not predict looking at 
nothing. This suggests that length & similarity (length, in particular) increased memory load 
as well. If the first account, that is, a difficulty/memory load account was indeed the only 
explanation for the effect of imageability on eye movements, length & similarity factor should 
have predicted eye movements as well. 
As this was not the case, it appears more probable that imageability predicted looking at 
nothing mainly due to its contribution to the mental imagery of the words. We assume that 
participants relied more on mental imagery by looking at blank locations when the internal 
images activated by words fell short. This interpretation is also supported by the difference 
between congruent cue and no cue conditions in the effect of imageability on looking at 
nothing. The effect of imageability was revealed in the no cue condition but not in the 
congruent cue condition. In the same vein, the effect of mental imagery control emerged in the 
no cue condition but not in incongruent cue condition. As we discussed in the introduction, 
visual information emphasizing the location of the probe word could have interfered with the 
mental imagery process and minimised the effect of imageability on looking at nothing- 
In a nutshell, weaker mental images corresponding to less imageable words were 
compensated for by looking more at nothing during retrieval. The effect of imageability on eye 
movements also disproves the prediction that participants treated the words as orthographic 
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units when remembering them on a blank screen. It is safe to assume that participants formed 
and relied on conceptual mental images rather than images reflecting the physical properties of 
words. The role of mental imagery in the current study is noteworthy considering that the 
participants were not instructed to generate mental images to retrieve the words (cf., Laeng & 
Teodorescu, 2002). Such a retrieval behaviour supports grounded-embodied and perceptual 
approaches to memory suggesting that retrieval is, in essence, imagining and simulating the 
encoding (Albers et al., 2013; Glenberg, 1997; Jonides, Lacey, & Nee, 2005; Kent & Lamberts, 
2008; Schacter et al., 2012; Wheeler et al., 2000). 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
From a wider perspective, reducing internal demands is a crucial and consistent function of 
behaviours in which cognitive work is externalised (Gilbert, 2015; Melinger & Kita, 2007; 
Schönpflug, 1986). Here, we analysed language-based factors which influence the propensity 
to engage the external world with eye movements to minimise memory load. Our findings show 
that people rely more on spatial indices when retrieving low imageable words. These findings 
can be considered compelling evidence for a flexible coordination of internal and external 
memory systems. Future studies should examine the temporal dynamics of the coordination 
between internal sources and external support. 
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4.8 Appendix 
 
4.8.1 Outputs of best fit mixed-effects models for looking behaviour 
 
Congruent cue 
 
Table 4.3 Results of the mixed-effects model for fixation percentage in the relevant, blank quadrant under 
congruent cue condition offering the best fit by maximum likelihood 
 
Fixed effects b SE (b) df t p 
(Intercept) 0.21 0.01 57.75 19.23 <.0001 
Imagery  -0.02 0.01 138.23 1.76 .08 
Random effects Variance SD    
Participants (intercept) .002 0.04    
Imagery < .001 0.01    
Length & similarity < .001 0.02    
Items (intercept) < .001 0.01    
Imagery .004 0.06    
Residual .085 0.29    
AIC 509.6     
BIC 584.9     
Model: fixation percentage ~ imagery + (1 + imagery + length & similarity | participant) + (1 + imagery | item) 
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No Cue 
 
Table 4.4 Results of the mixed-effects model for fixation percentage in the relevant, blank quadrant under no 
cue condition offering the best fit by maximum likelihood 
 
Fixed effects b SE (b) df t p 
(Intercept) 0.21 0.01 45.15 18.82 <.0001 
Imagery  -0.02 0.01 296.05 2.03 .04 
Random effects Variance SD    
Participants (intercept) .002 0.05    
Imagery < .001 0.00    
Length & similarity < .001 0.01    
Items (intercept) < .001 0.02    
Imagery < .001 0.02    
Residual .082 0.29    
AIC 473.4     
BIC 497.8     
Model: fixation percentage ~ imagery + (1 + imagery + length & similarity | participant) + (1 + imagery | item) 
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4.8.2 Outputs of best fit mixed-effects models for memory performance 
 
Hit rate 
 
Table 4.5 Results of the mixed-effects model for hit rate offering the best fit by maximum likelihood 
 
Fixed effects b SE (b) z p 
(Intercept) 1.46 0.11 13.57 <.0001 
Length & similarity 0.24 0.05 4.86 <.0001 
Imagery 0.18 0.04 3.96 <.0001 
Random effects Variance SD   
Participants (intercept) 0.46 0.68   
Imagery 0.01 0.11   
Lexical 0.08 0.27   
Length & similarity 0.02 0.13   
Items (intercept) 0.003 0.06   
Imagery 0.002 0.05   
Lexical 0.01 0.11   
Length & similarity 0.01 0.12   
AIC 4,344.1    
BIC 4,490.6    
Model: hit rate ~ imagery + length & similarity + (1 + imagery + lexical + length & similarity | participant) + 
(1 + imagery + lexical + length & similarity | item) 
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Hit latency 
 
Table 4.6 Results of the mixed-effects model for hit latency offering the best fit by maximum likelihood 
 
Fixed effects b SE (b) df t p 
(Intercept) 2044.16 68.16 48.02 19.24 <.0001 
Length & similarity -83.24 17.58 322.78 4.73 <.0001 
Imagery -48.66 20.41 44.89 2.38 .02 
Lexical  41.49 19.51 102.85 2.13 .04 
Random effects Variance SD    
Participants (intercept) 208,523.2 456.64    
Imagery 5448.7 73.82    
Lexical 4291.7 65.51    
Length & similarity 778.5 27.90    
Items (intercept) 1393.9 37.33    
Imagery 2132.4 46.18    
Length & similarity 527.0 22.96    
Residual 971,565.0 985.68    
AIC 56,413     
BIC 56,541.6     
Model: hit rate ~ imagery + length & similarity + (1 + imagery + lexical + length & similarity | participant) + 
(1 + imagery + length & similarity | item) 
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Chapter 5  
 
Experiment 3 
Simulating Space with Language: Horizontal and 
Vertical Coordinates for 1439 English Nouns 
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5.1 Motivation and Aims 
 
Simulation of word locations in the absence of words were explored in Chapter 3 and 4 
(Experiment 1 and 2). In the following chapters (Experiment 3 and Experiment 4), we shift our 
focus to spatial simulations evoked by words directly upon their presentation (see Chapter 
2.1.3). The study reported in this chapter is a norming study that has two aims: (1) Exploring 
the consistency of spatial mappings between words and the simulated locations they trigger in 
a systematic manner. (2) collecting spatio-lexical norms for controlling the words to be used 
in Experiment 4 and future studies. 
 
5.2 Abstract  
 
The link between language and space is well-recognised (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980b; Talmy, 
1983). There is now mounting evidence that words are associated with locations in space that 
play a role in visual and semantic processing (e.g., Meyer & Robinson, 2004). Despite the 
wealth of theoretical and experimental evidence, only a few studies have provided spatial 
norming for words (e.g., Meteyard & Vigliocco, 2009). Here, we present horizontal and 
vertical location norms for 1439 concrete and abstract English nouns. Participants were asked 
to give their location ratings on a two-dimensional coordinate system. Results show that the 
majority of the words in our pool were located on a diagonal line from bottom left to top right 
and participants were more conservative when using the horizontal plane as opposed to vertical 
plane. Both horizontal and vertical positions were positively correlated with goodness. We 
observed a remarkable consistency between participants in ratings. Findings are discussed 
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within the embodied perspectives of language framework related to spatial mapping. Spatial 
norms can be viewed and/or downloaded at https://osf.io/wb6pm/. 
 
Highlights 
• Both concrete and abstract nouns were consistently associated with horizontal and 
vertical positions on a two-dimensional coordinate system.  
• Participants tended to associate “good words” with higher and rightward positions. 
• Vertical space was more dominant than horizontal plane in spatial mappings. 
 
5.3 Introduction 
 
Many concepts have spatial associations. Expressions in everyday language such as “prices 
have recently gone up”, “she felt deep sadness”, “holiday is fast approaching” are clear 
examples that the spatial arrangement of language is deeply entrenched in cognition. Linguistic 
units corresponding to object and concepts, words and nouns, in particular, exhibit highly 
visible associations with space (e.g., roof - up).  
Mappings between words and space have been frequently explained within embodied 
perspectives. Perceptual (e.g., Pulvermüller, 1999) and developmental (e.g., Piaget & Inhelder, 
1969) theories of lexical representation posit that humans form sensorimotor experiences 
before the acquisition of language by tasting, touching, hearing, smelling or positioning the 
objects around them. As language is acquired and abstract thought is developed in time, verbal 
representations are coupled with prelinguistic sensorimotor memories. As a consequence, 
words can activate perceptual simulations (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; 
Pecher, Boot, & Van Dantzig, 2011; Pecher & Zwaan, 2010). For example, reading the word 
“apple” activates previously acquired sensory experiences associated with the apple as a fruit; 
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such as taste, smell, feel, colour and shape etc. Likewise, many common words can trigger 
spatial simulations and thus, are associated with locations in space. For instance, the word, 
“sun” is associated with upward locations as the actual location of the sun in the physical world 
(in addition to other sensory experiences associated with it such as heat) is rooted in the 
representational system and tightly coupled with the verbal representation of the word. 
Alternatively, words such as “worm”, “foot”, “lake” tend to be associated with downward 
locations. 
 In addition to object words, pairings between abstract words and space manifest in language 
as well. Sensorimotor representations are more concrete and thus, more efficient in expressing 
abstract concepts. Conceptual metaphor theory (Gibbs, 1994; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a, 1999; 
see also Landau, Meier, & Keefer, 2010) suggests that people tend to ground abstract concepts 
in concrete concepts through metaphors including metaphors involving space and orientation. 
As one of the most salient examples, goodness and the words with positive valence (e.g., 
honesty) are associated with upward locations, while negative words (e.g., murder) are mapped 
onto downward locations (i.e., good is up and bad is down). Such a mapping occurs as physical 
highness provides a concrete schema for abstract concepts likely due to our physical 
positioning in space, a sensual experience we have had since birth.  
There is a wealth of experimental evidence that abstract words with valance are mapped 
onto vertical space, which in turn, has an effect on visual and semantic processing. For 
example, reading positive or negative words as primes orients attention to higher or lower 
locations in space influencing decisions on subsequent words even if reading emotion-laden 
words is not related with the main task. Specifically, people are faster to detect higher targets 
followed by a positive word (conceptual cueing effect) (Gozli, Chasteen, & Pratt, 2012; Gozli, 
Pratt, Martin, & Chasteen, 2016; Zanolie et al., 2012) and evaluate valence words faster if they 
are presented in congruent locations (Meyer & Robinson, 2004). More specifically; concepts 
of power (Schubert, 2005; Zanolie et al., 2012), divinity (Chasteen et al., 2010), healing (Leitan 
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et al., 2015) and self-esteem (J. E. T. Taylor et al., 2015) are described as a vertical dimension 
in space in that words denoting powerfulness (e.g., boss, judge, professor etc.), God (e.g., Lord, 
almighty etc.), higher self-esteem (e.g., confident, proud, assertive etc.) and health 
(rejuvenated, alive, fit etc.) are associated with higher locations (and vice-versa) with similar 
cueing effects.  
Concepts are represented on the horizontal dimension as well. For instance, temporal words 
(e.g., yesterday, next, previously etc.) are projected onto the horizontal axis, where past is left, 
and future is right (Boroditsky, 2000; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Santiago, Lupiáñez, 
Pérez, & Funes, 2007; Weger & Pratt, 2008). Numbers (e.g., 6) and number words (e.g., six) 
are internally represented on a mental number line from left to right according to their 
magnitude (i.e., lower digits = leftward positions and higher digits = rightward positions), 
which in turn shifts attention to relative parts of the external space (Martin H Fischer, Castel, 
Dodd, & Pratt, 2003). The way people link space with language seems to be related to their 
bodies (body specifity hypothesis). For example, people allocate positive concepts on the 
dominant hand-side of their bodily space (i.e., right = good for right-handers and left = good 
for left handers) (Casasanto, 2009; de la Vega, de Filippis, Lachmair, Dudschig, & Kaup, 2012; 
De la Vega, Dudschig, De Filippis, Lachmair, & Kaup, 2013).  
Although the link between space and language is well-established on both experimental and 
theoretical grounds, only a few studies provided location norms for words either as a standalone 
norming study or as a pre-test to develop stimuli. In the only standalone norming study to our 
knowledge, Meteyard and Vigliocco (2009) asked 96 native English speakers to read rebus 
sentences where geometric shapes were used instead of subjects and objects. Sentences 
involved transitive verbs such as “[circle] writes [square]” or intransitive verbs such as “[circle] 
advances”. Then, participants were shown diagrams, which represented possible motions and 
directions (toward/away from the subject) and positioning (top/bottom/right/left) arrangements 
with the circle and square. Participants chose the most appropriate diagrams describing the 
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verb (see also Richardson et al., 2001). Thereby, axis and directions norms according to the 
diagram preference ranks were provided for 299 English verbs. Other studies frequently 
referred to spatial norming as a pre-test to manipulate and/or control spatial iconicity of the 
verbal material to be used in the actual experiments and thus, norms were not generally 
presented as supplementary: For instance, Marmolejo-Ramos et al. (2013) instructed 
participants to place 64 personality-trait adjectives in English and Japanese on a two by two 
grid through a task with a cover story (Experiment 2), in which they chose the best candidate 
for a job by allocating the adjectives to candidates on the grid. Thus, x and y coordinates were 
computed in visual angles of 64 adjectives on the computer screen. A number of studies relied 
on Likert-scales in spatial norming pre-tests: In Lachmair, Dudschig, De Filippis, de la Vega 
and Kaup (2011), 49 volunteers rated 104 German nouns with respect to the referents' typical 
location, using a 5-point Likert-scale ranging from down to up. Dunn, Kamide and Scheepers 
(2014) instructed Internet-based participants to rate 402 English words for vertical associations 
on a 11-point bipolar scale ranging from - 5 (labelled as down) to + 5 (labelled as up), where 
the midpoint (0) was labelled as neutral (no vertical association). In a similar fashion, 100 
Internet-based participants rated 180 concrete nouns in English on the vertical scale on a scale 
from 1 (extremely low) to 5 (extremely high) (pre-test of Experiment 2) in Estes, Verges and 
Adelman (2015). Although not a location norming study in its strictest sense, Louwerse (2008) 
asked the participants to rate the spatial iconicity of word pairs (e.g., bridge - river); more 
specifically, the likelihood that one word appeared above the other on a scale of 1-6, with 1 
being extremely unlikely and 6 being extremely likely. 
In order to fill the gaps in the previous spatial norming studies discussed above, we aimed 
to provide precise location ratings on both horizontal and vertical dimensions for a larger set 
of English nouns involving both abstract and concrete nouns. Our study differs from the 
previous studies on two main accounts: (1) Two-dimensional coordinate: Rather than using 
a Likert-scale with 5, 6 or 11 points either on vertical or horizontal direction, we provided the 
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participants a Cartesian coordinate system, whose horizontal and vertical axes were 960 pixels 
long (+/- 460 pixels on both directions from the origin), giving 921600 different clickable 
points to locate the words (see Figure 5.1). (2) Ratings on both horizontal and vertical 
dimensions: As a result of using a coordinate system, location ratings for each word were 
provided as a (x, y) coordinate. For example, if the word “sun” is at (31, 370), it means it is 
located on the rightward side of the horizontal scale (x) as of 31 pixels and upward side of the 
vertical scale (y) as of 370 pixels. Likewise, a word at (-230, -12) means that the word is located 
on the leftward side of the horizontal scale (x) as of 230 pixels and downward side of the 
vertical scale (y) as of 12 pixels. Further, participants were directly instructed to specify the 
locations of words in our study without any additional tasks. Thereby, we aimed to access 
relatively conscious representations of verbal - spatial mappings.  
 
5.4 Method 
 
5.4.1 Participants 
 
A group of thirty undergraduate psychology students at the University of Birmingham (five 
males; Mage = 19, SD = 0.69, range: 18 - 20) took part for course credit. All participants were 
monolingual native speakers of British English (speaking/learning only English from birth and 
currently using English as their primary language) as determined with the Language History 
Questionnaire (version 2.0; Li, Zhang, Tsai, & Puls, 2013). Thus, participants can be regarded 
as Western European culturally.  
Handedness was tested with Edinburgh Handedness Inventory. We did not address 
handedness as an additional variable and control the participants accordingly, but we aimed to 
observe the variability among participants. Results showed that there were 16 right-handed, 
 124 
one left-handed and 13 ambidextrous participants (i.e., using both right and left hands) in the 
study. Mean laterality quotient was 65 on a scale of -100 (absolute left-handedness) to +100 
(absolute right-handedness) showing that right-handedness was dominant among participants 
in particular including participants who can use their both hands, which is a frequently seen 
case considering the prevalence of right-handedness (Corballis, 2003). 
Participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no speech or hearing difficulties 
and no history of any neurological disorder. All participants were fully informed about the 
details of the experimental procedure and gave written consent. Post-experiment debriefing 
revealed that all participants were naïve to the purpose of the experiment.  
 
5.4.2 Materials and apparatus 
 
1482 nouns (excluding 2 pseudowords) were included in the study. Words were compiled from 
three main sources: (1) extensions of Paivio, Yuille and Madigan norms for 925 nouns (J. M. 
Clark & Paivio, 2004), (2) modal exclusivity norms for 400 nouns (Lynott & Connell, 2013), 
(3) material in two spatial iconicity studies (Dudschig, Souman, Lachmair, de la Vega, & Kaup, 
2013; Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003). 151 nouns, which are not available in these sources, were 
selected for their potential emotional (e.g., “despair”) or spatial content (e.g., “north”). 
Stimuli were presented on a TFT LCD 24-inch widescreen monitor operating at 144 Hz with 
a resolution of 1920 x 1080 pixels (508 mm x 285.75 mm). The experiment was programmed 
in and run on OpenSesame 3.1.2 (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012). Data were analysed 
and visualised with R (version 3.3.2) (R Core Team, 2017). 
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5.4.3 Procedure 
 
The paradigm was modelled after the norming study of Brysbaert, Warriner and Kuperman 
(2014). Material set was randomly distributed over 5 lists of 290 words. We aimed to compute 
internal consistency of the data. Thus, each list additionally included 32 control words, which 
were rated by all participants. Further, two pseudo words (“reiltas” and “vasagle”) were added 
to the lists to distinguish and exclude participants who were not attending the task. In total, 
each participant rated 324 words. Control words were rated by 30 participants and different 
words in the lists were rated by six participants. 
A list of 10 practice words was presented to participants before each set. The practice words 
represented the entire spatial range (i.e., top left, top right, bottom left, bottom right, left, right, 
up, down, neutral) with the aim of introducing the participants to the variety of the words they 
would encounter. The control words were also from the whole range and used to test 
consistency between participants and throughout the experiment. They were scattered 
randomly throughout the lists. The experiment was composed of two consecutive phases (see 
Figure 5.1 for a schematic illustration of the experimental design, see Appendix (5.8.1) for the 
instructions of the experiment): (1) Study: Participants were presented a centrally placed single 
word (Courier, font size = 52) in capital letters. They were instructed to read the word carefully 
and visualise its meaning before moving onto the rating phase. There was no time limit for the 
study phase and it ended by hitting the space key. (2) Rating: Participants were presented a 
rating screen during the rating phase. The rating screen included a blank, central square of 480 
x 480 in pixels (11° x 11° of visual angle). Four direction labels (i.e., up, down, left and right) 
were placed outside the rating square. Participants were expected to identify the word’s 
location by left clicking any point within the square. When a participant clicked a location, the 
experimental software automatically recorded click location in horizontal and vertical (x, y) 
coordinate space. A smaller box (32 x 32 in pixels) outside the rating square was placed at the 
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5.5 Results 
 
5.5.1 Data trimming 
 
9925 ratings were collected from 31 participants. One participant was removed due to missing 
responses and one participant was replaced due to high percentage of words rated as unknown 
(78%). Overall, 9720 unique ratings from 30 participants were analysed. 43 nouns were 
excluded as they were rated as unknown by four or more participants in each list (see Appendix 
(5.8.3)). As a result, 1439 nouns were given a location rating. Horizontal and vertical ratings 
for each word were included in the analyses. 
 
5.5.2 Reliability and validity 
 
We calculated intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC) via a two-way random absolute 
agreement model. Participants rating the control words showed excellent interrater reliability 
for horizontal (ICC = 0.95, CI (95%) = 0.92 - 0.97) and vertical positions (ICC = 0.98, CI 
(95%) = 0.97 - 0.99) as determined by the cut-offs provided by Cicchetti (1994) and Hallgren 
(2012). 
We grouped control words into two groups as concrete and abstract words based on 
concreteness (range: 2.87 – 6.77). Participants rating the control words showed excellent 
interrater reliability for horizontal positions of concrete words (ICC = 0.96, CI (95%) = 0.92 - 
0.98) and for horizontal positions of abstract words (ICC = 0.94, CI (95%) = 0.89 - 0.98). 
Participants also showed excellent interrater reliability for vertical positions of concrete words 
(ICC = 0.98, CI (95%) = 0.96 - 0.99) and for vertical positions of abstract words (ICC = 0.98, 
CI (95%) = 0.96 - 0.99). Point estimate of ICCs for concrete/abstract words and CIs of ICCs 
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for concrete/abstract words overlapped in each case, suggesting that there was not a significant 
difference between the consistency among participants when rating concrete or abstract words 
on the horizontal or vertical axis.  
There was a high degree of consistency between participants in location ratings. The mean 
standard error for all nouns was 3.02 for horizontal plane and 5.37 for vertical plane. We also 
computed rater correlation coefficients between each participant’s average rating for a given 
word and the mean rating for the word in question within each presentation list. The mean 
coefficient of the correlation sets was 0.76 (SD = 0.07, range: 0.59 - 0.84) for the horizontal 
position and 0.65 (SD = 0.12, range: 0.36 - 0.82) for the vertical position. 
Due to the limited number of location rating studies, we could only verify the external 
validity of our vertical ratings by correlating them with a data set from Estes et al. (2015). 
Overlapping 94 words showed a strong, positive correlation; r (92) = .92, p < .0001 (see Figure 
5.2). Experimental validation of the norms is provided in Experiment 4, in the next chapter. 
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diagonal axis from bottom left to top right (see Figure 5.3 - B). This was also evident from the 
strong, positive correlation between horizontal and vertical positions; r (1437) = .44, p < .0001. 
Words of particular interest are presented in Figure 5.4 and Appendix (5.8.2). 
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics of 1439 words 
 
Statistic Horizontal position Vertical position 
Mean 6.14 21.64 
SD 114.58 203.81 
SE 3.02 5.37 
Median 11.17 30.75 
Trimmed mean 8.69 25.73 
Median absolute deviation 101.31 208.93 
Minimum -471.67 -458.50 
Maximum 453.83 452.80 
Range 925.50 911.3 
Skewness -0.24 -0.16 
Variance 13128.40 41536.82 
Kurtosis 1.03  -0.64 
CI of mean (95%) 0.21 - 12.06 11.10 - 32.18 
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Table 5.3). As opposed to standard error, it is based on the participants, not the words in the 
list. Descriptive statistics for both variables are presented in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics of spatiality and controversiality (all measures range between 1 and 0) 
 
Statistic Spatiality Contraversiality 
Mean 0.33 0.37 
SD 0.19 0.12 
Median 0.31 0.37 
Trimmed mean 8.69 0.37 
Median absolute deviation 0.21 0.12 
Skewness 0.52 0.28 
Kurtosis -0.30  0.77 
SE 0.01 0.00 
Variance 0.04 0.02 
CI of mean (95%) 0.32 - 0.34 0.37 - 0.40 
 
Table 5.3 Words sorted according to spatiality and controversiality (all measures range between 1 and 0) 
 
 Word Spatiality  Word Controversiality 
Highest  Northwest 1 Arbiter 1 
 Murder 0.95 Corner 0.79 
 Suppression 0.93 Border 0.78 
 Justice 0.92 Catacomb 0.77 
 Grief 0.91 Close 0.76 
Lowest Centre 0 Left 0 
 Site 0.005 Centre 0.0009 
 Folly 0.006 Right 0.015 
 Odour 0.007 West 0.019 
 Pair 0.008 Down 0.02 
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Table 5.4 Spatial labels and their spatial ranges 
 
Zone Degree Label Range (in pixels) Dimension 
Up Extreme Top [480, 321] Vertical 
 Medium Higher [320, 161] Vertical 
Down Extreme Bottom [-480, -321] Vertical 
 Medium Lower [-320, -161] Vertical 
Left Extreme Far left [-480, -321] Horizontal 
 Medium Leftward [-320, -161] Horizontal 
Right Extreme Far right [480, 321] Horizontal 
 Medium Rightward [320, 161] Horizontal 
Centre Low Neutral higher [160, 1] Vertical 
 Low Neutral lower [-160, -1] Vertical 
 Low Neutral leftward [-160, -1] Horizontal 
 Low Neutral rightward [160, 1] Horizontal 
 Low Neutral* 0 Horizontal and vertical 
Ranges are inclusive of the thresholds. Words with location ratings between the thresholds (e.g., 320.38, -161.60 
etc.) were rounded above or below and labelled accordingly.  
* Words with a location rating of 0 on either horizontal (n = 7) and vertical plane (n = 6) were labelled as “neutral” 
without any spatial label.  
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Table 5.5 Means (standard errors) of spatial measures with regard to words in zones 
 
Zone Number of 
words 
Horizontal 
position 
Vertical position Spatiality Contraversiality 
Up Left 4 -272.81 (54.64) 289.54 (30.81) 0.74 (0.11) 0.44 (0.13) 
Up Centre 307 39.94 (3.58) 277.28 (4.24) 0.44 (0.01) 0.34 (0.01) 
Up Right 58 216.15 (6.15) 274.35 (9.33) 0.64 (0.01) 0.36 (0.01) 
Centre Left 46 -235.06 (11.87) -40.12 (12.2) 0.41 (0.02) 0.41 (0.02) 
Centre Centre 694 12.62 (2.81) 15.1 (3.22) 0.18 (0) 0.39 (0) 
Centre Right 39 227.64 (10.58) 37.63 (12.42) 0.39 (0.01) 0.42 (0.02) 
Down Left 60 -222.93 (5.58) -308.78 (10.2) 0.7 (0.02) 0.36 (0.01) 
Down Centre 226 -42.63 (4.91) -272.28 (4.87) 0.45 (0.01) 0.37 (0.01) 
Down Right 5 263.03 (51.48) -220.13 (18.57) 0.63 (0.07) 0.54 (0.12) 
 
5.6 Discussion 
 
We presented location norms on the horizontal and vertical axes for 1439 English nouns. The 
main findings are summarised and interpreted below. 
Words were rated on a diagonal line from bottom left to top right in our data set. Further, 
variance on the vertical space was considerably higher. As a result, top right and bottom left 
zones emerged as conventional zones as opposed to top left and bottom right zones. Thus, we 
conclude that participants relied more on the vertical space when associating the words with 
the locations. The dominance of the vertical plane over the horizontal when both dimensions 
are investigated separately was evidenced before (Franklin & Tversky, 1990; Marmolejo-
Ramos et al., 2013). For instance, the “up is good” metaphor is more salient than the “right is 
up” metaphor as shown with emotional face targets (Damjanovic & Santiago, 2016). Here, we 
demonstrate that people project words on the vertical space more frequently than horizontal 
space even when two axes are available at the same time. The distribution of words on the 
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coordinate system around the diagonal axis can be explained with the relationship between 
goodness and spatial positions. As expected, goodness was positively correlated not only with 
vertical but also with horizontal positions. As words got more positive in valence, they were 
more likely to be located on the top right position and as they got “worse”, they were more 
likely to be located on the bottom left. Thus, participants utilised the horizontal space when 
grounding goodness as well; yet, not as liberally as the vertical space. A strong, positive 
correlation between goodness and horizontal space can be attributed to the body-specifity 
hypothesis (Casasanto, 2009). Almost all participants except for one were either right-handed 
or ambidextrous in our study. As a result, positive words were mapped onto the right side of 
the coordinate system. We did not address the handedness as a variable and did not balance the 
raters accordingly in the current study. Further research can make use of the coordinate 
paradigm to investigate the impact of handedness on the representation of valence words on 
the horizontal axis. 
In addition to abstract words with valence; object words, whose referents occur in particular 
locations in the physical world, were rated on their encoded locations and particularly on the 
vertical space (e.g., tower, foot, hair, cellar etc.). On the other hand, horizontal space was 
mostly occupied by the nouns denoting time (e.g., past, yesterday, history etc.), direction (e.g., 
route) and motion (e.g., car). There is compelling evidence that the temporal words are mapped 
onto horizontal space (e.g., Weger & Pratt, 2008) yet not for direction and motion concepts. 
Along with that, such a tendency is not non-intuitive given that diagrams with horizontal 
arrows represent mental concepts such as order, cause, motion and outcome (Tversky, 2009).  
Our results show the spatial words (i.e., words away from the centre) were also more 
emotional and abstract. These findings are expected considering how emotion, regardless of 
being positive or negative, is transferred to space and that emotional words are typically 
abstract (e.g., Meyer & Robinson, 2004). Yet, it is worth considering that many models of 
affect represent arousal, as a dimension of emotion, on the vertical space as well (e.g., 
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annoyance vs. rage) (Rubin & Talarico, 2009; Yik, Russell, & Barrett, 1999). This might 
account for why emotionality increases as we move towards to the edges and borders of the 
coordinate system. We assume that participants rated the words higher/lower or more 
leftward/rightward as arousal level associated with the words increased. 
Diversity of word categories is an important advantage of the present study. Participants 
rated concrete words referring to objects perceived in typical locations in physical world such 
as “bird”, abstract words with metaphorical spatial associations such as “honesty” and also, 
emotionally neutral words which explicitly shows positions in the subject’s immediate 
environment such as “east”, “left” or “bottom”. In this respect, our ratings suggest that mapping 
associations between language and space are highly prevalent in that they spread over different 
types of words. We argue that word spatiality might serve as an important variable to 
manipulate or control in future studies.  
It is important to note that spatiality and spatial iconicity measure highly similar but different 
concepts. Spatial iconicity refers to the strength of the mapping between the word and its 
location (e.g., Louwerse, 2008); whereas, spatiality shows the extent to which a word is distant 
from being spatially neutral. Thus, words with high spatiality might not necessarily have high 
spatial iconicity. For example, “northwest” and “murder” are the most spatial words in our 
study although intuitively, “northwest” seems to have a higher spatial iconicity than “murder”. 
Future research should investigate the relationship between spatiality and spatial iconicity. 
The most prominent finding is the reasonably high degree of agreement between 
participants in location ratings. Humans do not learn locations when they learn words. 
Although object words are mapped onto space implicitly, there are not explicit grammatical or 
lexical conventions in language with regard to associations between space and language. Even 
though, participants systematically and consistently located the words on certain points 
regardless of spatiality. Language-driven perspectives of language - space correspondence 
(Goodhew, McGaw, & Kidd, 2014; Louwerse, 2008; Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003) as an alternative 
 140 
to an embodied account attributes the link between language and space to language use; more 
precisely, the frequency with which abstract and spatial words co-occur in language. 
Accordingly, certain abstract concepts are associated with locations due to the frequent use of 
spatial terms with these abstract concepts (e.g., God above, feeling down, look forward). 
However, participants in our study were merely instructed to specify their location rating for 
each word and did not perform any other language-related task (e.g., semantic judgement 
between word pairs), which would naturally trigger linguistic constructions (cf., Zwaan & 
Yaxley, 2003).  
Thus, we conclude that location norms in our data set mostly depend on spatio-perceptual 
and bodily experiences associated with verbal representations. Along with that, spatial 
arrangements corresponding to certain abstract concepts still appear to be arbitrary. Conceptual 
metaphor theory claims that a pleasant person is “sweet” as sweetness is associated with 
pleasure at the sensory level (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980a; Meyer & Robinson, 2004). However, 
why goodness is associated with the upward position in the first place without any explicit 
metaphoric transfer remains as a critical question. Given that cultural differences (de la Fuente, 
Casasanto, Roman, & Santiago, 2015) or individual value systems (such as religiosity) 
(Chasteen et al., 2010) do not play a role in spatial mappings, possible answers might tap into 
the overarching questions of arbitrariness in language (Gasser, 2004; Pena, 2002; Seidenberg, 
2002). 
The main limitation of the study is the number of participants rated the words. A lab-based 
study enabled us to collect high quality data under controlled conditions yet with fewer 
participants. Although analyses indicated good external validity for vertical positions, results 
should be interpreted by taking the sample size into consideration. Further studies can adapt 
the coordinate paradigm for an online rating task in order to collect more participants and thus, 
bigger data. Variables such as linguistic, educational and sociocultural background, gender, 
body-specificities can be factored in with larger and more representative samples. 
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It is also important note that task instructions and the examples of spatial associations 
provided to the participants (see 5.8 Appendix) may have shaped participants’ behaviour and 
thus, their ratings. Spatial associations in the current study should be interpreted considering 
this limitation. Although our findings are consistent with the previous studies exploring word-
location associations where participants did not see explicit instructions before the test (e.g., 
Estes et al., 2015; Verges & Duffy, 2009), future norming studies could test spatial associations 
without any examples in the instructions. 
We are of the opinion that the norms we provided in this study can be used to control and 
manipulate verbal material in studies exploring the relation between space and language. Main 
advantages of this data set are its size and precision and also, the availability of both horizontal 
and vertical norms for each word. In addition to the norms, the novel methodology we 
introduced paves a new way for norming spatial or spatially neutral words. Future studies can 
use the same paradigm to test different words, word types or words in different languages. The 
paradigm itself can also be improved. For example, the coordinate system can be integrated 
into Internet-based solutions such as Mechanical Turk by allowing to collect ratings from more 
people. Further, a three-dimensional coordinate system, measuring depth or the proximity of 
words to subjects in addition to horizontal and vertical positions, might shed further light on 
conceptual and spatial grounding of language. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
The domain of language is critical for understanding grounded-embodied cognition and for any 
well-defined model that aims to explain sensorimotor operations. In this respect, spatial 
simulations evoked by language provide strong evidence for the sensorimotor origins of 
language within the framework of grounded-embodied cognition. Our study extends the 
literature of grounded-embodied cognition by providing further evidence for the link between 
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language and spatial cognition. Word - space mappings does not seem to be arbitrary. Our 
results suggest that lexico-spatial associations are predominantly consistent, based on 
bodily/spatio-perceptual experiences and metaphorical groundings. Spatial simulations via 
language should have systematic implications for semantic processing even if space is 
irrelevant to the task considering the consistency of word - space mappings and that language-
based simulations are triggered automatically. 
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5.8 Appendix 
 
5.8.1 Instructions 
 
Screen 1 
Welcome to the spatial rating experiment. This experiment will take about 20 minutes. Please 
read the following instructions very carefully. Ask the experimenter if you have any questions 
at any point. Left click to proceed. 
 
Screen 2 
Words in language suggest the relative positions of the objects/concepts they stand for. For 
example, the word GRAVE suggests a relatively low location. Because a grave in the real 
world is located under the ground. Your task is to rate the locations of a number of words. This 
is done by left-clicking any point on a rating screen. Left click to see the examples of word and 
rating screens. 
 
Screen 3 
This is an example of the word screen. Please read the word carefully. Think about its meaning 
and try to visualise it. Then, press any key on the keyboard to see the rating screen. PLEASE 
TRY IT NOW! 
 
Screen 4 
(An example rating screen) 
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Screen 5 
Everyone might have different word location concepts. That’s perfectly fine. There are no right 
or wrong answers in this experiment. We are simply asking YOUR opinion. For example, for 
some people, the word MAXIMUM might be located on the RIGHT end of the screen on a 
horizontal scale. For others, it might be located on the TOP of the screen on a vertical scale. 
Please use YOUR OWN intuition. Left click to proceed. 
 
Screen 6 
You will see some words, which might be located both on horizontal and vertical scales. For 
example, DAWN might be located BOTTOM LEFT if you think about the location of the Sun 
when it’s rising. Please think in all directions. Left click to proceed. 
 
Screen 7 
You will also see some words such as BALANCE, which might not make you think of any 
location at all. You can always click the central area to give these words somewhat a neutral 
location rating. This is also informative for us. Left click to proceed. 
 
Screen 8 
Rating screen has a very high resolution. It can distinguish tiny differences between click 
locations. You can click any point on the rating screen within the box. Please differentiate the 
words by considering this. For example, BUG might be located somewhat BELOW the 
previously seen word, COW. Left click to proceed. 
 
Screen 9 
You will see the following sentence and a box at the bottom right of the rating screen saying: 
I do not know this word well enough to give a rating. Left click the box if you don’t know the 
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meaning of a word well enough to rate it. Please left click the box on the bottom right to 
proceed. PLEASE TRY IT NOW! 
 
Screen 10 
Now you will rate 11 words as a practice. If you have any questions, stop the practice and let 
the experimenter know. Left click to start the practice. 
 
Screen 11 
(Practice) 
 
Screen 12 
This is the end of the practice. Please let the experimenter know if you have any questions. The 
experiment will start when you left click and your ratings will be recorded. Please take your 
time, visualise the words and think carefully before rating. Thank you very much! 
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5.8.2 Words at the extremes of coordinate system 
 
Table 5.6 Horizontal and vertical coordinates, controversiality and spatiality of the words located at the extreme 
positions of the coordinate systems 
 
Location Word Horizontal Vertical Mean Contraversiality Spatiality 
Top left Northwest -409.67 350.17 379.92 0.23 1.00 
 Corner -307.33 314.00 310.65 0.79 0.82 
 Beginning -366.67 133.50 250.09 0.41 0.66 
 Tomahawk -162.40 288.80 225.60 0.29 0.59 
 Painter -144.33 285.83 215.08 0.38 0.56 
Top right Justice 344.50 353.67 349.08 0.37 0.92 
 Determination 309.50 382.83 346.17 0.35 0.91 
 Excitement 246.83 399.50 323.17 0.27 0.85 
 Climax 217.17 425.83 321.50 0.25 0.85 
 Cure 320.00 288.17 304.08 0.39 0.80 
Bottom left Murder -295.50 -427.50 361.50 0.32 0.95 
 Suppression -259.60 -444.20 351.90 0.28 0.93 
 Grief -326.33 -367.83 347.08 0.38 0.91 
 Decadence -276.00 -407.75 341.88 0.25 0.90 
 Abasement -218.00 -458.50 338.25 0.32 0.89 
Bottom right Arbiter 421.50 -244.50 333.00 1.00 0.88 
 Nightfall 346.33 -167.67 257.00 0.47 0.68 
 Whalebone 266.00 -98.00 182.00 0.28 0.48 
 Rosin 203.50 -146.00 174.75 0.52 0.46 
 Feudalism 186.00 -106.33 146.17 0.68 0.38 
Right Right 453.83 2.17 228.00 0.02 0.60 
 Arbiter 421.50 -244.50 88.50 1.00 0.88 
 Tomorrow 377.63 102.60 240.12 0.30 0.63 
 East 360.83 11.17 186.00 0.23 0.49 
 Nightfall 346.33 -167.67 89.33 0.47 0.68 
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Up Magnitude 54.60 452.80 253.70 0.11 0.67 
 Peak 0.00 451.00 225.50 0.04 0.59 
 North 8.17 441.17 224.67 0.04 0.59 
 Tower 26.17 432.83 229.50 0.10 0.60 
 Rocket 53.67 431.83 242.75 0.29 0.64 
Left Left -471.67 2.00 -234.84 0.00 0.62 
 West -456.83 1.33 -227.75 0.02 0.60 
 Past -422.50 -111.83 -267.17 0.21 0.70 
 Northwest -409.67 350.17 -29.75 0.23 1.00 
 Yesterday -390.50 -65.33 -227.92 0.26 0.60 
Down Abasement -218.00 -458.50 -338.25 0.32 0.89 
 Down 0.00 -455.00 -227.50 0.02 0.60 
 Hell -66.40 -454.00 -260.20 0.27 0.68 
 Death -87.33 -452.83 -270.08 0.22 0.71 
 Suppression -259.60 -444.20 -351.90 0.28 0.93 
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5.8.3 Excluded words 
 
Table 5.7 Word that were rated as unknown by at least four participants and thus, excluded from the analysis  
 
Rated as unknown by four participants Rated as unknown by five participants 
Abbess  Allegory 
Banality Belfry 
Charlatan Bivouac 
Connoisseur Blunderbuss 
Debacle Crag 
Domicile Deluge 
Edifice Encephalon 
Fiord Epistle 
Firmament Exactitude 
Inanity Gadfly 
Increment Gaiety 
Indignation Inclemency 
Insolence Kerchief 
Kine Loquacity 
Osculation Sonata 
Prairie Surtax 
Racketeer Titbit 
Rheumatism Thicket 
Serf Vestibule 
Steerage  
Supplication  
Temerity  
Timepiece  
Warbler  
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Chapter 6  
 
Experiment 4 
Simulating Space with Language: Effects of 
Congruency between Physical Space and 
Semantic Space on Memory for Language 
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6.1 Motivation and Aims 
 
Two types of spatial simulations were examined in the previous chapters. Word locations were 
simulated in Experiment 1 and 2 when participants were asked to retrieve the words from 
memory in their absence. In Experiment 3, spatial norms indicated the potential locations of 
language-based spatial simulations based on either perceptual (e.g., “bird” - upward location) 
or metaphorical (“murder” - downward location) mappings. This chapter aims to explore how 
perceptual simulation of locations and language-based simulation of space interact in a single 
task and how these interactions affect retrieval performance in memory for language. 
 
6.2 Abstract 
 
Compatibility between the position of a word on a screen (i.e., physical space) with the position 
it implies as in “bird” = upward position (i.e., semantic space) can facilitate word processing 
(Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003). Further, words with such spatial associations can guide eye 
movements to the suggested locations and facilitate or interfere with the subsequent visual 
processing in the compatible location (e.g., detecting a visual target in upward position after 
reading the word “bird”) (Gozli et al., 2012). However, it is unclear how these two spatial 
dimensions (i.e., physical and semantic) interact in a single task. In the present study, we 
investigated the effect of spatial position during encoding and cueing/looking position during 
retrieval on memory performance for words with implicit spatial meaning or metaphorical 
spatial associations. Participants were asked to encode words presented in congruent (e.g., 
“bird” in an upward location) and incongruent locations (e.g., “bird” in a downward location). 
At retrieval, an auditorily presented word probed participants’ recognition memory as they 
were cued to look at either the original location of the probe word or a diagonal location. In 
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contrast to spatial congruency advantage in conceptual tasks, words presented in incongruent 
locations were retrieved faster than those in congruent locations. Further, being cued to 
congruent locations during retrieval improved memory performance for words encoded in 
incongruent locations but damaged the performance for highly imageable words encoded in 
congruent locations. Results provide strong evidence for the persistence of spatial simulation 
via language and indicate the role of physical space and mental imagery in spatial simulations 
via language. 
 
Highlights 
• A mismatch between a word’s location on the screen and the location it implies (e.g., 
seeing “bird” at the bottom of the screen) led to better memory performance. 
• Language-based simulations guided participants’ eye movements to the implied 
locations. Seeing a visual cue in the compatible location interfered with memory and 
delayed the retrieval. 
 
6.3 Introduction 
 
“Ms. Cooper reached for her cup to have a sip of freshly brewed coffee. It smelled bitter but 
somehow fruity, which reminded her of the orange trees from her childhood.” When readers 
of fiction read about the perceptual experiences of a character in a story such as smelling a cup 
of coffee, they tend to take the perspective of the character and have the same experiences as 
if they were real (e.g., Avraamides, 2003). Processing linguistic information (e.g., words 
describing the scent of coffee) activates perceptual information (e.g., scent of coffee). This 
phenomenon is known as mental simulation within the scope of grounded-embodied cognition 
(Zwaan, 1999). 
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Spatial perception, the perception of oneself and other objects in space, their locations and 
the spatial relations between them, can be simulated with language as well (see Speed & 
Vigliocco, 2015 for a review). For example, reading the word “bird” elicits a mental image 
which can give rise to a perceptual experience of “upward location” based on the typical 
location of a bird in the physical world (Bergen, Lindsay, Matlock, & Narayanan, 2007; 
Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, & McRae, 2003). Further, abstract words with valence trigger 
simulations of metaphorical locations in space they are associated with (e.g., “justice” - upward 
location) (Chasteen et al., 2010; Leitan et al., 2015; Meyer & Robinson, 2004). Many concrete 
and abstract words in language, which we call spatial words, have such spatial associations 
(see Chapter 5) and thus, evoke spatial simulations. 
The architecture of language-based spatial simulation is not well-defined. In particular, the 
literature is mixed with regard to the effect of physical space on language-based spatial 
simulations. First, there is evidence showing that spatial congruency between physical space 
and semantic space improves performance in conceptual tasks in which the response is made 
when the words are on the screen (e.g., Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003). Second, there is evidence that 
objects are identified more accurately when they are presented in congruent locations as to the 
locations implied by previously seen words (i.e., match advantage) (Chasteen et al., 2010; 
Meyer & Robinson, 2004; Zanolie et al., 2012) or more accurately when they are presented in 
incongruent locations (i.e., mismatch advantage) (Bergen, 2005; Bergen et al., 2007; Estes et 
al., 2008; D. C. Richardson et al., 2003). 
The current study aims to shed light on the effect of physical location on spatial simulations 
evoked by language in memory. In particular, we tested the effect of congruency between 
physical space and semantic space at encoding and looking position at retrieval (congruent vs. 
incongruent as to the original location of the spatial word) on memory performance.  
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6.3.1 Physical and semantic space at encoding 
 
Encoding in verbal memory involves the perception of words and generation of mental 
representations (Paivio, 1990). There is evidence that these representations do not only involve 
semantic information, but also information with regard to the location of words (see Spivey, 
Richardson, & Fitneva, 2004 for a review). Pylyshyn (1989) was among the first to propose a 
model (i.e., spatial indexing) in which locations are encoded along with the words themselves. 
In this model, a pre-attentive or a pre-cognitive mechanism in the visual system indexes the 
location of a visual stimulus by separating locations from other visual features (e.g., colour, 
shape etc.) even before recognising visual patterns. 
Abundant evidence indicates that indexed locations interact with locations denoted by words 
upon presentation. For example, people react faster and more accurately in naming tasks if a 
word that conveys specific and explicit spatial information such as “left” appears in a congruent 
location on the display (i.e., left side of the screen) (White, 1969). On the other hand, 
inconsistency between spatial representations results in slower and less accurate responses (see 
Lu & Proctor, 1995 for a review). Known as spatial Stroop, this effect occurs even though the 
information about the word location is not necessary to complete the task successfully. 
Reading words, which do not denote a location explicitly such as “left” but imply implicit 
locations such as “bird” at certain locations, has also consequences on how well these words 
are processed. Zwaan and Yaxley (2003) evidenced facilitation with spatial congruency in the 
case of words with imagined locations such as “basement” rather than the locations in the 
subject’s immediate environment. Participants were tasked to identify whether “root” and 
“branch” are semantically related. Reactions were faster and more accurate if “root” was 
located under “branch” compared to the incongruent arrangement (i.e., “branch” under “root”). 
In a similar paradigm, participants in Šetić and Domijan (2007) were tasked to verify whether 
a given word refers to a flying or a non-flying animal. Words for flying animals were verified 
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faster when they were presented at the top of the screen and words for non-flying animals were 
verified faster when they were presented at the bottom (Experiment 1). The same effect was 
observed when participants verified living or non-living objects that are associated with upward 
or downward positions, with a categorisation task that was not spatial (Experiment 2). 
Words that make direct reference to spatial locations (e.g., “above”) and words that occur 
in imagined but typical locations (e.g., “bird”) are not the only words associated with locations 
in space. Emotionally charged words with positive or negative valence such as “hero” or “liar” 
activate spatial simulations as well based on metaphorical relationship between valence and 
vertical space (i.e., “good is up”, “bad is down”) (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980b). Drawing on the 
associations between emotional words and space, Meyer and Robinson (2004) demonstrated 
that positive words are evaluated faster (i.e., “Rate ‘hero’ on a scale from 1 (negative) to 5 
(positive)) if they are presented at the top of the screen and negative words (e.g., “liar”) are 
evaluated faster if they are presented at the bottom. In a similar fashion, Giessner and Schubert 
(2007) showed that people evaluate leaders as more powerful if their picture are positioned 
higher in a vertical arrangement (see also Schubert, 2005). In the domain of time - space 
mapping, it was demonstrated that linguistic units that imply time (e.g., “yesterday”, “we will 
drive”, “next” etc.) were judged faster when their position (i.e., left or right of the screen) 
matched with the location of response button (i.e., left or right hand-side button on the 
keyboard). For example, participants were faster to evaluate whether the sentence “we will 
drive” refers to past or future if the sentence was presented on the right side of the screen and 
response button was on the right hand-side (Santiago et al., 2007). 
These studies reveal two mechanisms regarding space and language: First, word locations 
cannot be ignored even when they are irrelevant to the task (see Hock & Egeth, 1970; Seymour, 
1977). In other words, individuals encode word locations automatically along with the words 
(see Chapter 3). Second, reading words with implicit spatial meaning simulates these locations 
automatically. When these two automatic mechanisms take place at the same time, a 
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compatibility between the physical and sematic location of a word facilitates the response in 
tasks that require conceptual processing; whereas a conflict between these locations delays the 
processing. 
Along with that, how simultaneous activation of physical and semantic representations of 
space affects memory performance is not clear. As a first question, we tested whether spatially 
congruent encoding (e.g., encoding “bird” at the top of the screen) results in faster retrieval in 
comparison to spatially incongruent encoding (e.g., encoding “bird” at the bottom of the 
screen). 
The intuitive prediction in line with the studies discussed above is that spatial congruency 
at encoding leads to better memory. Under this prediction, participants are expected to process 
spatially congruent words faster and in contrast, spatially incongruent words slower. There is 
evidence to assume that encoding difficulty results in impaired memory as frequently seen in 
schizophrenia (M. J. Smith, Gorman, Malaspina, Sharif, & Amador, 2000) and older 
populations (Grady et al., 1995). There is also evidence showing that faster encoding usually 
results in faster and better retrieval (Kent & Lamberts, 2006; Lamberts, Brockdorff, & Heit, 
2002). However, whether the ease of processing due to spatial congruency is robust enough to 
determine retrieval performance is not obvious. 
The second prediction is that spatial incongruency rather than congruency will result in 
superior memory. This prediction might sound paradoxical; however, memory retrieval is 
fundamentally different than semantic judgement tasks reviewed above. Distinctiveness, in 
particular, has a substantial impact on verbal memory (see Hunt & Worthen, 2006 for a 
comprehensive review). Distinctiveness in the present study can occur and impact retrieval 
performance in two related ways: 
Hirshman (1988) demonstrated that weakly related word pairs (e.g., quick - short) are better 
remembered than strongly related pairs (e.g., long - short). Weakly related word pairs are more 
likely to represent unexpected or novel semantic combinations and allow more elaborate 
 156 
encoding than expected pairs. In turn, elaborate encodings give rise to more accurate retrieval. 
In the current study, spatial words that are presented in incongruent locations can be assumed 
to violate participants’ expectations due to spatial simulations. Consequently, spatially 
incongruent words might enjoy a similar memory advantage over spatially congruent words 
due to reconstruction of more detailed encodings. 
Craik and Lockhart (1972) suggested that the memory of an item is a function of the depth 
to which the item was initially processed. In keeping with this argument, Craik and Tulving 
(1975) reported higher retrieval accuracy for words processed at deeper levels which were 
induced with semantic questions at encoding (e.g., “Does ‘apple’ fit into the ‘fruits’ category?”) 
as to words encoded with questions related to phonological (intermediate level) or orthographic 
(shallow level) properties of the word. We expect that participants encode all words at semantic 
level regardless of spatial congruency (see Chapter 4). That said, spatially incongruent words 
could be encoded at a relatively deeper level due to possibly additional resources (e.g., 
attention, cognitive effort) required to process an unexpected situation. In this respect, 
unexpectedness can lead to deeper and more elaborate encodings, which, in turn, could lead to 
a memory advantage for words encoded in incongruent locations. 
In sum, evidence reported above demonstrates that words with spatial associations can give 
rise to simulations of concerned locations. Simulated locations interact with where the words 
are perceived and in return, either facilitate or delay the processing of spatial words. Previous 
studies suggest a congruency advantage in memory performance. However, incongruency 
between physical and semantic space at encoding could lead to better memory performance 
because unexpected items are typically remembered more accurately. 
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6.3.2 Physical and semantic space at retrieval 
 
Pylyshyn's (1989) spatial indexing model posits that spatial indices persist across time, which 
makes it possible to locate and examine the encoded information if needed later on. Availability 
of spatial indices even when the information is no longer available manifests itself clearly 
during a memory retrieval behaviour, known as looking at nothing or congruent area effect. In 
looking at nothing, information to-be-retrieved is registered with spatial indices at encoding. 
When participants are asked to retrieve the information from memory in its absence, spatial 
indices attached to the information trigger eye movements to the location where the 
information appeared previously at encoding (e.g., Richardson & Spivey, 2000).  
Semantic space persists in time as well. Simulated space (either through object words that 
denote certain locations or through abstract words that are grounded in certain locations) has 
consequences on the processing of subsequent visual information. This effect, known as spatial 
cueing, results in both facilitation and inhibition. For example, in Estes, Verges and Barsalou 
(2008), participants saw words that denote objects occurring in typical locations (e.g., “hat”) 
in the centre of the screen. Later, participants were asked to detect unrelated visual targets (X 
or O) appearing either in the typical location of the object denoted by the preceding word (e.g., 
X on the upward location following “hat”) or in an incongruent location (e.g., X on the 
downward location following “hat”). Visual targets appearing in the incongruent locations as 
to simulated locations (e.g., X on the downward location following “hat”) were detected faster 
than visual targets appearing in the congruent locations (e.g., X on the upward location 
following “hat”). Participants had to supress the simulated location of the object (e.g., hat) to 
process the perceptual target occurring in the same location (e.g., X). This suppressing led to 
inhibition when identifying symbols in overlapping locations. 
On the other hand, Chasteen, Burdzy and Pratt (2010) found that participants detected visual 
targets in congruent locations faster when their attention was guided by religious concepts 
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associated with spatial locations (i.e., “God is up and right”, “Devil is down and left”). 
Response times were faster when targets appeared at the top and the right side of the screen 
following the concepts of God and when targets appeared at the bottom and the left side of the 
screen following the concepts of Devil (see also Amorim & Pinheiro, 2018; Zanolie et al., 
2012). There is also evidence showing similar congruency advantage after reading words with 
positive or negative valence (e.g., processing a downward target following the word “tyrant”) 
(Zanolie et al., 2012) and retrospective or prospective time words (e.g., processing a leftward 
target following the word “tomorrow”) (Weger & Pratt, 2008). 
Additionally, event-related brain potentials in Zanolie et al. (2012) revealed that words of 
power cause a shift in spatial attention towards specific positions in space in a time window 
from 160 to 200 ms. In a replication attempt of Chasteen et al. (2010), Gozli, Chasteen and 
Pratt (2012) reported early interference (short SOA between word and visual target = 200 - 400 
ms) and late facilitation (long SOA between word and visual target = 800 - 1200 ms) and 
concluded that spatial cueing by words leads to two temporal stages of the same process: early 
interference and late facilitation. 
The abovementioned evidence suggests that word locations are simulated in the absence of 
words and spatial simulations triggered by words persist in time and extend into the subsequent 
processing. How these mechanisms interact each other and in return, affect memory for 
language? An answer to this question could be informative as to the persistence of language-
based spatial simulations and the effect of physical space on spatial simulations in the absence 
of words. To this end, participants in the current study are instructed to look at visual cues at 
the encoding stage appearing either in the congruent location as to the original location of the 
probe word or in a diagonal location. 
Under the light of the studies reviewed above, two different effects can be observed in the 
current study. If spatial simulations evoked by words become decisive in memory performance, 
participants could treat the visual cue to orient their eye movements as additional visual 
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information. In such a case, processing visual information in the same location as to the probe 
word could interfere with and delay the memory process (Estes et al., 2008) or alternatively, 
improve it (Chasteen et al., 2010; Gozli et al., 2012). However, if physical locations become 
decisive in memory performance, then visual cues could emphasize the previous locations of 
the words. In this case, a compatible visual cue would improve memory performance as in 
studies showing better memory performance with looks to previous locations of words 
(Johansson et al., 2012; Johansson & Johansson, 2014; Scholz et al., 2018, 2016). 
 
6.4 Method 
 
6.4.1 Participants 
 
The experiment was carried out with forty-eight students at the University of Birmingham (five 
males; Mage = 20.15, SD = 3.27). 79% of the participants were psychology students. All 
participants were native speakers of British English as determined with the Language History 
Questionnaire (version 2.0; Li, Zhang, Tsai, & Puls, 2013). Participants reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, no speech or hearing difficulties and no history of any neurological 
disorder. They received either £8 or course credit for participation. All participants were fully 
informed about the details of the experimental procedure and gave written consent. Post-
experiment debriefing revealed that all participants were naïve to the purpose of the 
experiment. 
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6.4.2 Material 
 
There were 192 trials involving 864 unique nouns in total. Trials were evenly divided into two 
groups (n = 96) as experimental (positive probe) trials and fillers. Probe words in the 
experimental trials were among the four study words in the encoding phase, whereas a 
different, not seen, word was probed in fillers. 
Words in the experimental trials and fillers were arranged into sets with four and five words, 
respectively. Words within sets were matched on imageability, concreteness and length in 
letters (all SDs < 2.00). Words were further controlled so that no word started with the same 
letter or was semantically related with any other word in the trial set. Monosyllabic, disyllabic 
and trisyllabic words were evenly distributed [e.g., (3, 3, 3, 3), (1, 2, 1, 2) or (3, 2, 3, 2, 3) etc.]. 
Welch’s t-tests revealed no significant difference between the probe and distractor words in 
imageability, concreteness, length in letters or number of syllables (all ps > .05). Thus, any 
word among the four words in each trial set was as likely to be remembered as any other word. 
Probe words in experimental trials (n = 384) were selected from normed and labelled words 
according to their horizontal and vertical positions in Experiment 3. They were also a subset 
of the extension of Paivio’s (1986) norms (J. M. Clark & Paivio, 2004). Equal number of words 
(n = 24) in the stimulus set were associated with top, top right, bottom and bottom left locations 
in space (see Chapter 5). 
Horizontal positions were not considered as a variable due to the dominance of vertical 
space over horizontal space (Franklin & Tversky, 1990; Marmolejo-Ramos et al., 2013). Thus, 
words were grouped as upward (top and top right) and downward words (bottom and bottom 
left). All participants saw an equal number of upward and downward words (n = 48). Along 
with that, words were placed into quadrants according to both horizontal and vertical positions. 
In the spatially congruent condition, words associated with upward and rightward position 
(e.g., “friend”) were placed in the top right quadrant and words associated with upward position 
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(e.g., “heaven”) were placed in the top left quadrant. Similarly, words associated with 
downward and leftward position (e.g., “jail”) were placed in the bottom left quadrant and words 
associated with downward position (e.g., “mule”) were presented in the bottom right quadrant. 
In the spatially incongruent condition, words were encoded in the diagonal position as to their 
default position in congruent encoding. For example, participants saw a word associated with 
an upward position (e.g., “flag”) in the top left quadrant when it was spatially congruent and, 
in the bottom right quadrant when it was spatially incongruent. 
Finally, we formed 192 unique mathematical equation [e.g., (2*3) - (2+3) = 1] to present as 
memory interference between encoding and retrieval phases (see Conway & Engle, 1996 for a 
similar design). Half of the equations were correct. Incorrect equations were further divided 
into two equal groups: The results were either plus or minus one from the correct result. 
Descriptive and spatial statistics of words used as probe are presented in Table 6.1 and Table 
6.2 respectively. 
 
Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics of probe words (n = 96) 
 
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Imageability 4.93 1.34 2.20 6.77 
Concreteness 4.43  1.96 1.18 7 
Length in letters 6.76 1.80 4 11 
Number of syllables 2.23 0.96 1  5 
Horizontal position -1.9 175.47 -326.33 344.5 
Vertical position 2.51 321.65 -452.83 452.8 
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Table 6.2 Spatial statistics of the probe words (n = 96) 
 
 Upward words Downward words 
 
Top Top right Bottom Bottom left 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Horizontal position 33.87  75.82 221.74  52.83 -39.53  80.77 -226.81  48.32 
Vertical position 327.84  68.41 289.35  74.99 -316.03  51.54 -317.66  72.74 
Contraversiality 0.28  0.1 0.36  0.1 0.36  0.11 0.34  0.1 
Spatiality 0.52  0.1 0.65  0.12 0.51  0.09 0.72  0.13 
 
6.4.3 Apparatus 
 
Stimuli were presented on a TFT LCD 24-inch widescreen monitor operating at 144 Hz with a 
resolution of 1920 x 1080 pixels (508 mm x 285.75 mm). The experiment was programmed in 
and run on OpenSesame (version 3.1.7; Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012). Auditory material 
was produced by a native female speaker of British English in a sound attenuated room and 
recorded using Audacity (Version 2.1.10; https://www.audacityteam.org). Participants 
responded (yes/no they had seen the word) by pressing one of two keys on a standard keyboard.  
Data were analysed and visualised in R programming language and environment (R Core 
Team, 2017). Mixed-effects models were constructed with lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015). 
Significance values of the coefficients in models were computed based on the t-distribution 
using the Satterthwaite approximation with lmerTest package (Kuznetsova et al., 2015). 
 
6.4.4 Procedure 
 
The task was a yes/no verbal recognition memory test. As spelled out in detail below, each trial 
was composed of five consecutive phases: (1) fixation, (2) encoding, (3) interference, (4) 
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retrieval and (5) feedback (See Figure 6.1). The task was to decide whether an auditorily 
presented word had appeared before or not. As soon as the participants made yes/no judgement 
by hitting one of the response buttons, the trial ended, and a new encoding phase began. 
(1) Fixation: A fixation cross appeared at the centre of the screen for 500 ms. (2) Encoding: 
Participants were presented four words (Courier, font size = 56) in capital letters on a 2 x 2 
grid for 1800 ms. Encoding location was a between-subjects variable. A random half of the 
participants (n = 26) saw the probe word in a spatially congruent location and the other half in 
an incongruent location. (3) Interference: Participants were presented a mathematical 
equation and asked to identify whether the equation was correct or not within 10,000 ms (or 
they timed-out). (4) Retrieval: The probe word was auditorily presented as participants looked 
at the screen with the blank grid. Participants were tasked to make a yes/no judgement to 
determine whether they had seen the probe word among the four words shown in the encoding 
phase within 3,000 ms (or they timed-out). Participants were asked to respond as quickly and 
as accurately as possible. During the retrieval phase, a square appeared either in the same 
(congruent retrieval) or in the diagonal quadrant (incongruent retrieval) as the original location 
of the probe word in the encoding phase. Participants were instructed to look at the square as 
they gave their response. Retrieval manipulation was a within-subjects variable. All 
participants were asked to retrieve the probe word in congruent and incongruent retrieval 
conditions. (5) Feedback: Participants were shown their accuracy (“correct” or “incorrect”) 
and response time for 500 ms after each trial. Total accuracy and average response time were 
shown at the end of the experiment. 
The order of trials and equations were fully randomised independently of each other. The 
experiment was divided into four equal blocks with 48 trials in each block and there was a short 
pause between the blocks. A typical session lasted approximately 45 minutes. Overall accuracy 
in interference equations and in the recognition memory test for words (including fillers) were 
 164 
79% and 81% respectively, suggesting that participants attended to the task with high 
concentration. 
Following the experiment, a computerized version of the Corsi block-tapping task (Corsi, 
1972) operated on PEBL (Psychology Experiment Building Language, version 0.13, test 
battery version 0.7, http://pebl.org) (Mueller & Piper, 2014) was used to measure visuospatial 
short-term memory and a digit span test was used to measure short-term memory. Participants 
were also asked to report their level of sleepiness on Epworth Sleepiness Scale (Johns, 1991). 
Mental fitness was measured on a Likert scale from 0 (“I feel very tired”) to 4 (“I feel mentally 
very fit and attentive”). Physical fitness score was computed based on exercise frequency. 
Psychological mood was measured on a Likert scale from 0 (extremely unhappy) to 10 
(extremely happy). 
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6.5 Results 
 
6.5.1 Data preparation 
 
Homogeneity 
 
Variability between the participants was considered as a random effect in the mixed-effects 
models. Along with that, participants who were tested on congruent and incongruent encoding 
conditions were compared on individual variability measures (i.e., Corsi Block-tapping test, 
digit span, Edinburg Handedness Inventory, Epworth Sleepiness Scale, self-reported mental 
fitness, self-reported physical fitness and self-reported mood) to verify the homogeneity 
between the groups. There was not a significant difference between participants tested on 
congruent and incongruent encoding conditions in any of the measures (see Table 6.3). 
 
Table 6.3 Results of the individual variability measures among all participants and across encoding groups 
 
Measures All (48) Congruent encoding (24)  Incongruent encoding (24) t p 
Corsi block  58.94 (24.25) 53.75 (25.01) 64.12 (22.81) 1.50 .14 
Digit span 7.06 (1.36) 9.62 (2.58) 8.67 (2.16) 1.39 .17 
Handedness laterality 59.17 (49.17) 54.79 (49.35) 63.54 (49.64) 0.61 .54 
Sleepiness 0.84 (0.55) 0.85 (0.51) 0.83 (0.6) 0.13 .90 
Mental fitness 2.21 (0.92) 2.25 (0.94) 2.17 (0.92) 0.31 .76 
Physical fitness 3.21 (1.52) 3.21 (1.61) 3.21 (1.44) 0 1 
Mood 6.85 (1.22) 6.62 (1.13) 7.08 (1.28) 1.31 .20 
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6.5.2 Mixed-effects modelling 
 
Data were analysed using linear and binomial logit mixed-effects modelling. Visual inspections 
of residual plots did not reveal any obvious deviations from homoscedasticity or linearity. 
Linear models were fit for continuous target variables (hit latency). Binomial models were fit 
for categorical target variables (hit rate) and with bobyqa optimiser to prevent non-
convergence. Participants and items were treated as random effects to explain by-participant 
and by-items variation (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008). 
We started fitting models by building the random effects structure and followed a maximal 
approach. That is, random effects were included as both random intercepts and correlated 
random slopes (random variations) as long as they converged and were justified by the data 
(Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). Random intercepts and slopes were included even if 
they did not improve the model fit in order to control for possible dependence due to repeated 
measures or order effects. Random effects structure was simplified step by step as per the 
magnitude of the contribution of a random effect to the explanation of the variation in the data. 
That is, the random effect with the weakest contribution was dropped first and if necessary, the 
structure was further reduced accordingly. 
Contribution of a fixed effect was investigated by comparing a full model containing the 
effect in question against a reduced model in which only that effect was removed, or a null 
model without any fixed effects. Compared models had the same random effects structure 
(Winter, 2013). 
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6.5.3 Factor analysis 
 
Diagnostic tests indicated collinearity between word variables (MeanVIF = 2.86, RangeVIF = 
2.06 - 3.46; kappa = 2400.33). In order to address collinearity, we performed exploratory factor 
analysis using a principal component analysis extraction method with an orthogonal (varimax) 
rotation method. Kaiser’s criterion and the scree test criterion showed the presence of three 
factors in our data. Three factors were interpreted as follows based on the loadings (see Table 
6.4): (1) Imagery5: Imageability and concreteness, (2) Length: Length in letters and syllable 
length and (3) Position: Horizontal and vertical position. The three-factor solution explained 
89.38% of the variance in the data. VIF of the factors were below one and thus, below our 
threshold of two. Regression scores calculated for three factors were employed as predictors in 
the subsequent linear mixed-effects multiple regression models. 
Models were fit to investigate the effect of word factors on hit latency. Random slopes were 
added for length and imageability into items and length into participants. Likelihood tests 
showed that word length (length in letters and syllable length) was predictive of hit latency; 
χ2(1) = 3.76, p = .05 but not imageability; χ2(1) = 1.49, p = .22 or word position; χ2(1) = .007, 
p = .93. Longer words were retrieved slower; b = 14.22, t = 2.17, p = .04. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
5 We refer to imagery factor (i.e., imageability and concreteness) as imageability for the sake 
of simplicity. 
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Table 6.4 Varimax rotated factor-loadings and communalities of the predictors 
 
  Factor  
Predictors Imagery Length Position h2 
Imageability 0.93 -0.21 -0.02 0.92 
Concreteness 0.95 -0.15 -0.06 0.92 
Length in letters -0.19 0.93 0.11 0.91 
Number of syllables -0.17 0.94 0.05 0.91 
Horizontal position -0.02 0.09 0.92 0.85 
Vertical position -0.05 0.06 0.92 0.86 
Factor statistics     
Eigenvalue 2.62 1.60 1.13 7.99 
Variance (%) 30.55 30.28 28.54 89.93 
Bolded numbers indicate the groupings. Eigenvalues and percentage of variance are after rotation. h2 = 
communality. 
 
6.5.4 Effect of spatial congruency at encoding 
 
Hit rate 
 
First, we examined the effect of spatial congruency between word locations and locations 
implied by the words on hit rate in the verbal recognition memory test. Fixed effect was 
encoding condition with two levels (spatially congruent encoding and spatially incongruent 
encoding). Random slopes were added for imagery, word length and word position factors both 
into participants and items. Likelihood tests showed that encoding condition did not improve 
the model fit for hit rate; χ2(1) = 0.49, p = .48. In other words, participants’ accuracy was the 
same for words encoded both in canonical (mean hit rate = 80%) and unexpected locations 
(mean hit rate = 82%). None of the lexico-semantic factors modulated the effect of spatial 
congruency at encoding on hit rate (ps > .05) (see Figure 6.3). 
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Hit latency 
 
Next, we examined the effect of spatial congruency at encoding on hit latency. Fixed effect 
was encoding condition with two levels (spatially congruent encoding and spatially 
incongruent encoding). Random slopes were added for imagery, word length and word position 
factors both into participants and items. Likelihood tests showed that encoding condition 
significantly improved the model fit; χ2(1) = 6.96, p = .008. Words encoded in congruent 
locations (e.g., “bird” in the top left quadrant) (mean hit latency = 1075.26 ms) were retrieved 
slower than words encoded in incongruent locations (e.g., “bird” in the bottom right quadrant) 
(mean hit latency = 985.63 ms); b = 95.29, t = 2.80, p = .007. None of the lexico-semantic 
factors modulated the effect of spatial congruency at encoding on hit latency (ps > .05) (see 
Figure 6.3). 
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retrieval when they were cued to look at the previous locations of the probe word (mean hit 
rate = 79%) or at a diagonal location (mean hit rate = 80%). None of the lexico-semantic factors 
modulated the effect of spatial congruency at retrieval on hit rate within congruent encoding 
trials (ps > .05). 
Incongruent encoding: Word length and word position factors were added as random 
slopes into participants and items. Retrieval condition improved the model fit for hit rate within 
incongruent encoding condition; χ2(1) = 4.59, p = .03. Participants were more accurate in word 
retrieval when they were cued to look at the previous locations of the probe word (mean hit 
rate = 84%) than to a diagonal location (mean hit rate = 80%); b = 0.25, z = 2.11, p = .03. 
Findings are visualised in Figure 6.4. 
 
Hit latency 
 
Congruent encoding: Imagery and word length factor were added as random slopes into 
participants. Word length factor was added into random slopes into items. Retrieval condition 
did not improve the model fit for hit latency within congruent encoding condition; χ2(1) = 0.10, 
p = .75. Participants were equally fast in word retrieval when they were cued to look at the 
previous locations of the probe word (mean hit latency = 1081.80 ms) or at a diagonal location 
(mean hit latency = 1082.01 ms). 
There was a significant interaction effect between retrieval condition and imageability on 
hit latency; χ2(1) = 5.58, p = .02. Participants retrieved high imageable words slower when they 
read the word in the congruent locations and then, were cued to look at the previous location 
of the word; b = 25.32, t = 2.36, p = .02. 
Incongruent encoding: Imagery, word length and word position factors were added as 
random slopes into participants. Imagery factor was added as random slopes into items. 
Retrieval condition did not improve the model fit for hit latency within incongruent encoding 
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6.6 Discussion 
 
We investigated compatibility effects of physical and semantic locations of words at encoding 
and retrieval stages on memory performance. Physical space was the actual position where the 
word was presented on the screen at encoding and semantic space was the location suggested 
by the word either perceptually or metaphorically. 
 
6.6.1 Physical and semantic space at encoding 
 
Results showed that words that were encoded in incongruent locations as to the locations they 
are associated with were retrieved faster. To illustrate, participants were faster when 
remembering the word “bird” if they saw it at the bottom of the screen as compared to the top 
of the screen. The effect was evident even when word properties (length in letters, syllable 
length, imageability, concreteness, horizontal and vertical positions) that have evidenced 
impacts on verbal memory under the current paradigm (see Chapter 4) were controlled as much 
as the models permit. 
The results are in contrast with studies showing facilitation with spatial congruency in other 
linguistic tasks such as semantic judgement (Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003) and conceptual 
categorisation (Šetić & Domijan, 2007). However, verbal memory can be assumed to require 
different mental operations than other language/conceptual tasks as discussed in introduction. 
Consequently, memory-related effects seem to have played a more decisive role in retrieval 
performance in the present study. Thus, we refer to the research on memory, in particular, the 
concept of distinctiveness to explain our results. We assume that participants retrieved the 
words that appeared in unexpected locations faster as these words were encoded more 
distinctively. According to this account, spatial congruency might indeed have led to ease of 
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conceptual processing. However, encoding in the current study was not a production but a 
perception task itself. That is, participants were not instructed to produce a respond at the 
processing stage unlike studies showing facilitation with spatial conformity (e.g., Meyer & 
Robinson, 2004; Šetić & Domijan, 2007; Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003). 
We argue that expectation-violation effect (Hirshman, 1988) and level of processing (Craik 
& Lockhart, 1972) together could explain the spatial incongruency advantage in the present 
study. Experiment 3 indicated that there are strong and consistent associations between words 
and their simulated locations in space. Thus, we reason that participants in the current study 
had consistent spatial expectations as to the words they encoded. It is possible that the need to 
resolve the inconsistency between the word location and the location implied by the word 
resulted in deep encoding elaboration. In support of this account, there is a large body of 
evidence that such complex, elaborate encodings lead to better recognition memory by leaving 
richer traces (R. P. Fisher & Craik, 1980; Galli, 2014; Hunt & Worthen, 2006; Wagner et al., 
1998). In sum, spatially incongruent words were paradoxically remembered faster in our study 
because such words violated spatial expectations and thus, encoded deeper than words that 
were presented in locations in line with their implied locations. 
Findings from encoding condition can be regarded as expected within memory research. 
That said, they are noteworthy from the standpoint of simulation approach to language and 
thus, grounded-embodied cognition. In the current study, the embodied mind undertook two 
spatial operations at different dimensions (i.e., physical and semantic) at the same time: 
Participants registered locations of the words on the screen and the words activated spatial 
perceptions. Spatial information was neither relevant nor necessary for a successful retrieval 
in the present study. Even though, both external and internal spatial perception, that is, 
perception of word location on the screen and simulation of implied locations had effect on 
memory for language, which is seemingly a non-spatial and predominantly internal task. 
Importantly, we had observed the effect not only for concrete nouns that denote object 
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occurring in typical locations in the real world but also for abstract nouns that are 
metaphorically associated with spatial locations. Such a finding suggests the pervasiveness of 
spatial perception in linguistic operations. Hence, results provide evidence for grounding of 
both concrete and abstract concepts in space and on a larger scale, for a simulation-based 
understanding of language (Barsalou, 1999; Bergen, 2007). 
 
6.6.2 Physical and semantic space at retrieval 
 
Visual cues presented in either the same or a diagonal location as to the original location of the 
probe word affected memory performance according to the initial location of the probe word 
at encoding: 
 
(1) Participants who were cued to look at the previous location of a high imageable word 
encoded in a congruent location were slower than the participants who were cued to 
look at a diagonal location. To illustrate, responses were slower when participants 
were cued to look at the top left quadrant after seeing the word “bird” (but not 
“justice”) in the top left quadrant. 
 
(2) Participants who were cued to look at the previous location of a word encoded in an 
incongruent location were more accurate than the participants who were cued to look 
at a diagonal location. To illustrate, responses were more accurate when participants 
were cued to look at the bottom right quadrant after seeing the word “bird” (or 
“justice”) in the bottom right quadrant. 
 
Both findings indicate that words activated spatial simulations and guided participants’ eye 
movements to the locations they suggest due to involuntary spatial cueing (e.g., looking upward 
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after reading the word “bird”) (Dudschig et al., 2013). Later, seeing visual information in the 
compatible location interfered with the retrieval process (Bergen, 2005; Bergen et al., 2007; 
Estes et al., 2008; D. C. Richardson et al., 2003). In the first case, reading the word “bird” 
oriented eye movements to the top left quadrant and processing a visual cue in the same 
location delayed the retrieval process. In the second case, reading the word “bird” oriented eye 
movements to the top left quadrant again and processing a visual cue in a different location 
than the simulated location (i.e., bottom right quadrant) improved memory performance. In 
short, memory performance was better whenever the simulated location did not overlap with 
the cue location. 
We assume that the interference effect was a consequence of the competition between the 
simulated location and the visual information when they occurred in the same quadrant. 
Although participants were not tasked to act on the visual information shown at retrieval and 
thus, they did not have to supress the simulated location to respond (cf., Estes, Verges, & 
Barsalou, 2008), they still had to allocate cognitive resources to overlapping physical and 
semantic spatial information. Hence, a competition for cognitive resources could have led to 
worse memory compared to the retrieval condition in which the simulated location and visual 
information did not overlap. 
Memory advantage with spatial incongruency at retrieval is in line with studies showing 
mismatch advantage in object identification tasks (Bergen, 2005; Bergen et al., 2007; Estes et 
al., 2008; D. C. Richardson et al., 2003) but at odds with studies showing a match advantage 
due to spatial simulations (Amorim & Pinheiro, 2018; Chasteen et al., 2010; Zanolie et al., 
2012). Notably, previous evidence suggests that simulation via concrete language leads to a 
match advantage; while, simulation via abstract language leads to a mismatch advantage (Liu 
& Bergen, 2016). We did not group words as concrete and abstract; however, it is possible that 
abstract language with high emotionality and thus, strong spatial associations (see Chapter 5) 
might have affected the results over concrete words in the present study. 
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Our results are also at odds with the evidence highlighting the functional role for eye 
movements in memory (Johansson & Johansson, 2014; Scholz et al., 2018, 2016). We argue 
that semantic space rather than physical space played a key role in memory retrieval when 
words suggest locations in space. As a result, participants treated visual cues as additional 
information to be processed rather than location tags that remind them the previous locations 
of the words. If this was the case, performance should have been better when participants 
looked at previous locations of words encoded in congruent locations. 
The mediating role of imageability for words encoded in congruent location is consistent 
with this explanation. We assume that imageability exaggerated the spatial simulation and in 
turn, supported the interference at the simulated locations. Accordingly, “bird” (a highly 
imageable word) elicited a more vivid mental image and thus, gave rise to a stronger spatial 
experience as compared to a low imageable word such as “justice”. Experiment 3 showed that 
low imageable words are also associated with certain locations in space according to their 
valence. We assume that reading these words activated their locations to a certain degree. 
However, this simulation was not robust enough for the interference effect when the words 
were encoded in congruent locations. 
Why did words encoded in incongruent locations lead to interference effect without the 
mediating role of imageability but only high imageable words encoded in congruent locations 
resulted in interference? We speculate that words encoded in incongruent locations could have 
given rise to stronger spatial simulations due to the spatial unexpectedness discussed above. 
Put differently, an unexpected location could have emphasised the spatial meaning of a word 
and consequently, the interference due to spatial cueing was more pronounced for words 
encoded in incongruent locations. 
One important issue to consider is that spatial manipulations in the current study affected 
accuracy or response time under different conditions. To be more precise, spatial congruency 
at encoding affected hit latency but not hit rate. Spatial congruency at retrieval affected hit 
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latency for words encoded in congruent positions and hit rate for words encoded in incongruent 
positions. There is evidence that attentional cues affect accuracy and response time via different 
cognitive and neural processes (van Ede, de Lange, & Maris, 2012). That is, accuracy is 
explained by a single process (i.e., increase in preparatory excitability in the sensory cortex), 
whereas response time is explained by an additional process that is sensitive to the 
compatibility between cue and target (post-target comparison between expected and actual 
location of stimulus). This evidence suits well with the effect of spatial congruency at encoding 
on hit latency in that response time was more sensitive to the spatial manipulation. In another 
study, the effect of spatial simulation activated by emotional words was not reflected in 
accuracy data but only in reaction times (Amorim & Pinheiro, 2018). However, this account 
fails short to explain why spatial congruency affected hit latency for words encoded in 
congruent positions but hit rate for words encoded in incongruent positions. Further research 
disambiguating the effects of spatial simulations on hit rate and hit latency is necessary.  
Results have a number of implications for the interactions between space, language and 
perceptual simulation. First, we provided further evidence that simulated locations can persist 
in time with consequences in the later stages of a task. The novelty of our contribution is the 
robustness of spatial simulation and persistency of semantic space in a longer time-window. 
Locations activated by spatial words in the current study affected subsequent processing even 
after participants solved a maths problem as an intermediate task. Thus, the duration between 
stimulus (i.e., spatial word) and response was 5351 ms on average in the current study. Such a 
result goes against the evidence suggesting that language-based simulation decays in the 
following 800 ms from the stimulus onset (Ostarek & Vigliocco, 2017) or that simulations have 
later effects within a time window of 800 - 1200 ms but congruency results in facilitation in 
the performance (Gozli et al., 2012). Language-based simulations had effects in a much longer 
time-window in our study and congruency resulted in interference. We argue that when 
participants retrieved the words, they retrieved the suggested locations associated with the 
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words as well. We did not manipulate and investigate stimulus-onset asynchrony in the present 
study. However, our results suggest a potential direction for future studies to investigate the 
cueing effect of spatial words on the subsequent visual information processing at longer SOAs. 
Second, we provided the preliminary evidence that spatial cueing could be stronger when 
spatial words are presented in different locations as to locations they imply. To our knowledge, 
spatial arrangement at the presentation has not been manipulated as a variable before in studies 
exploring subsequent effects of spatial simulations. Our results suggest that compatibility of 
semantic space with the physical space can enhance or dampen the effect of simulated 
locations. This also paves a new way for the future studies looking at the relationship between 
space and language. 
Lastly, we showed that imageability as a word property and by extension, mental imagery 
is critical in perceptual simulation (see Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006). Mental imagery 
has been used in many studies as a representative operation to show the existence and 
reactivation of perceptual symbols in that perceptual symbols (e.g., eye movements) encoded 
at the viewing phase are simulated at the imagery stage (e.g., Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002; 
Verges & Duffy, 2009). Mental imagery as a function of word imageability appears to 
modulate the strength of perceptual experiences through linguistic processing (see also 
Experiment 2). 
The current experiment has a number of limitations. First, we have no proof that participants 
actually looked at locations they were cued to as we did not track eye movements although 
experimental instructions and systematic effects of visual cues suggest that they did. That said, 
accompanying eye movement data in a future study could verify the effect of language-based 
simulations on visual cues. Second, two different effects were investigated in the present study: 
(1) the congruency between physical and semantic location of a word at encoding and (2) the 
congruency between physical/semantic location of a word and subsequent visual information. 
These two effects might have been intermingled and obscured each other when investigated in 
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one experiment with a relatively complex design. A more elegant experiment that focuses on 
either the first or the second effect would further clarify the role of spatial simulation in 
memory for language. For example, in one experiment, participants can be instructed to 
remember spatially congruent or incongruent words as to the locations they imply without 
showing any cues at retrieval. In another experiment, participants can be instructed to encode 
words in the central (thus, neutral) position. At retrieval, they can be asked to retrieve the probe 
word while looking at a visual cue that is congruent or incongruent as to the physical or 
semantic word location at encoding. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
Space in language was investigated at two dimensions in the present study: semantic and 
physical. A mismatch between semantic and physical space made words more distinct and thus, 
more memorable. Alternatively, the simulated semantic location interfered with subsequent 
processing in the congruent location and delayed retrieval. In that, our results allow for a more 
precise characterization of the nature of language-based simulations. Both cases underline the 
importance of space in language. We argue that spatiality as a word property could be taken 
into consideration in models of language processing and memory for language. Overall, results 
indicate that space is automatically simulated via language with highly persistent and pervasive 
consequences on mental operations such as verbal memory. Results can be taken as further 
support for a perceptual and extended understanding of language (e.g., Gibbs, 2005): Language 
is not an amodal, symbolic abstraction that is independent of other cognitive faculties in mind. 
Rather, it is a flexible system grounded in perceptual simulations and interacting with the 
physical environment. 
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Chapter 7  
 
General Discussion 
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7.1 Summary of Main Findings and Conclusions 
 
The current thesis explored and illustrated spatial simulations towards more precise simulation 
models within the framework of grounded-embodied theories of memory and language. 
Simulation of word locations in the absence of words during memory retrieval was addressed 
in Chapter 3 (Experiment 1) and Chapter 4 (Experiment 2). Simulation of spatial locations 
triggered directly and automatically by word meanings was focused in Chapter 5 (Experiment 
3) and Chapter 6 (Experiment 4). 
Experiment 1 results showed that participants encoded locations of words upon their 
presentation in an unintentional and effortless manner: First, word locations were encoded 
along with the words themselves although participants did not have to remember locations 
intentionally. Second, words locations were encoded without any objects (e.g., faces) to 
explicitly associate with as in previous studies (thus, effortless) (D. C. Richardson & Spivey, 
2000; Scholz et al., 2018, 2011, 2016). Spatial indices tagging word locations induced 
simulation of the location when the information previously occurred there was re-accessed with 
memory retrieval. In return, simulation of word locations guided eye movements to the relevant 
locations (i.e., looking at nothing). In other words, participants relied on the simulation of word 
locations. In this manner, memory work was offloaded onto the body and the environment 
through eye movements and spatial simulations, respectively. 
Experiment 1 results also showed that spatial indices can be modulated with additional 
visual information. A visual cue appearing in the same location as to the previous location of 
the probe word emphasised the locational information and strengthened its simulation. As a 
result, looks to the relevant, blank locations were more frequent following a spatially congruent 
visual cue compared to trials where no cue was shown. On the other hand, a visual cue 
appearing in a diagonal location to the previous location of the probe word formed a new spatial 
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index. Competition between the spatial indices standing for the probe word and the incongruent 
visual cue interfered with “looking at nothing” behaviour but it did not delay memory retrieval. 
The key findings of Experiment 1 are the correlations between visuospatial memory span 
measured with Corsi-block tapping task and looking behaviour: First, there was a positive 
correlation between visuospatial memory and percentage of fixations in the central interest area 
(across all cue conditions). Second, there was a negative correlation between visuospatial 
memory and percentage of fixations in the relevant, blank quadrant (in incongruent cue 
condition) and in the irrelevant, blank quadrant (in no cue condition). We conclude that 
participants with worse visuospatial memory relied more on the environment and thus, 
simulation of word locations than participants with better visuospatial memory. 
Almost all patterns of the looking behaviour observed in Experiment 1 were replicated in 
Experiment 2: First, participants looked at the relevant, blank locations (the quadrant where 
the probe word was presented) more than the irrelevant, blank locations (the other three blank 
quadrants) when remembering words. Second, visual cues shown between encoding and 
retrieval stages affected looks in the same way as found in Experiment 1. Participants looked 
at “nothing” when no cue was presented or following a spatially congruent cue. However, 
spatially incongruent cues disrupted the looks to blank locations. Third, the link between 
visuospatial memory and looking behaviour was replicated. Lastly, looking at nothing did not 
improve memory performance in either of the studies. 
What is the novel contribution of Experiment 2? The key finding is that participants looked 
more at “nothing” when remembering words that are more difficult to maintain and retrieve 
from memory compared to easier words. Mixed-effects models that were fit to investigate the 
contribution of lexico-semantic variables revealed that word imageability and concreteness 
modulated looks to blank locations. There were more looks in the relevant, blank locations 
during the retrieval of less imageable and abstract words as compared to more imageable and 
concrete words. Notably, word length modulated memory performance (hit rate and hit latency) 
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but not looks to relevant, blank locations suggesting a special role for imageability and by 
extension, mental imagery. In support of this, participants with more control on their mental 
images as measured with Gordon Test of Visual Image Control (Gordon, 1949) relied on spatial 
simulations more frequently (i.e., looked more at nothing) than participants with worse mental 
imagery control when there was no visual cue between encoding and retrieval stages. The 
contribution of semantic variables (i.e., word imageability and concreteness) but not perceptual 
variables (i.e., word length) indicates that participants did not treat words as physical images. 
Rather, they accessed word meanings and a semantic component modulated looking behaviour. 
Such a behaviour highlights the tight links between spatial and conceptual representations 
(Boot & Pecher, 2011; Martarelli et al., 2017).  
We attempted to specify the mechanism of location simulation in memory for language in 
Experiment 1 and 2. In particular, our evidence illuminated the conditions under which 
individuals tend to rely on location simulations and look at relevant, blank locations during 
memory retrieval. We conclude that there is a balanced trade-off between internal and external 
sources driven by cognitive differences between individuals and cognitive demands coming 
from the words to make the most of environmental opportunities and cognitive capacity.  
In Experiment 3, we asked participants to read 1439 concrete and abstract nouns selected 
from a wide range of domains (e.g., temporal words such as “yesterday”, directional words 
such as “north”, emotional words such as “bewilderment” etc.). Then, participants were asked 
to associate words with locations on a precise, two-dimensional coordinate system. Thereby, 
we collected semantic coordinates for each word on the horizontal and vertical axes just as 
geographical coordinates in topographic environments in the real-world. For example, the word 
“moon” was located on the centre of the horizontal scale as of 17 pixels and on the upward side 
of the vertical scale as of 419.83 pixels. As such, “agony” was located on the leftward and 
downward position at (-243, -413.83). Location ratings showed that most of the words were 
positioned on a diagonal line from bottom left to top right. Words that denote objects were 
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associated with locations where the objects typically occur in the real world. “Good” words 
with positive valence were associated with upward and rightward locations; whereas “bad” 
words with negative valence were associated with downward and leftward locations. Ratings 
revealed that vertical space was more dominant than horizontal space. That is, participants 
tended use the whole range of the vertical scale but rated the words more conservatively on the 
horizontal scale. Importantly, there was a high degree of agreement between participants in 
spatial ratings. We conclude that mappings between words and locations are even more 
consistent and fine-grained than previously documented (Dunn et al., 2014; Estes et al., 2015; 
Lachmair et al., 2011; Louwerse, 2008; Marmolejo-Ramos et al., 2013; Meteyard & Vigliocco, 
2009). This is particularly interesting considering that language itself does not provide any 
rules or conventions as to spatial associations. In this respect, Experiment 3 results support a 
perceptual basis of language within grounded-embodied cognition (Barsalou, 1999; 
Pulvermüller, 1999). 
Experiment 4 demonstrated that words, which are associated with locations in space either 
perceptually or metaphorically, give rise to simulations of these locations upon their 
presentation. We evidenced that language-based reactivations of space have consequences for 
memory in relation with physical locations and their simulations. Words that were presented 
in locations incongruent to the locations they imply (e.g., “moon” in a downward location or 
“agony” in an upward location) were remembered faster than words that were presented in 
congruent locations (e.g., “moon” in an upward location or “agony” in a downward location). 
A visual cue shown at retrieval guided participants’ attention to the previous locations of the 
probe word and/or semantically implied location. Performance was better when the cue 
location did not overlap with the location of the language-based spatial simulation. Consider 
the word “moon”. “Moon” guides attention to the upward side of the screen because it is 
associated with an upward location in space as Experiment 3 indicated. Experiment 4 showed 
that participants’ recognition memory was more accurate when they saw a cue in the bottom 
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right quadrant, but it was slower when they saw a cue in the top left corner after encoding 
“moon”. 
Crucially, visual cues occurring in simulated locations deteriorated memory performance 
only with the modulation of imageability for words encoded in congruent positions. In other 
words, simulations invoked by high imageable words (but not low imageable words) interfered 
with visual cues if words were encoded in the congruent positions. Whereas, visual cues 
interfered with spatial simulations without any lexico-semantic modulation if the words were 
encoded in incongruent locations. Put differently, abstract words with spatial associations 
triggered strong spatial simulations and interfered with visual cues only when they were 
encoded in incongruent locations. We conclude that incongruency between physical and 
semantic space at the encoding stage produces an unexpectedness effect (Schmidt, 1991). 
Unexpectedness due to spatial incongruency has two impacts on memory for language: (1) It 
deepens memory traces which results in better retrieval performance. (2) It strengthens 
language-based spatial simulations which elicits a more robust interference effect. 
Spatial simulations examined in this thesis have connections to language; yet, they are of 
two different types: (1) Simulation of locations (in which words are perceived) in the absence 
of words (offline spatial simulation). (2) Simulation of space suggested by word meanings 
(online spatial simulation). We evidenced that online and offline simulations of space have 
consequences on memory for language even if space does not seem to be a part of the retrieval 
process. We conclude that spatial perception and spatial cognition underlie memory and 
language operations in robust and systematic ways. In this respect, experiments provide 
compelling evidence for a memory and a language conceptualisation that is grounded in the 
sensorimotor system and extended into the body and the environment. 
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7.2 Implications 
 
The overarching theme of the present thesis is space and spatial simulation. Experiments 
connect to each other in that space is involved in cognitive processing in different ways. Thus, 
the overall implication of the current work is showing that simulations and particularly, 
simulations of space play key roles in the human cognition. Along with that, experiments 
reported in this thesis extend into different domains of cognition; in particular, memory, 
language, grounded-embodied and extended cognition. Hence, results have considerable 
implications for the architecture of the abovementioned domains and potentially, on more 
practical fields. 
 
7.2.1 Implications for Grounded-Embodied and Extended 
Cognition 
 
Our results can be thought as further steps towards more precise models of grounded-embodied 
and extended cognition in a broader sense. In four experiments, we specified the mechanisms 
of simulation (Experiment 1, 2, 3 & 4) and cognitive offloading (Experiment 1 & 2). We 
observed a flexible and intelligent coordination between internal and external sources across 
all experiments. In Experiment 1 and 2, participants moved from internal to external bits of 
information wherever the “cost of an operation” (Kirsh, 2010) is lower according to their own 
sources and task conditions. In Experiment 4, the combination of external information (i.e., 
physical location) and internal information (i.e., semantic location) affected memory 
performance. In this respect, our results demonstrate not only the existence but also the 
importance of mental representations within grounded operations. Results support a relatively 
 190 
moderate view as compared to radical embodiment (Chemero, 2011) in terms of mental 
representations.  
There were concrete and abstract words in all experiments. The effects (i.e., looking at 
nothing and language-induced spatial simulations) extended to both types of words. Hence, the 
current thesis suggests that abstract concepts can be grounded in space both perceptually (via 
their locations in the real-world) and semantically (via their meanings and metaphorical spatial 
associations). Grounding abstractness was not tested directly. Along with that, our findings 
seem to be more supportive for a hard approach to grounded-embodied cognition, which 
suggests that perceptual, motor and affective processes underlie all cognitive phenomena 
including those with abstractness (Barsalou, 1999; Pezzulo et al., 2013) rather than the 
pluralistic approach (Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010, 2012), which holds that abstract concepts 
are handled by symbolic systems. 
Participants in Experiment 1 and 2 deployed memory work onto their body with eye 
movements and the environment with simulation of word locations. In this respect, we 
reframed looking at nothing as a type of cognitive offloading (Risko & Gilbert, 2016) and an 
efficient use of space and spatial simulation via cognitive offloading (Kirsh, 1995). Embedding 
looking at nothing into the abovementioned mechanisms and thus, extended cognition could 
conflate different but conceptually overlapping lines of research (i.e., looking at nothing and 
cognitive offloading) and open up novel directions in research and application (see Chapter 
7.4). 
In this respect, one potential implication could be making use of space and spatial simulation 
consciously in order to improve performance in tasks that require memory retrieval under 
demanding conditions. There are recommendations for active use of memory outsourcing with 
environmental modifications (e.g., external memory cues for navigating indoor environments 
such as hospitals and nursing homes etc.) in aging population (Ross & Schryer, 2015). As such, 
simulation of locations and looking at nothing might be operationalised in the service of 
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memory in a strategic way. Individuals with memory disorders or learning disabilities, older 
population, students, learners of second language or professionals in memory-demanding jobs 
(e.g., interpreters, air traffic controllers etc.) (G. G. Fisher et al., 2014) can be trained to use 
the environment effectively to support their internal memory. 
 
7.2.2 Implications for Memory 
 
Results from Experiment 1, 2 and 4 extend the contemporary memory research in agreement 
with theories of grounded-embodied and extended cognition. There are two crucial tenets of 
the memory model that the experiments reported in the current thesis present: 
(1) Remembering is a partial simulation of encoding: During retrieval, participants 
reactivated their spatio-perceptual experiences they had at encoding (i.e., perceiving word 
locations on the screen). We conclude that remembering words involves reconstruction of the 
perceptual states that were present during encoding (Danker & Anderson, 2010). In short, 
remembering can be thought as a partial simulation of encoding. Simulation of encodings is 
“partial” rather than an exact “replay” because simulations themselves are “sketchy” and 
“never complete” (Barsalou, 1999). Thus, we focused on the percentage of looks in the relevant 
locations rather than the correspondence of eye movements executed at encoding and at 
retrieval (cf., Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002) (see also Chapter 7.4.1). Findings fit well with the 
experimental evidence that encoding and retrieval are strongly interdependent and common 
neural systems are activated in both processes (Goldberg et al., 2006b; Nyberg et al., 2000; 
Otten, 2007; Rugg et al., 2008; Wheeler et al., 2000). 
(2) Remembering involves perceptual and contextual details of encoding: Retrieval of 
words involve spatial locations (Experiment 1 and 2) and semantically suggested locations 
(Experiment 4). Further, memory for language was affected by spatial perception although 
participants in these experiments were not aware of the link between the words and the spatial 
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manipulation. Results underline the perceptual underpinnings of memory within grounded-
embodied cognition. Simulation-based memory model in grounded-embodied cognition and 
thus, results in this thesis contrast to computational models (e.g., multi-store model in Atkinson 
and Shiffrin (1968)), which hold that memory and sensory systems are detached from each 
other (Buckner & Wheeler, 2001). 
As a novel contribution, our findings tap into a critical question as to the simulations in 
memory: How does accessibility of retrieved information affect simulation of encoding? 
Danker and Anderson (2010) highlighted this question as an important research avenue among 
others. Results in the present thesis demonstrated that items that are more difficult to access 
result in more robust activations through eye movements. We conclude that memory for 
language is a flexible process of piecing together fragments of both semantic and perceptual 
information and it is based on partial reconstructions of the sensorimotor experiences of 
encoding. Simulation approach to memory could have even broader implications. First, 
understanding the processes and neural substrates involved in visual and auditory perception, 
for instance, could shed light on the role of these processes and substrates in remembering 
words (Buckner & Wheeler, 2001). Second, investigating perceptual and thus, encoding 
dysfunctions could clarify memory distortions among healthy and clinical population (e.g., in 
amnesia, dementia or schizophrenia) (Michaelian, 2016a; Schacter, Guerin, & St. Jacques, 
2011; Tek et al., 2002). 
 
7.2.3 Implications for Language 
 
Language operations in the present thesis resulted in spatio-perceptual simulations even though 
space was never an explicit part of the task with the exception of Experiment 3. In this respect, 
results (particularly those from Experiment 4) extend the literature of simulation semantics 
(Bergen, 2007). The simulation approach to language and thus, our findings have implications 
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for the general architecture of language. Computational models of language argue that 
language is a system of abstract symbols that reside in an amodal region of the brain 
independent of the perceptual and the motor system and that language comprehension is a 
manipulation of these abstract symbols (e.g., Chomsky, 1980; May, 1985; Pinker, 1995). Our 
findings, along with the overwhelming evidence that language comprehension involves the 
activation of sensorimotor experiences (see Chapter 2.1.3), disapprove the computational view. 
The novel implication of our results is the specification of the linguistic properties that give 
rise to spatial simulations. First, our findings demonstrate that lexical items are sufficient to 
generate simulations without any contextual information or without integration into larger 
linguistic structures such as sentences. This finding is in contrast with the results in Bergen, 
Lindsay, Matlock and Narayanan (2007), who demonstrated that comprehension of the 
sentence as a whole and not simply lexical associations yields simulations. Second, our 
findings demonstrate that word imageability is a crucial property both for looking at nothing 
and for the subsequent effects of language-induced simulations. We show that less 
imageable/more abstract words lead to more frequent reliance on simulation of word locations 
(Experiment 2). On the other hand, imageability plays an important role in exacerbating the 
word-induced simulations when the physical arrangement dampens their effects (Experiment 
4). Third, our findings demonstrate that abstract words are grounded in space as well as 
concrete words and they trigger robust simulations which later impact performance. As a matter 
of fact, Experiment 3 results indicate that emotional abstract words had even more spatiality 
(as opposed to being spatially neutral) than concrete words with lower emotionality. Grounding 
of abstract language in space is informative not only for theories of grounded-embodied 
cognition but also for theories of language processing considering the previous evidence that 
metaphorical language does not yield simulations (Bergen et al., 2007) or lead to different 
simulation effects as compared to concrete language (Liu & Bergen, 2016). 
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In conclusion, the present thesis puts forward that language is grounded in space and spatial 
perception in a more robust manner than previously documented. Spatial simulations triggered 
by language have consequences on tasks involving language. Therefore, language models and 
experimental studies should consider spatial domain even when linguistic stimuli in question 
do not explicitly denote spatial positions or when spatial perception or spatial simulations are 
not investigated. Considering the fundamentality of space in language and robustness of 
language-induced simulations, we call this domain spatial-simulation semantics combining the 
terms spatial semantics (Zlatev, 2012) and simulation semantics (Bergen, 2007). 
 
7.3 Future Work 
 
The research on looking at nothing, cognitive offloading and simulation mechanism within the 
framework of grounded-embodied and extended cognition is still in its infancy. Hence, there 
are numerous outstanding questions waiting to be answered. In general, looking at nothing via 
simulation of locations and language-based spatial simulations should be further specified as 
detailed below. The questions and issues listed below can direct a research path towards well-
defined models of both mechanisms. 
 
7.3.1 Looking at nothing 
 
1. At what point exactly do individuals look at blank locations? We show that fixations in 
the relevant, blank locations increase as memory load increases as a function of word 
difficulty in Experiment 2. More studies are required to specify the effect of memory 
load on looking at nothing. For example, future studies could measure mental load 
based on ocular indices such as pupil dilation (van der Wel & van Steenbergen, 2018) 
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and ocular aberrations (i.e., imperfections of the ocular optic elements arranged along 
the ocular axis) (Jiménez, Cárdenas, González-Anera, Jiménez, & Vera, 2018) or other 
biological markers such as heart rate variability (Cerpa, Chandler, & Sweller, 1996), 
facial thermography (Marinescu et al., 2018) or galvanic skin response (Kohlisch & 
Schaefer, 1996). Based on more precise measures, it might be possible to identify the 
amount of cognitive load that is required to guide participants to environmental sources. 
 
2. How precisely are word locations registered? Consider that participants are asked to 
retrieve specific words in a sentence or in a longer text. In such a case, do fixations fall 
specifically on the previous word locations or within their periphery in a sentence, or a 
larger text? If, for example, fixations accumulate in a larger area corresponding to the 
word to be retrieved rather than the word’s specific location, this could be informative 
about the spatial precision of indexing and accordingly, requirements of looking at 
nothing. Related to this, how does spatial precision relate to functionality of looking at 
nothing? There could be a positive correlation between precision in spatial indexing 
and functionality of fixations in looking at nothing. Future studies could also make use 
of location ratings collected in Experiment 3 to investigate the effect of spatial position 
on looking behaviour. 
 
3. How much information can be attached to one location? Experiment 1 and 2 
demonstrate that subsequent visual cues update spatial indices corresponding to words 
(see also Richardson & Kirkham, 2004). However, there is no direct evidence that more 
than one word can be registered to the same location. In such a case, do individuals 
look at the previous location equally often for each word; or does the frequency of looks 
change as a function of the encoding order? 
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4. Future studies should further clarify the functionality of eye movements in memory. 
The studies evidencing that looks to blank locations improve memory performance 
(Johansson & Johansson, 2014; Scholz et al., 2018, 2016) follow a similar 
methodology. It is critical to settle whether looks to blank locations benefit memory at 
all times; or whether specific conditions (e.g., memory load at a certain threshold, 
spatial distance between the visual cue at retrieval and the previous word location etc.) 
should be met. Also, new methodologies should be developed, in which participants 
are not forced to look at certain locations during retrieval, with the aim of gathering 
more reliable and ecologically valid data (see Wantz et al., 2016 as an example). 
 
5. What is the time course of looking at nothing? We observed that the majority of the 
participants looked at previous locations of the words at the very beginning and the 
very end of the retrieval phase. Are there such specific time windows within the 
retrieval phase during which looking at nothing increases and/or decreases? Are 
looking at nothing patterns within these time windows comparable to each other or do 
they have different characteristics (e.g., functional eye movements at early stages and 
confirmatory looks at later stages)? As an example, Martarelli, Mast and Hartmann 
(2017) performed a time-course analysis on the spontaneous eye movements during 
free recall and recognition of past and future items and showed that position changes 
(e.g., rightward looks for future items) took place within the first 50% of the recall and 
recognition duration. A similar analysis can be applied to our looking at nothing 
paradigm. 
 
6. How does the looking behaviour during encoding relate to the looking behaviour during 
retrieval? Grounded-embodied theories of memory emphasise the correspondence 
between encoding and retrieval (Kent & Lamberts, 2008). In this regard, for example, 
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are there similarities between the time course of eye movements at encoding and 
retrieval and does such a potential overlap predict the functionality of eye movements 
(Laeng & Teodorescu, 2002; Noton & Stark, 1971)? There is evidence that eye 
movements at retrieval are not exact reinstatements of the movements occurring at 
encoding for complex images (Johansson et al., 2012). However, there is no evidence 
if this is the case for visually presented single words. 
 
7. What is the neural basis of looking at nothing? We speculate that encoding words on a 
grid taps into the regions of brain that are specialised in processing spatial information. 
This hypothesis seems probable considering the relation between visuospatial memory 
and looking at nothing behaviour. However, we do not have direct evidence to support 
this hypothesis to our knowledge. Further, event-related brain potentials could provide 
a new perspective to the time course of looking behaviour during encoding and 
retrieval. Potentially different activations (e.g., N400) at consecutive time windows 
(e.g., early vs. late stages) within the retrieval phase might illuminate the characteristics 
of looking behaviour. 
 
8. Do looks to blank locations always occur without awareness? Future studies should be 
designed in a way to investigate whether looking at nothing is a completely unconscious 
behaviour, or whether we have some kind of control on our “decision” to offload 
memory work onto the world (Risko & Gilbert, 2016). Informal queries with the 
participants following Experiment 1 and 2 indicated that participants were unaware of 
the spatial arrangement and that they looked at blank locations without awareness. 
Future studies could make use of subjective or objective measures of consciousness 
based on behavioural and/or neural methods (Seth, Dienes, Cleeremans, Overgaard, & 
Pessoa, 2008). For example, participants can be formally asked to make metacognitive 
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judgements about their memory “strategies” during the task. If looking at nothing is an 
entirely unconscious behaviour, participants would not know when they rely on the 
environment and when they rely on internal sources. Pupillary responses can support 
the investigation of consciousness in looking at nothing because pupil diameters 
continuously change in response to task conditions without awareness (Laeng et al., 
2012). Event-related brain potentials and fMRI can be employed for the same aim as 
consciously perceived stimuli (simulation of previous word locations in our case) elicit 
widespread brain activation and trigger different ERP signals as compared to stimuli 
that do not reach consciousness (Baars, 2002; Seth et al., 2008). On the other hand, if 
looking at nothing is a partly conscious behaviour, it is important to identify which 
factors (e.g., metacognitive believes and confidence in internal sources) modulate 
decisions to rely on the environment. This question can be investigated in a study where 
looking at nothing is given as a deliberate memory strategy and participants are 
instructed in this way (Risko & Dunn, 2015). 
 
9. Following on from question 8 above: Can looking at nothing be taught and/or 
improved? If so, is it possible “motivate” individuals with better visuospatial memory 
and/or worse mental imagery ability to rely more on the environmental sources? Does 
such a memory training translate into a meaningful improvement in memory 
performance? 
 
10. Can spatial indexing be prevented or controlled to a certain degree? Our findings 
indicate that individuals index word locations automatically. However, an experimental 
paradigm manipulating the visual/contextual information on the screen with masking 
or filtering could identify the visual properties that enable or contribute to spatial 
indexing of words.  
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7.3.2 Language-based simulations of space 
 
1. We introduced a variable of spatial-simulation semantics that we call ‘spatiality’ in 
Experiment 3. Spatiality shows the distance from spatially neutral (i.e., located in the 
centre of the rating screen) for a given word. A similar variable, that is, spatial iconicity, 
refers to the strength of the mapping between the word and its location (e.g., Louwerse, 
2008). We predict that these two concepts refer to different aspects of language-space 
associations. That is, a word located in the centre of the rating screen (thus, spatially 
neutral) could have a high spatial iconicity (strongly associated with central location) 
such as the word “centre” and vice versa. Norming studies should test the correlation 
between spatiality and spatial iconicity to confirm this prediction. We speculate that 
words with higher spatial iconicity could lead to stronger simulations of space. 
 
2. Future studies could look at the relation between handedness and associations between 
words and spatial locations. There is evidence that individuals associate words with 
positive valence with the side of space that corresponds to their dominant hand and 
words with negative valence with the side of their nondominant hand (i.e., body-
specifity hypothesis) (Casasanto, 2009; de la Vega et al., 2012). It could be important 
to verify body-specificity hypothesis when participants are explicitly asked to rate word 
locations in a norming study (pure association) rather than attending a task with an 
implicit spatial component. Further, cross-linguistic norming studies are necessary to 
clarify whether languages differ in the mappings between words and spatial locations. 
 
3. Future studies with event-related brain potentials could provide valuable information 
on the effect of spatial incongruency between word location and location implied by 
word meaning. Particularly, we predict a potential modulation of the N400 component 
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during the encoding of spatially incongruent words. Because N400 is sensitive to 
perceptual modality switching (Hald et al., 2011) and semantic violations (e.g., 
implausible adjective-noun combinations) (Hagoort, 2003). Event-related potentials 
could also give invaluable information about the timing of events within the encoding 
stage as opposed to end-state variables of memory performance (hit rate and hit latency) 
(Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). 
 
4. How does conscious mental imagery ability map onto language-based spatial 
simulations? Experiment 2 results show that both word imageability and self-reports of 
visual imagery are correlated with the tendency to rely on the environment via spatial 
simulations. However, there is also evidence showing that there is no systematic 
relation between vividness of visual imagery (based on questionnaires) and the 
amplitude of modality-switching effect based on simulations (Pecher, van Dantzig, & 
Schifferstien, 2009). A more refined version of Experiment 4 with objective measures 
of mental imagery could examine whether participants with better imagery abilities are 
subject to greater mismatch advantage and interference effects due to language-based 
spatial simulations. 
 
5. Can language-induced simulations be prevented? Our findings indicate that simulations 
are automatic and cannot be controlled. If it is possible to stop the simulations activated 
by words, then their effects could be modulated. An experiment aiming at this could be 
informative in understanding the automaticity of simulations activated by language. 
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